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Summary
The scope of this thesis is the study of cognitive processes with, and within Virtual
Environments (VEs). Specifically, the presented work has two main objectives: (1)
to outline a framework for situating the applications of VEs to cognitive sciences,
especially those interfacing with the medical domain; and (2) to empirically illustrate
the potential of VEs for studying specific aspects of cognitive processes.
As for the first objective, the sought framework has been built by proposing clas-
sifications and discussing several examples of VEs used for assessing and treating
disorders of attention, memory, executive functions, visual-spatial skills, and lan-
guage. Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy was briefly discussed as well, and applica-
tions to autism spectrum disorders, schizophrenia, and pain control were touched on.
These applications in fact underscore prerogatives that may extend to non-medical
applications to cognitive sciences.
The second objective was sought by studying the time course of attention. Two
experiments were undertaken, both relying on dual-target paradigms that cause an
attentional blink (AB). The first experiment evaluated the effect of a 7-week Tibetan
Yoga training on the performance of habitual meditators in an AB paradigm using
letters as distractors, and single-digit numbers as targets. The results confirm the
evidence that meditation improves the allocation of attentional resources, and ex-
tend this conclusion to Yoga, which incorporates also physical exercise. The second
experiment compared the AB performance of adult participants using rapid serial
presentations of road signs — hence less abstract stimuli — under three display
conditions: as 2-D images on a computer screen, either with or without a concur-
rent auditory distraction, and appearing in a 3-D immersive virtual environment
depicting a motorway junction. The results found a generally weak AB magnitude,
which is maximal in the Virtual Environment, and minimal in the condition with
the concurrent auditory distraction. However, no lag-1 sparing effect was observed.
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Riassunto Analitico
La tesi attiene allo studio dei processi cognitivi in ambiente virtuale (AV). In par-
ticolare il lavoro presentato ha due obiettivi principali: (1) proporre un quadro di
riferimento per le applicazioni degli AV nelle scienze cognitive, specialmente quando
queste rientrano nel settore medico; e (2) illustrare empiricamente il potenziale degli
AV per lo studio di specifici aspetti cognitivi.
Il quadro di riferimento del primo obiettivo è stato costruito discutendo classi-
ficazioni ed esempi di AV usati per valutare e trattare disturbi dell’attenzione, della
memoria, esecutivi, delle abilità visuo-spaziali e del linguaggio. Sono stati breve-
mente discussi anche esempi di applicazioni di Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy, e
per i disturbi dello spettro autistico, la schizofrenia, e l’analgesia. Esse sono infatti
rappresentative delle prerogative degli AV trasferibili ad aspetti non medici delle
scienze cognitive.
Per il secondo obiettivo del lavoro si è studiata l’attenzione nel dominio temporale.
Sono stati realizzati due esperimenti, entrambi basati su un paradigma sperimentale
di doppio-compito tale da indurre il fenomeno dell’attentional blink (AB). Il primo
esperimento ha valutato l’effetto di 7 settimane di Yoga tibetano sull’AB di un
gruppo di meditatori. La presentazione visiva seriale rapida comprendeva lettere
come distrattori e numeri a una cifra come target. I risultati confermano che la
meditazione riduce l’AB, ed estendono questa conclusione allo Yoga, che include
anche l’esercizio fisico. Il secondo esperimento ha confrontato l’AB di un gruppo
di adulti utilizzando presentazioni visive seriali rapide di segnali stradali — dunque
stimoli meno astratti — in 3 condizioni: immagini 2-D sullo schermo di un computer,
essendo simultaneamente presente o assente una distrazione uditiva, e presentazione
3-D in un AV immersivo che simula un incrocio autostradale. I risultati rilevano un
AB lieve, che è massimo nell’AV, e minimo nella condizione 2-D con la distrazione
uditiva. L’effetto lag-1 sparing non è presente.
3
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Introduction
Virtual Environments are interactive, three-dimensional (3-D), computer-generated
environments which may simulate an existing physical reality, or provide an altern-
ative, completely new experience. What a participant experiences interacting with
a Virtual Environment (VE) is named Virtual Reality (VR), and its applications
span across many areas. Therefore, very often the design, development, and manip-
ulation of a VE during its operating cycle pose multidisciplinary issues that require
and bring together multidisciplinary teams. The nature of VR is twofold: that of an
advanced technological human-computer interface, and that of a special medium,
which should sustain an illusion of non-mediation in an individual who interacts
with a multisensory substitute of physical reality. The possibilities originated from
the potential of generating a compelling surrogate of physical reality are diverse,
and an ever increasing number of them is turning actual. This is made possible
by many concurring factors, the major being the advances in miniaturisation of the
devices composing a VR system, their augmented computing power, the reduction
in costs of those devices, and, importantly, the spreading of VR-related technologies
in the society, mainly for entertainment purposes (e.g., 3-D cinema, and video-game
consoles). Clearly, the first beneficiaries of the possibilities offered by advancements
in VR technologies have been basic and applied researchers, who have been devising
several ways of capitalising on VR. In this line VEs have been studied and tested for
being used in medicine, as a pedagogical tool, but also as an aid for diagnostic and
therapeutic aims. Thence, VEs were introduced also as sophisticated stimulation
paradigms to study human performance, and human cognitive mechanisms, such as
spatial cognition. The present dissertation stems from a research work aimed at
investigating the use of virtual environments in cognitive sciences, but at the inter-
face with medical conditions affecting the cognitive, and more generally, the mental
domain.
Admittedly, the context of cognitive sciences is very broad, encompassing philo-
sophy, psychology, neuroscience, language, and sprouting interdisciplinary connec-
tions with many diverse disciplines and application fields. The subset on which this
dissertation focalises is the study of cognitive processes, and, more broadly, mental
processes, in their relations with VEs. However, also the relations between VEs and
cognitive sciences may be considered in several ways, and at different levels. In-
deed, VEs involve technologies, thus one way of approaching the relations between
cognitive sciences and VEs would have been to investigate how the technological
factors and specifications of a VE impact on certain aspects of human cognition.
Another level, different from the technological aspects, is the virtual experience en-
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acted in a VE. At this level, one topic to study and measure would have been the
psychological correlates of that experience, typically through studies of the sense of
presence, and of how personality traits affect the experience in the VE as a function
of different technologies. The choice of this research work is different, namely it is
to start from a more applicative linkage between VEs and mental processes: the
applications of VEs to medicine for neuropsychological assessment, cognitive rehab-
ilitation, psychotherapy, and psychiatry. Two reasons determined this choice: first,
the search of a framework into which VEs applications to cognitive sciences may be
situated; second, the goal to produce an instantiation of this framework that demon-
strates the potential of VEs for relevant medical applications. The proposition of
this framework, instantiated for the applications to neuropsychological assessment,
rehabilitation, and mental health is complemented by empirical case studies, which
centre on the exploration of human attention with VEs, but not in explicit relation
to medical conditions.
The cognitive process taken as the target of the empirical case studies is attention —
albeit attention is not a unitary process —, specifically the study of the time course
of attention with experiments based on the attentional blink (AB) paradigm. There
are a number of reasons for this choice. The foremost reasons are the centrality
of attention to control human information processing, and the fact that attention
interacts with multiple perceptual and cognitive operations. This makes attention
essential in human performance, because it controls the information flow so that
perceptions and actions of an individual are kept coherent to one another, and in
view of the individual’s intentions and goals. Another relevant reason for empirically
studying attention in VEs turns out from the review of VEs applications to cognitive
assessment and rehabilitation, and to basic neuroscience in general. In fact, not
many applications of VEs targeted attention, and none of them considered the time
course of selective attention in the information processing flow, as indexed by the
AB. The AB is an attentional deficit arising when two targets, T1 and T2, appear
in a rapid stream of distractors, and the stimulus onset asynchrony between the two
targets is between 100ms and 400ms.
As a result, this dissertation explores cognitive processes in VEs, as stated in its
title, pursuing two series of research questions. Firstly, how VEs are applied for
the assessment and therapy of mental disorders following neurological damage and
psychological conditions, what are the grounds for this kind of applications, and if
a framework built for categorising those applications is suitable to cover the wider
range of VEs applications to cognitive sciences. Secondly, the research questions
taken on about attention are split in two experimental studies. The first, Study 1,
does not involve VEs, and investigates whether the the distribution of attentional
resources as indexed by the AB performance can be changed following a 7-week
Tibetan Yoga training undertook by habitual meditators. This kind of training
combines a mild physical exercise associated with visual imagery, and a mindfulness-
like meditation practice. The rationale for formulating this research question is
supported by several findings. Large individual differences have been found in the
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general population in terms of shown AB magnitude (Martens et al., 2006), and
the same magnitude has been alleviated by adding task-irrelevant distraction to the
AB task (Arend et al., 2006; Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005; Taatgen et al., 2009;
Lapointe-Goupil et al., 2011), and following a training in action video games (Green
et al., 2003). Furthermore, meditation as a pure mental training has been shown
to produce a change in the distribution of limited brain resources as pointed by the
AB performance (Slagter et al., 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2009). Study 2 on its side,
introduces a VE in the experiment, and attempts to answer two questions: whether
rapid visual stimuli which are not as simple as letters or numbers, and which may be
meaningfully contextualised in a VE, elicit an AB with similar characteristics as that
arisen with abstract and simple visual stimuli; and whether there is an effect of the
VE on the AB magnitude, similar to that of an auditory distraction. Road signs are
used as visual stimuli for assessing the AB magnitude, and they have been presented
on a 3-D virtual motorway junction to have them in a meaningful context. The
rationale for this second experiment is partially in common with the first study, also
following the observation that the kind of attention quality involved in mindfulness
meditation implies a diffuse state of attention, with a less narrow attentional focus
on the task at hand (Bishop et al., 2004), which is similar to the attentional state
referred to for the explanation of the effect of a concurrent distraction alleviating
the AB magnitude according to Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2006). Concerning the
background findings about AB evaluated with less abstract symbols as stimuli, words
and natural pictures have been used in the past, including faces. Opposite effects
of target categories, whether the same or different in a single rapid serial visual
presentation, on the AB performance, have been found by Evans and Treisman
(2005) and Einhäuser et al. (2007). Effects of emotional processing through the use
of faces have been found as well on the AB by Stein et al. (2010), who demonstrated
a trade off between perceptual load of T1 and fearfulness of T2 in determining
the AB magnitude, and by de Jong et al. (2010), who noticed how an angry face
used as T1 hampers the processing of a letter stimulus used as T2. This is to say
that, although a robust phenomenon, the AB magnitude and duration may change
depending on both individual differences, and featural or semantic characteristics of
the stimuli used to assay it.
In view of the objectives and background laid out, the present dissertation is or-
ganised in 6 chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the conceptual and technological funda-
mentals of VR in order to provide the basic background information underpinning
VEs construction and characteristics, and motivating their applications. Some il-
lustrative definitions of VR and VEs are considered to understand the technological
components that create VEs, and allow to deliver them for engendering a compel-
ling virtual experience. The functional components of a VR system are concisely
described too, and connected to the important properties of level of immersion and
interactive capabilities characterising VEs. The chapter terminates with a section
introducing virtual presence as a major indicator of the human response to a VE.
Its determinants, a framework to relate it to immersion and interaction of the VE
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(Slater, 2009), and possible general methods to measure it are discussed in the end.
This arrangement of Chapter 1 is intended to provide an overview of all the key ele-
ments playing a role in the human experience of a VE. This overview encompasses
both the technology-oriented, and the experience-oriented approaches to VEs, as
they are complementary for the applications of VR. Chapter 2 tackles the series
of research questions formulated for defining a framework to situate applications of
VEs to neuropsychological assessment, cognitive rehabilitation, psychotherapy, and
psychiatry. Such questions are answered by discussing different criteria adopted to
categorise applications of VEs to medicine, and in diverse fields. Consequent categor-
isations are separately proposed for applications to neuropsychological assessment
and cognitive rehabilitation on one side, and to psychotherapy and psychiatry on
the other. Prominent examples of VEs applications found from a scientific literature
search are described to instance the proposed categorisations branches. In a unifying
attempt, a framework for all the VEs applications to cognitive sciences is proposed
and discussed by combining the two separate categorisations, and drawing on other
non-medical applications of VEs. Chapter 2 terminates with the motivation for the
choice of attention, and specifically of its temporal aspects, as the target of the
empirical studies undertaken, and illustrated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Thereby,
Chapter 3 introduces the fundamental concepts about attention, its role in the hu-
man information processing, and taxonomies of attention mainly drawing on that
proposed by Chun et al. (2010). Then, Chapter 3 concentrates on temporal atten-
tion, the attentional blink phenomenon, and the empirical evidence cumulated in
the last two decades about it. Chapter 4 is devoted to the empirical Study 1. It
illustrates in detail the rationale for investigating the effect on the AB of a training
based on Tibetan Yoga. This illustration is based on a review of studies demonstrat-
ing training-related alterations of the AB in video game players, and in meditators.
The remainder of Chapter 4 presents the experiment undertaken in terms of ma-
terial and method, results, and conclusive discussion. Chapter 5 has a parallel
structure for empirical Study 2. Thus, it discusses in detail its rationale, mainly by
reviewing existing evidence about AB with natural pictures, faces, and words, and
about concurrency benefits in AB performance generated by task-irrelevant distrac-
tions. Subsequently, material and method, results, and discussion for Study 2 are
presented. Chapter 6 is for the dissertation conclusions. Here the conclusions are
summarised and restated based on the previous chapters, and insights for future
work on the lines considered in the present dissertation are suggested. There is also
a section for Appendixes, which contain background material used for the experi-
ments, such as a description of the Tibetan Yoga exercises used for the training in
Study 1, and the questionnaire and experiment instructions employed in Study 2.
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1. Virtual Environments
Fundamentals
In this chapter the conceptual and technological fundamentals of Virtual Reality
are illustrated in order to provide the basic background information underpinning
Virtual Environments construction and characteristics, and motivating their applic-
ations.
Some illustrative definitions and the key aspects of Virtual Reality and Virtual En-
vironments are considered to understand the technological components that create
Virtual Environments, and allow to deliver them for engendering a compelling virtual
experience. Then, the concept of immersive Virtual Environments is introduced, un-
derscoring the important role of interactive capabilities. Finally, conceptualisations
of the sense of presence, and its role in Virtual Environments are presented in order
to complete the account about the virtual experience arising from the participation
of an individual in a Virtual Environment.
1.1. Virtual Reality Definitions
A comprehensive definition of Virtual Reality (VR) is very difficult, and risks to offer
too a simplistic view of the topic. Indeed, although some ideas and rudimentary
components underpinning VR had been introduced since the late 1950s (see Alonso
et al., 2008 for a brief review), the term VR is quite recent (Kelly et al., 1989) and
several definitions have been proposed and discussed, especially in the 1990s, at the
beginning of VR history as we conceive it nowadays.
Generally speaking, VR deals with building an interactive three-dimensional (3-D)
computer-generated environment — the Virtual Environment (VE) — that might
either simulate an existing physical reality, or provide an alternative, completely
new experience. The experience of this VR is enacted by a human participant
through a set of display and interface devices (Pan et al., 2006), that enable the
participant to feel the VE and actively interact with and move within it. Thus, VR
has two inherent natures: that of a collection of technologies enabling an advanced
human-machine interaction; and that of a medium able to provide a novel kind
of experience to the human body and mind. The conception of VR as a medium
capable to immerse the human user in a VE, and engender a virtual experience of it
as if real, is the fundamental idea guiding VR research and applications in relation
9
Chapter 1 Virtual Environments Fundamentals
to cognitive science. However, in order to get a complete understanding of VR and
its applications, it is advantageous, and necessary to explore to some extent both
the technological and the experiential nature of VR.
The term Virtual Reality was first coined by Jaron Lanier, the computer scientist
and inventor CEO of VPL Research Inc., in the second half of the 1980s (Kelly
et al., 1989). VPL Research was a company settled in California, and one of the
first developer and marketer of VR technologies. It had several projects that used
computer graphics, goggles for 3-D viewing of digital spaces and datagloves to in-
teract with digital objects (see for instance Zimmerman et al., 1987; Stone, 1992):
Virtual Reality was just the term chosen by Jaron Lanier as a common heading for
such projects.
Then, the debate started about defining VR, and various definitions were proposed.
The definitions essentially differ in the degree to which they emphasise either the
technology or the human experience inherent in VR (Steuer et al., 1995), and the fo-
cus depends on the context where they are built, whether of engineering, psychology
or communication science.
Some emblematic definitions that seem to clearly outline these two different dimen-
sions of VR are the following:
D1. “Virtual reality (VR) is the use of computer graphics systems in combin-
ation with various display and interface devices to provide the effect of
immersion in the interactive 3-D computer-generated environment. We
call such an environment a virtual environment (VE).” (Pan et al., 2006)
D2. “[Virtual reality] is a technology that uses computerized clothing to syn-
thesize reality.” (Franchi, 1994)
D3. “Virtual Reality is electronic simulations of environments experienced
via head mounted eye goggles and wired clothing enabling the end user
to interact in realistic three-dimensional situations.” (Coates, 1992)
D4. “[Virtual reality can be defined as] a class of computer-controlled multi-
sensory communication technologies.” (Biocca, 1992)
D5. “Virtual Reality uses computers to create 3D environments in which one
can navigate and interact. [...] The main goal of VR is to create in the
user the illusion of being in an environment that can be perceived as a
believable place with enough interactivity to perform specific tasks in an
efficient and comfortable way.” (Alonso et al., 2008)
D6. “Virtual Reality is an alternate world filled with computer-generated im-
ages that respond to human movements. These simulated environments
are usually visited with the aid of an expensive data suit which features
stereophonic video goggles and fiber-optic gloves.” (Greenbaum, 1992)
D7. “VR is a medium for the extension of body and mind.” (Biocca and
Delaney, 1995)
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1.2 Virtual Reality Components
D8. “A virtual reality is defined as a real or simulated environment in which
a perceiver experiences telepresence.” (Steuer et al., 1995)
Several basic aspects of VR and VEs emerge from these definitions:
1. VR and VEs represent a synthetic digital environment generated and con-
trolled by a computer or a network of computers.
2. The environment is intended to be experienced by a user through special
devices that serve to display and interact with the VE. These devices are
often in physical contact with the user, who wears them.
3. The interaction with the environment may be immersive for the user, who
should perceive the VE as believable, experiencing the sense of presence in it.
4. The VE is a 3-D space, perceived by the user as a believable place.
5. The interaction with the VE may be a multisensory communication.
6. The VE may either simulate an existing reality or provide the believable illu-
sion of an alternate world.
7. The experience in the VE should allow the user to perform tasks, and the VE
should respond to the user’s actions.
8. VR is a medium that affects body and mind.
Starting from these items, and looking at the comparatively short history of VR, it is
clear that VEs lie between two poles: one is the core of the view of VR as a machine,
i.e., a technology based on a collection of hardware and software components; and the
other pole is the nucleus of the view of VR as a medium, capable of engendering in its
users (multi-)sensory experiences of a substitute of the physical environment. These
two poles, which form a technology-oriented view, and an experience-oriented view
of VR, are not incompatible; rather, they represent two complementary constituents
of VR, as elementarily the virtual experience is made possible by the machine. In
contrast, the choice of one of the views against the other would expose to the risk
of missing the factors related to the other view, which are instead important to
understand and scientifically measure VR.
For this reason, in the following we will take both the experience-oriented and
technology-oriented points of view not as one opposed to the other, but as com-
plementary, in order to catch all the factors and dimensions useful to understand
and scientifically approach VR. This is the approach we claim adequate for get-
ting a single overall picture of VR, into which it is possible to situate also Virtual
Environments applications to cognitive sciences.
1.2. Virtual Reality Components
Though taking into account its intrinsic multidimensional quality, in order to get a
single view of VR and VEs a first step is to define what a VR system consists of.
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The VR system represents in fact the technological essence of VR. It includes hard-
ware and software components, and its goals are to generate the VE, to deliver it
to the user, and to manage and maintain it according to the interactions occurring
between the user and the VE. A schematic general view of the components of a VR
system is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1.: Technology-oriented schematic representation of the components of a VR system: a
software application manages a collection of input and output hardware devices which render
the VE to the user, and enable her/his interaction with the VE. The management includes the
continuous update of the VE properties and behaviours according to either the user’s actions
or a pre-programmed sequence.
1.2.1. Output and Input Devices
As referred to in definitions D5 and D8, the VE is perceived by the user: specifically,
the simulated environment is experienced through the senses of the user, which
thus require a stimulation from the VR system. Such a stimulation is provided by
output devices that convey synthetic sensory data to the user’s sensory systems. The
output devices may in principle stimulate any of the human senses, but the most
typically used are visual displays, aural displays, and, to a lesser but increasing
extent, haptic displays. When the VR system generates data streams for different
sensory modalities, e.g., a visual stream and a haptic stream, the VE is called
multimodal, and the multisensory characteristic of VR technology is exploited as
indicated for example in definition D4. The output devices bring to the user the
afferent information coming from the VE. The most typical output devices are those
for vision. As repeatedly mentioned in the listed definitions of VR, the VE is three-
dimensional, so it often requires a stereoscopic display of the virtual scene. This is
accomplished by delivering to the left and right eye of the participant a different view
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of the same scene, quickly refreshed by the computer according to the participant’s
head motion to simulate binocular disparity, and obtain depth perception. This may
be achieved in several ways. One way is to display on special rear-projected screens
two different views of the same scene, resembling the difference in perspective arising
from the two eyes, and using special goggles that shut out the left and right lens
in synchrony with the projection of the right and left views respectively. Another
method is to provide the participant with an helmet (head-mounted display, HMD)
with two built-in monitors, one in front of each eye, thus conveying the proper view
to the corresponding eye. The first method is typical of CAVE-like systems. CAVE is
an acronym standing for CAVE Automatic Virtual Environment (Cruz-Neira et al.,
1993), which designates a room whose walls, and possibly the floor too, are rear-
projected screens. Thus, in a CAVE, the participant in the virtual experience moves
inside this room, and is surrounded by the stereoscopic graphic display of the VE
projected onto the walls. The participant wears special eye-goggles, and her/his
head motion is tracked. Other body parts may be tracked as well depending on the
interaction expected with the VE.
There are also other means to achieve a 3-D visual display, but those just mentioned
are particularly relevant for the work presented in this dissertation. Indeed, the
“mini-CAVE” used for visual display in the empirical study presented in chapter 5
is a CAVE-like system. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it covers part of the
peri-personal space of the participant, but not the whole space around her/him (see
chapter 5). On the other hand, the HMD importance is due to the wide use of
this means to display VEs in most of the applications for cognitive sciences, and for
mental health in general. As for the haptic display, devices acting as both sensors
and actuators are used (Riva, 2006): the haptic feedback may be confined in the
end-effector of an instrument handled by the user, or can use an exoskeleton frame
to impart forces on the user according to the interaction with the VE (Bergamasco
et al., 2007).
A further important characteristic of VEs is the possibility for the user to interact
with the VE, which appropriately responds to the user’s action (see definitions D3,
D5, and D6). For this purpose additional interface devices are necessary, the input
devices. Such devices have two main functions: first, they allow the user to effect
changes in the VE; second, they track the position and orientation of the user’s head,
and other body parts if relevant, to update in real-time the displays of the VE, so
as to avoid discrepancies in the sensorimotor loop of the user (Slater et al., 2009).
Therefore, typical input devices are position trackers. Trackers include sensors and
processing units, and are intended to track in real-time the spatial position and
orientation of a body part to allow for an effective interaction with the VE and its
objects. Thus, head is tracked for visual displays, the hand and arm are tracked
for haptic interaction, and the whole body may be tracked for simulations involving
locomotion. Motion capture, i.e., the real-time capture of positions and angles at
body joints, may be used along with tracking devices, for example for animating
a virtual character in the VE according to the user’s actions. Various technologies
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exist for implementing tracking devices, and devices for motion capture, but their
description is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Displays and tracking devices are often attached to, or worn by the user (e.g.,
eyegoggles for stereoscopic viewing or HMD, dataglove for tracking fingers flexion,
tracking sensors fixed to the user’s head, force-feedback exoskeletons for haptic inter-
action) as reported in definitions D2, D3, and D6. These “computerized clothing”,
“wired clothing” and “data suit” have been the stereotypical representation of VR
for long in the first decade of its development. The equipment for an immersive VR
experience was indeed bulky and expensive, and seemed to be designated to remain
a niche application, confined in research laboratories. This situation substantially
changed in the last decade, thanks to the tremendous progress in electronics in terms
of miniaturization and availability of augmented computational power at low cost.
The result has been to open up new ways for VEs applications spanning from enter-
tainment to industry and healthcare, enabling as well the applications to cognitive
sciences that will be discussed in chapter 2.
1.2.2. Software Components
Output and input devices allow the user to perceive the VE as they support the
exchange of data streams between the VE and the user. But what about such data?
And what about the very VE? The two questions are indeed the same. As a matter
of fact, the VE does not physically exists, it is a digital environment, and as such
it consists of digital data that represent models of what is intended to be delivered
to the user, carrying specific properties and behaviours. A clear explanation of this
aspect is provided by Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005): the virtual scene the user
should perceive is described in a computer database, that includes all its properties
and behaviours (i.e., the model). Geometric, acoustic, radiant and physical charac-
teristics of the scene are stored in the database, including the virtual objects present
in the scene. As mentioned in almost all the VR definitions we listed, a computer
generates and controls the VE. Particularly, the computer constructs and controls
this database, and the output and input devices. The tracking devices send inform-
ation in real-time to the computer, that based on such information renders the VE
through the display devices, by using appropriate information in the database. In
this way at any moment in time the display of the VE matches the user’s position,
orientation and action. For example, if the user turns the head, the head tracking
device sends the new orientation to the computer, and this uses the information in
the database to update, according to the new viewpoints, the scene images that are
administered to the left and right eye of the user by a stereoscopic visual display.
Also, if the user’s body is represented in the VE, and the user’s arm is tracked,
when the user moves the tracked limb its virtual counterpart needs move accord-
ingly, and this is enabled by the software running in the computer that renders the
database based on the user’s efferent information coming from the tracking devices
in real time. Input and output devices and the whole VE rendering algorithms,
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as well as those governing the interaction with the user are controlled by modular
computer programming scripts that compose the VR software components indicated
in Figure 1.1. There are pieces of software for managing input and output devices,
and there is the very VR (software) application that generates and sustains the VE.
1.3. Immersion and Interaction in Virtual
Environments
In short, the VR system integrates the technological components of a VE: indeed,
it includes a computer that stores the model of the VE, and controls interface and
display devices to render it and allow the interaction with the user. Clearly, the user
introduces a subjective component in the loop, as the response she/he provides in
the interaction with the VE and to the stimulation of the VR system depends on
subjective factors of the user. Here, we temporarily put them aside, and we consider
instead the physical properties of the VR system. Such properties are objective in
the sense that they can be objectively measured as they are a direct consequence of
the characteristics of the adopted technologies. They play an important role because
they determine the level of immersion of the VE, that is one of the main criteria to
classify VEs.
Generally, an immersive VE is “one in which the user is perceptually surrounded
by the VE” (Loomis et al., 1999), that is a system which stimulates multiple senses
of the user in order to convince her/him of the simulated environment.
If we come to more operational terms, there are two ways to consider the level of
immersion associated to a VE, and both are determined by the physics of the system,
i.e., depend on its objective properties (Slater, 2009). The first approach defines the
level of immersion in terms of displays and tracking information available (Slater
and Wilbur, 1997): the more sensory modalities are supplied by the VE displays and
the more the tracking enables a consistent rendering compared to the real world, the
more the delivered VE is immersive. The alternative approach is to shift the focus
on the interaction of the user with the VE. In this respect, Slater (2009) refers to the
concept of sensorimotor contingency (SC) supported by an immersive VR system.
SCs are part of a sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience that is posited in
terms of ways of exploring the environment (O’Regan and Noë, 2001). In this
framework, to become aware of an object, e.g. with vision, an active exploration
of it is necessary (Maye and Engel, 2011). The object characterization is indeed
based on the relationships between the actions of the perceiver and the resulting
sensory stimulation. The sensorimotor contingencies are the structure of the rules
that govern the sensory changes effected by different motor actions (O’Regan et al.,
2001). For example, shifting the gaze and moving the head to see underneath
something, or rotating the head to better hear a sound are actions associated to
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visual and auditory SCs respectively. Consequently, different SCs are associated to
specific actions and to specific sensory modalities.
In the context of immersive VEs, depending on the VR system properties, there will
be specific SCs supported by the system, and in turn these SCs will define a set of
valid actions that a user can carry out in the VE to get a meaningful perception
and interaction. Such valid actions might be categorised as sensorimotor actions
when they are actions that the user can perform in the VE to meaningfully change
perception, and as effectual actions when they refer to user’s actions that change
the VE (Slater, 2009).
In view of this theory, it is possible to characterise the level of immersion of a VE
by means of the valid actions that are possible within that VE and to compare
the “immersiveness” of two VR systems in terms of the set of valid actions they
support. A system supporting only a subset of valid actions with respect to another
is less immersive than the latter. Clearly, this approach does not change the fact that
immersion depends on the physical, objective properties of the VR system generating
the VE. The difference with respect to the first approach, which in practice is based
on the number of sensory channels created and on the values of technical parameters
measuring the fidelity of tracking and display devices, lies in the integration of the
system interactive capabilities as determinants of immersion, in terms of the valid
actions the user may take in the VR system to meaningfully perceive or effect changes
in the VE. This establishes a link between the physical properties of the VR system,
which determine the set of valid actions a user may take in a VE, and the plausibility
of those actions, and of the system responses too. This plausibility may be affected
by the subjectivity of the user.
Recapitulating, two key factors affecting the experience of the user in a VE are
the levels of immersion and interaction that the VE affords. Nonetheless, these
two factors do not depend on the user. Rather, they are the result of the physical
properties of the VR system, and can be associated to a set of valid sensorimotor
and effectual actions that can be taken in the VE. The response of the user to the
VE is partly a consequence of these properties, but for the remaining part depends
on subjective factors.
In the next section we examine a question that is a core in the experiential view of
VR: the consequences on the user of immersion in and interaction with the VE or,
differently posited, the contribute of the user’s response, that is subjective, to the
VE characterization.
1.4. Presence in Virtual Environments
Steuer defines VR as an environment where the perceiver experiences telepresence
(Steuer et al., 1995, definition D8 in section 1.1). Telepresence (Minsky, 1980) refers
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to the sense a human operator feels of being present in a remote physical environ-
ment. Originally this definition had been coined for teleoperators: a teleoperator is
a machine that allows a human operator to “move about, sense and mechanically
manipulate objects at a distance” (Sheridan, 1995). A robotic system can be teleop-
erated by a human operator. The robot is located in a remote physical environment,
and the operator, by distally manipulating the robot, might develop a sense of being
in the remote environment where her/his actions effect changes through the robot,
although s-/he is not physically there. This concept has been later extended to
virtual environments, initially by designating it as virtual presence (Sheridan, 1992;
Slater and Steed, 2000; IJsselsteijn and Reiner, 2004), and later simply as presence
(Slater et al., 1994; Loomis, 1992).
The general idea underpinning presence in VEs is that the user feels to exist in the
computer-generated environment rather than in the physical place where she/he is
physically situated (Witmer and Singer, 1998). The issues of debate are about a
more precise definition of presence, also outside VEs, about which are its determ-
inants, and which is its place in the frameworks of psychology and neuroscience.
Reviewing these arguments in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, so in the
following only some aspects of presence will be described, since presence is the main
component of human response to the virtual experience.
As mentioned in some of the definitions of VR we reported previously in section 1.1,
the virtual experience provides an illusion, that should result in a convincing substi-
tute of physical reality. The sense of presence experienced in the VE is an indicator
that such an illusion succeeded, and thereby the target for VR applications to be
effective. The advantage of using presence for measuring whether a VE is functional
is that it is not application-specific, rather it is a general concept that can arise in a
human individual when participating in an experience. The critical point is how to
precisely define presence, and consequently find objective and reliable measurements
of it.
1.4.1. Presence Conceptualisations
There are two main research approaches to presence in general terms (Riva et al.,
2011): presence as a function of the experience of a specific medium; and presence as
a psychological phenomenon that is independent of the medium and acts to control
the activity of the person in the environment.
The former approach is more related to the technological aspects of VR as a me-
dium, and presence is often defined as the “perceptual illusion of non-mediation”
(Lombard and Ditton, 1997). This definition of presence actually applies also to non-
technological media like books or movies. In this context, presence is an all-or-none
phenomenon occurring when the medium disappears from the conscious attention
of its user (Coelho et al., 2006); and the perceived level of presence depends on how
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many instants over time have seen the occurrence of the illusion of non-mediation
(Lombard and Ditton, 1997).
In this view presence in VEs is achieved when the technology components of the
VR system are transparent to the user, and the sense of presence is the result of
immersion and interaction levels offered by the VR system. Therefore presence is
a subjective experience, resulting from the human response to VE, but it depends
also on the medium characteristics.
On the other hand, the second approach takes presence as a psychological process
that does not require a medium to occur: presence locates the self in an external
space (either physical or cultural), and then serves as a feedback for the perceiver to
tune her/his agency and control based on her/his intentions (Riva et al., 2011). This
conception of presence is related to an ecological perspective of perception and action
(Gibson, 1986). Indeed, the above definition of presence links perceiver’s intentions
and actions in the environment, with no need for a medium. Another definition of
presence that draws on the ecological perspective, and specifically on the concept of
affordances is that by Zahorik and Jenison (1998) who state that actions afforded
by the environments lead the user to feel present in it. This reference to actions
afforded by the environment in the general definition of presence, reminds us of the
concept of “valid actions” supported by a VR system introduced by Slater (2009)
for defining immersion in VEs. Nevertheless, the two situations are different in
their starting point because Slater’s position does not directly refers to presence,
yet to the fact that sensorimotor and effectual actions supported by the VR system
determine the level of immersion of the generated VE. In Slater’s view, presence in
the VE intended as the “sense of being there” (Heeter, 1992) (i.e., located inside
the VE, despite the knowledge of actually being in the physical space) derives from
an immersive system that supports valid actions similar to those found in physical
reality. The more the approximation of the VR system to physical reality in terms of
valid actions is rough, the more an additional creative mental processing is required
to the user for achieving the illusion of being in the virtual place (Slater, 2009).
1.4.2. Presence Determinants in Virtual Environments
So far we have presented general approaches to presence, rather than operational
characterizations that instantiate presence in VEs. Actually, the two approaches
tend to converge when coming to what factors affect presence in VEs, and both
consider presence as a subjective experience that represent the human user’s response
to the VE. The difference lies in how presence is determined: the media approach
sees presence as the result of immersion in a technological medium, and the level
of immersion depends on the technological properties of the VR system; in contrast
for the ecological approach presence is still determined by immersion, but the latter
is the result of the interaction between the user and the environment.
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Anyway, the two approaches are to the opposite extremes of a line that includes
other intermediate stances, which aim at standing more operational and specifically
linked to VEs.
In particular, as noted by IJsselsteijn and Riva (2003), presence is a multidimen-
sional perception, and it is determined by media characteristics and user’s charac-
teristics. Media characteristics comprise form factors and content factors, while user
characteristics consist of psychological variables about the user.
Typical form factors affecting presence in VEs are the number of sensory channels
generated by the VR system to stimulate user’s senses; the extent of the field of
view; the visual depth cues that impart pictorial realism in the VE; and the extent
to which the user can exert control over the VE. Content factors instead refer to the
content experienced by the user during the participation in the VE. In this context
the virtual representation of the user’s body and the presence in the VE of virtual
characters seem to increase the sense of presence in the user. In particular, the
presence of others in the VE is connected with some special kind of presence, i.e.,
co-presence and social presence, that often overlap, and refer to the sense of being
in the VE with others (see Childs, 2010 for a review).
User’s characteristics relate to the concentration of the user, her/his proneness to be-
lieve in illusion, the prior experience with VEs, the susceptibility to motion sickness
(a side effect that can occur in a VE, but is far less frequent in current VR systems,
thanks to their enhanced technological capabilities) (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2000), the
value of the virtual experience to the user (Takatalo et al., 2008), and personality
variables like empathy and imagination (Wallach et al., 2010).
Similarly, the determinants of presence are also referred to as external factors and
internal factors (Slater et al., 1994). The former are those imparted by the VR
system, and largely agree with media factors, whereas internal factors deal with how
perceptions engendered by the VR system are mediated by mental models shaping
the user’s subjective experience.
In terms of presence multidimensional nature, in addition to co-presence and social
presence, differing because the first requires co-location, i.e., the VE user needs to
share the space with the other virtual characters (Zhao, 2003), other concepts as
physical presence, spatial presence and self presence may be found in the scientific
literature about virtual presence (see for instance Lee, 2004 for a review).
Physical presence and spatial presence point to the same dimension: that of feeling
physically located in the virtual space (Biocca, 1997). Self presence is a particularly
important component of presence when the user’s body is represented in the VE: it
is the effect of the VE on the mental models of the user, her/his identity and her/his
emotional and physiological states (Biocca, 1997).
A further distinction of presence components that is very useful in operational terms
is that by Slater (2009), which is based on the theory of sensorimotor contingen-
cies introduced in section 1.3. Actually, Slater proposes a framework to solve the
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ambiguity arising from the multiple significations assigned to “presence”. Such a
framework is based on two concepts: place illusion (PI) and plausibility illusion
(Psi), which are incorporated in an operational conception of presence as connected
to how much realistically the human user responds to the VE.
PI is the “feeling of being there”, i.e. the sense of being in the place created by
the VE. Psi is the illusion that what is happening in the VE is real. PI depends
on the physical characteristics of the VR system: if the level of immersion of the
system ideally supports the sensorimotor contingencies typical of an equivalent real
situation, then PI is a direct perceptual consequence of the physics of the VR system.
However, in common immersive systems, which do not support all the sensorimotor
contingencies of everyday reality, an additional role for PI to arise is played by the
personality characteristics of the participant in the VE. PI as an illusion may break,
thus quantitatively determining the level of presence in terms of “being there”.
Psi is an orthogonal component of presence, and it causes the user to consider
what is happening in the VR as really happening. Psi deals with the inference
from perceptions of the “reality” and “credibility” of a situation. In order to arise
and be maintained, Psi requires a correlation between actions and reactions in the
VE, and between events happening in the VE not controlled by the user and the
user sensations. It is just the correlational level rather than physical realism which
determines Psi. Also Psi may break, but it is more difficult to be recovered as it
deals with the credibility of the reality of the VE. This is also the reason why it is
less directly dependent on the objective properties of the VR system: it is affected
by plausibility of events and interactions occurring in the VE.
1.4.3. Presence Measurements
The successive step after defining presence in VEs is to cope with its measure-
ment. There are three approaches to measuring presence in VEs: questionnaire-
based methods, behavioural methods, and physiological response measurements.
Questionnaire-based methods are subjective, and they usually consist in asking the
user of the VE to answer questions related to presence components and provide a
rating for each component, following the performance of a task in the VE. Such
methods have been often criticized as they can be confounded by many factors
associated to the subjective interpretation of the questions, and the interest and
expectations of the user (Freeman et al., 1999).
Behavioural methods use features of the VE to induce bodily responses that are
measured and compared to responses expected in equivalent situations occurring
in physical environments. In practice presence is assessed in terms of behavioural
realism of the user during the virtual experience. For example, presence has been
measured as a function of postural response in a moving VE (Freeman et al., 2000),
and as the taking of typical behaviours exhibited around precipices when the user
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was immersed in a VE and had to walk on the edge of a precipice substituting a
large part of the room floor (Meehan et al., 2002).
Physiological methods are more objective, as they measure user’s physiological re-
sponses during the exposure to the VE, and use these measurements to assess pres-
ence. The most used physiological indicators are heart rate and electrodermal activ-
ity (Slater et al., 2009), respiration rates and skin temperature (Meehan et al., 2005),
although recently also the use of other parameters has been tested, such as auditory
event-related potentials (Kober and Neuper, 2012).
There are two directions for getting physiological measurements of presence. One
is to compare the physiological measurement with a baseline consisting in the same
physiological activity acquired when the user is in an equivalent situation in the
physical reality: if the two physiological responses are similar, than this is a sign
of presence. Alternatively, physiological responses may be used just as surrogates
of presence, especially in stressful VEs, such as those eliciting height-fear (Meehan
et al., 2005) or anxiety responses in phobics (Wiederhold et al., 2001).
A different approach to presence measurement is that related to the concept of
break in presence (Slater and Steed, 2000). The idea is of inducing breaks in pres-
ence through subtle or gross events in the VE that makes the user aware that the
VE is not “real”. This can be done in various ways, e.g., by lowering the visual
realism of virtual objects or by establishing contacts with the physical reality. The
resulting breaks in presence can be counted and a probabilistic model of “presence
in the VE” be constructed based on them (Slater and Steed, 2000), or physiological
responses correlated with breaks in presence can be measured and used as presence
surrogates (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
1.5. The Virtual Experience
A synthetic account of the experience in an immersive VE may be drawn from the
above sections. The VE consists in a digital environment rendered by a computer
that uses the information in a database collecting representations of the virtual scene,
its objects, and their physical properties and behaviours. The user experiences the
VE through a series of interface devices. These devices create multiple channels to
display the rendered VE to the sensory systems of the user, and to use information
coming from the user (essentially position and orientation of body parts) to allow
the interaction with the VE by taking actions, and effect changes on it.
The general goal of the VE is to provide an experience to which the user responds as
if real. The extent to which the user realistically responds to the virtual experience
mainly depends on the sense of presence elicited by the VE. Therefore the sense of
presence is a way of measuring the functionality of the VE. This is true also when
the VE does not simulate physical reality. Indeed, the illusion of being present in
the VE rather than in the physical reality is important to respond to the virtual
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experience as if the virtual experience were real. The determinants and dimensions
of presence are multiple, and somehow intertwined.
The physical properties of the VR system supporting the VE determine immersion
and interactive capabilities of the VE, which in turn define the sensorimotor contin-
gencies supported by the VE, and thereby a set of valid actions which are possible
in the VE as if real. The set of valid actions, and personality characteristics such
as the immersive tendency of the user determine the perceptual component of pres-
ence associated to the sense of being in the space created by the VE, despite the
firm knowledge of actually being in the physical space. The orthogonal compon-
ent of presence in the VE is that associated to plausibility illusion, which is more
cognitive, because it is linked to the correlation between events occurring in the
VE, and the sensations and expectations of the user. In this sense the user should
feel a plausible correlation between external events happening in the VE and own
sensations and expectations in order to feel present in the VE. A summary picture
illustrative of this account is presented in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2.: Factors affecting the virtual experience.
Also the two perspectives mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the technology-
oriented one, and the experience-oriented one for VEs may be conciliated by re-
marking how the response of a human participant in a VE is determined by both
objective, and subjective factors. The unitary element is provided by the experience
engendered by the VE, which is primarily qualified by the experienced sense of pres-
ence. The operational conceptualisation of presence by Slater (2009) accommodates
both objective and subjective properties, and thereby also technology-oriented, and
experience-oriented views. Indeed, place illusion is largely a direct perceptual con-
sequence of the physical properties of the VE, while plausibility illusion requires a
correlation between actions and reactions in the VE, and between events happening
in the VE not controlled by the user and the user sensations. So plausibility illusion
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relies less on the physical properties of the system, and more on the plausibility of
events and interactions in the VE, thus on a subjective judgement.
In the next chapter several virtual environments will be considered as examples of
applications to mental health. These VEs have different levels of immersion and
different interactive capabilities. However, given their purpose, the measurement of
presence is not frequent, and anyway not taken as the primary outcome to evalu-
ate their functionality. Rather, correlation with measures taken in equivalent real
settings, or behavioural and physiological patterns associated to different grades of
a medical condition, are measured in connection to the virtual experience. These
measures may be sometimes considered as a surrogate of presence, or even taken as a
measure of it, provided that appropriate reference measurements are taken. Finally,
it is not common in medical applications that the sense of presence is measured
comparing level of immersion and interactive capabilities of the VE, and personality
characteristics of the user.
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2. Applications of Virtual
Environments for Cognitive
Sciences
This chapter provides an overview of how Virtual Environments (VE) are being ap-
plied in several fields, and focuses on their applications in connection with cognitive
sciences.
In particular, the medical domain is taken as exemplary, because healthcare purposes
represent the major driving forces for this kind of developments and applications,
and because in that field the prerogatives of VEs are fully leveraged, at least at
a potential level. Thus, the medical arena may be a starting point for outlining
a framework to situate Virtual Environments applications in relation to cognitive
sciences. Because the ultimate goal of this chapter is to propose such a framework,
a criterion for classification of VEs applications is chosen from the applications to
the medical field, and the prerogatives of VEs applications to medicine, which are
generalisable, are discussed. The framework is gradually made up by considering
categories of applications to neuropsychological assessment, cognitive rehabilitation,
psychotherapy, and psychiatry. For each of these categories prominent examples are
provided, and finally, a complete framework is proposed. Starting from considera-
tions about the framework, and the examples discussed, the chapter ends by dis-
cussing the motivation for the study of temporal attention proposed in theoretical
and empirical terms in the next chapters.
2.1. Categorisations of Virtual Environments
Applications
VEs have been applied to numerous fields, covering very different areas. In the
industrial context VEs are used for diverse purposes. One of these is virtual pro-
totyping, a process that uses VR to build the virtual prototype of a product, and
assess its performance (Seth et al., 2011). Virtual prototyping is usually combined
with a computer-aided design (CAD) environment, and may include both the as-
sembly part of the prototype make-up, and the interaction with the user of the final
product. Virtual prototyping is used in diverse areas, such as automotive, material
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for biomedical applications and various manufacturing sectors. Other major indus-
trial applications of VEs are based on simulators. These were also the first kind
of applications devised and developed with VR technologies. Industrial simulators
are mainly used for training and ergonomics purposes. A typical use is for train-
ing the personnel to complex maintenance tasks, possibly at geographically remote
locations (Gutierrez et al., 2010; Tripicchio et al., 2010).
The potential of multimodal VEs for training applications has been studied in re-
cent years with a novel approach, different from the traditional mainstream based
on simulators. Such an approach relies on the setting up through VEs of training
scenarios that replicate specific perceptual conditions and provide ad hoc feedback
on performance in order to let the trainee completely understand the task to be
learned (Bergamasco, 2012). In this kind of training scenarios, the emphasis is on
the training of individual sensorimotor and cognitive skills necessary to achieve a
skilful performance of the task, and not on a full, exact replication of the environ-
ment as done in traditional simulators. Useful training applications with multimodal
VEs following this new approach involved, among the others, watercraft rowing in
the sport domain (Ruffaldi et al., 2011), balls juggling as an entertainment applica-
tion (Ruffaldi et al., 2011), and upper limb rehabilitation and maxillo-facial surgery
training for the medical field (Frisoli et al., 2009; Gosselin et al., 2010).
VEs are also applied in the cultural heritage arena (Carrozzino and Bergamasco,
2010), where they can be used both as a valorisation tool and as an advanced human-
computer interface for opening up new ways of interaction and fruition of the cultural
contents. A typical example in this area is the Museum of Pure Form (Bergamasco
et al., 2001), a virtual museum that allows the visitor to view in 3D and touch with
haptic interface in an immersive CAVE-like VR system digital statues modelled from
their physical counterparts preserved in museums spread worldwide.
Important and numerous applications of VEs refer to healthcare, but they will be
considered in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
In general, a categorisation of VEs applications may be formulated according to
at least two criteria. An intuitive one is to define the categories by application
domain; thus a possible, non exhaustive, categorisation includes industry, medicine,
training, entertainment. And each of these categories could be then broken down in
sub-groups such as automotive, surgery, education, gaming, cinema etc. However,
this sort of categorisation is quite arbitrary, because many different categories and,
especially, sub-groups can be defined; and often sub-groups are prone to overlap to
one another: e.g., there are industrial training, as well as game for training, and
in such cases it would be subjective the decision about whether to emphasise the
industrial, training or entertainment aspect of the applications.
The second method of classification is to give more relevance to how VEs are applied,
achieving in such a way categories that go across application domains, and emphasise
the VEs peculiarities beneficial for a whole class of application fields.
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Anyhow, it is hardly feasible and almost unfruitful to attempt a coverage of all VEs
application domains, whatever the chosen categorisation criterion. Here we adopt
the method based on how — and why — VEs technologies are applied, and we focus
on VEs applications directed to cognitive assessment and rehabilitation, including
psychotherapy and psychiatry. Indeed, albeit this thesis is not intended to validate
healthcare VEs, our idea is that those examples offer the right substrate onto which
an elaboration about more general applications of VEs to cognitive science may be
built.
2.2. Simulation-Centred vs Interaction-Centred
Applications in Medicine
As discussed in chapter 1, VEs are simulated environments that provide a powerful
means of human-computer interaction. Given appropriate technological properties
of the VR system hardware, with sufficiently elaborated models of the VE and its
objects, it is possible to have highly-interactive and physically-realistic simulations
of real situations, as well as very natural paradigms of interaction with such simu-
lated situations. Therefore, depending on whether the VE accent for an application
is on the simulation for or the interaction with the target users, two categories
are recognizable concerning how VEs are applied: that of simulation-centred VEs
applications, and that of interaction-centred VEs applications (Riva, 2006).
Simulation-centred VEs are those in which the primary goal is to have an accurate
simulation of real objects, their appearance, and their behaviour in terms of phys-
ical interactions. Interaction-centred applications are instead those where the VE
primary role is to open up enhanced ways of interaction for its user, in order to
achieve the goal of the application itself, sometimes even by deliberately forcing the
VE to respond unrealistically.
This categorisation, by distinguishing VEs as simulation tools from VEs as interac-
tion tools, proves to especially fit the medicine application domain. When dealing
with VEs applications in medicine, it is indeed possible to consider the following
different sub-domains (see Riva, 2003; Adamovich et al., 2009; Gregg and Tarrier,
2007; Rizzo et al., 2002 for a review):
• Surgical simulation and planning
• Telepresence surgery
• Virtual endoscopy
• Medical education
• Medical Rehabilitation
• Psychotherapy and Psychiatry
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Figure 2.1.: A categorisation of VEs applications in medicine. Application sub-domains dealing
with surgery, endoscopy and medical education chiefly rely on the potential of VEs as an accurate
simulation tool. Real objects and their behaviours are simulated accurately, e.g., for training
surgeons skills with real-like operative practice on virtual patients, or assessing non-invasively
the airways of a real patient through a virtual endoscopy. On the other hand, applications in
the field of medical rehabilitation and psychotherapy exploit the capabilities of VEs as natural
and enhanced interaction tools. For instance, in neuropsychological rehabilitation VEs can
selectively stimulate the neglected space and require response for it from a patient suffering
from unilateral spatial neglect, or other VEs can provide a “safe” social place for a social phobic
to meet virtual characters, and undergo an exposure therapy.
Whereas the first four sub-domains usually need applications that primarily exploit
the simulation capabilities of VEs, medical rehabilitation, and psychotherapy do
mainly rely on the interaction potential made available by VEs (Figure 2.1).
2.2.1. Simulation-Centred Applications in Medicine
Historically, the first applications of VEs to medicine were in surgery more than a
decade ago (Krummel, 1998). At present, such applications cover different tasks,
and partially overlap with medical education, specifically with training of surgical
skills. Actually, VEs are used for surgical training, for diagnosis and pre-operative
planning, and for intra-operative guidance and assistance (Pednekar and Kakadiaris,
2000).
The main reasons to use VEs for surgery are different according to the area of use. In
terms of surgical training, VEs are unique as to the possibilities they offer to entirely
simulate surgical procedures on different kinds of tissue, located in specific positions
and orientations, and to repeat the tasks several times, in safe conditions, with the
possibility to also play back what done. In addition, for training purposes it is im-
portant to replicate the multifarious and multimodal feedback potentially returned
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to the surgeon during the intervention, such as during drilling or while searching for
anatomical landmarks. These are especially important requirements, in particular
for the training of minimally invasive surgery (MIS, Gallagher et al., 2005), which
requires particular psycho-motor skills and per se offers an impoverished interface
and feedback for the surgeon (Tendick et al., 2000). Hence, simulators have been
chiefly developed for MIS, also due to the restricted information set to be modelled,
but they have anyway been developed to cover the training of numerous surgical
tasks, such as vitro-retinal surgery (Rossi et al., 2004), knee arthroscopy (Lu et al.,
2009), and other orthopaedics interventions (Mabrey et al., 2010). In addition, sim-
ulators for dental surgery (Thomas et al., 2001), and maxillo-facial simulators for
training of complex tasks as the Epker osteotomy (Mégard et al., 2009), neurosur-
gery (Kockro and Hwang, 2009), and gastrointestinal surgery (Lauscher et al., 2010)
have been set up too.
In short, VR surgical simulators are based on models of the human organ of interest,
including deformable models specifying how the related tissues react to surgical
operations, and on tracking and rendering algorithms to enable the presentation
to the surgeon of the multimodal information and interaction possibilities required
by the specific training scenario. In addition to visual feedback, tactile and force
feedback are crucial for surgical training, as well as appropriate auditory feedback
prompting the surgeon of the accuracy of a path-following or of a change in the
nature of the tissue encountered while the surgical action (Pednekar and Kakadiaris,
2000).
More recently, also Augmented Reality (AR), i.e., the combination of virtual inform-
ation with those coming from the physical world, has been used in surgical train-
ing (Botden and Jakimowicz, 2009). In this case virtual models of the organs to be
operated are presented to the trainee in a hybrid setting often including physical
instruments and a mannequin or a real video display used in laparoscopic interven-
tions. One of the main advantages of AR simulators is the real haptic feedback
they allow to experience, though in the most recent VR simulators haptic interfaces
are included (Konietschke et al., 2010; Gosselin et al., 2010), and represent a key
feature of these systems, as they also work in playback, that is they make possible
to repeatedly experience a procedure, including in haptic terms.
VEs for diagnosis, pre-operative planning, and intra-operative assistance and guid-
ance are patient-specific. This means that the model of the organs comes from
medical images acquired on the specific patient (Pednekar and Kakadiaris, 2000).
These images are typically Computed tomography (CT) scans, Magnetic Resonance
(MR) images, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans and Ultrasound images.
All these images need to be fused together for achieving a single model and providing
multimodal information of the patient, and need to be registered, i.e., a common
reference frame between the pre-operative model and the patient’s anatomy needs
to be established for subsequent congruent operations that are based on the model,
but operated on the patient. Clearly, the main benefit of surgical planning is the
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possibility to anticipate a simulation of the intervention and its outcome, to practice
it and rehearse in order to optimise surgery results.
Telepresence surgery (a.k.a. telesurgery) is a different surgical paradigm that uses
robotics and VR technologies to practice surgery with no physical contact between
the surgeon and the patient. The operations are physically executed on the patient
by a robot, which is endowed with surgical tools and is teleoperated by a surgeon,
who may be in a distance of a few meters from the patient or even very far (Mares-
caux et al., 2001).
The role of VR in telesurgery is essentially to immerse the surgeon in the operating
field despite its physical distance. This is achieved by providing a stereoscopic visual
display that offers a three-dimensional magnified view of the operating workspace,
a haptic feedback from the interaction of the robotic surgical tools with the tissues
of the patient, and the possibility to accurately scale the surgeon’s movements and
combine previously acquired medical information with those coming from the pa-
tient in real-time. A typical example of telesurgery platform is the DaVinci system
(Intuitive Surgical, Sunnyvale, California).
Virtual Endoscopy starts again from medical imaging sources, and specifically CT
and MR data, to construct three-dimensional models of a human organ. The en-
doscopy is then performed by flying through this virtual model, and is completely
non-invasive for the patient. The main goal of virtual endoscopy is to provide
information about the inner surface of anatomical structures in an interactive ex-
ploration (Vining, 1996). The use of virtual endoscopy is being evaluated for large
airways diseases (Thomas et al., 2009), for the ear (Karhuketo et al., 2002), for the
urinary and gastrointestinal tracts (Battista et al., 2009; Aschoff et al., 2008), and
for angioscopy (Louis et al., 2009).
As for medical education, besides the training tools mentioned in the surgical field,
and the possibility to use virtual endoscopy as a training aid, the contribution of
VEs is mainly for providing anatomical knowledge in three dimensions, with the
possibility to have photorealistic human atlases that can be navigated and touched
by trainers and trainees. An important database in this framework is that from
the Visible Human Project (Spitzer and Ackerman, 2008), which includes three-
dimensional anatomical representations of the normal human male and female bod-
ies, largely based on digital bioimages. Recently, also AR has been used to build
synthetic environments for teaching anatomy (Thomas et al., 2010).
2.2.2. Interaction-Centred Applications in Medicine
Biocca and Delaney (1995) defined Virtual reality as a medium able to extend body
and mind. A reason for this definition is that in the VE the user may be an active
participant, and her/his interaction, encompassing both perceptual and cognitive
levels, and covering multiple sensory systems, may go beyond the observation and,
even, the manipulation of virtual objects that accurately resemble their physical
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counterparts. Moreover, the extension enabled by the VE consists of actions and
behaviours that the user can take when participating in a virtual experience, actions
and behaviours being impossible in the physical reality, e.g., due to the health
condition of the same user.
The interaction paradigm that enables such a going beyond — that might be inter-
preted as the “extension of body and mind” referred to in the cited VR definition —
is the cardinal nucleus holding the applications of VEs to medical rehabilitation and
assessment, and to psychology. In addition, in the interaction with the VE this ex-
tension of body and mind can be controlled, because the VE is a computer-generated
world consisting of input and output data streams that become afferent and effer-
ent information for the user, and concretise the active interaction process, possibly
even transforming user’s actions and behaviours. These data streams are fully con-
trolled, hence offering a controllable interaction in a controllable environment, still
maintaining quite an ample degree of flexibility.
Therefore, interaction-centred applications of VEs try to realise an extended form of
interaction by seeking two major goals: to fully exploit the potential of an extended
natural interaction, which overcomes the possibilities of interactions in the physical
world, and still to maintain the ecological validity in the resulting virtual experi-
ence, which remains a controlled context. These are the prerogatives of VEs that
mainly motivate interaction-centred applications in medicine, and, more broadly, in
neuroscience research.
When considering the interaction-centred applications of VEs to medicine in more
detail it is possible to further split the applications in medical rehabilitation, espe-
cially to keep up with the focus of the present work, that is to explore and shed
light on the potential of VEs for cognitive science. Thus, Figure 2.2 proposes a
refined categorisation, also adopting the heading of Virtual Rehabilitation (Burdea,
2003), which is often used to indicate all the diverse applications of VEs to medical
rehabilitation.
Virtual rehabilitation is an umbrella which covers the applications of VEs to medical
rehabilitation, and can be specified in various ways: a means of specification is
the patients population addressed, another is the extent to which VEs and VR
technologies are used to provide rehabilitation, and a third means is the protocol
used, or the fact whether the therapist is physically present with the patient or not,
in the latter case implementing a form of telerehabilitation.
In the present work it is adopted a classification of virtual rehabilitation based on
the origin of the dysfunction to be remediated. In particular, neurorehabilitation
is distinguished from general rehabilitation — i.e., rehabilitation for dysfunctions
not originated by injuries to the central nervous system — and within neurorehab-
ilitation, cognitive assessment and rehabilitation are separated from motor rehab-
ilitation. However, it is worthwhile noticing that what Rizzo et al. (2004) call the
assets for VR applications — from which we drew here for defining the prerogatives
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Figure 2.2.: A proposed categorisation for application fields of interaction-centred VEs applic-
ations in medicine. Virtual Rehabilitation is an umbrella term covering the use of VEs for
medical rehabilitation. The primary scope of application is neurorehabilitation, both for motor
training and for cognitive rehabilitation and neuropsychological assessment. Psychotherapy and
Psychiatry, usually not included under the heading of virtual rehabilitation, are still part of the
categorisation, with a number of mental disorders that may find in VEs a valuable therapeutic
instrument. Alternatively, following a trend emerging from part of the scientific literature, it
would be possible to change the heading “Psychotherapy and Psychiatry” with “Mental Health”.
mentioned in section 2.3 — are similar for the diverse populations benefiting from
virtual rehabilitation.
The basic assumption underpinning neurorehabilitation is neuroplasticity, i.e., the
capacity of the brain to change across the lifespan, and the fact that sensorimotor
and cognitive training may induce such changes to counteract dysfunctions caused
by brain lesions. Correspondingly, the stated goal that defines neurorehabilitation
is to change brain function in order to remediate a disability due to an impairment
caused by damage to the central nervous system, most often the brain (Robertson
and Fitzpatrick, 2008; Rose et al., 2005).
There are different mechanisms involved in brain plasticity (Johansson, 2000), and
some of them take advantage from VR-based or VR-augmented rehabilitation prac-
tices. VR-based practices completely substitute the conventional exercises with
tasks that fully unfold by interacting with a VE. The distinctive points of this sort
of therapy pertain to what sensory modalities are stimulated, and to the degree of in-
teraction foreseen between the patient and the VE. Such aspects are very important
for both motor and cognitive neurorehabilitation using VEs.
The primary goal of rehabilitation is to recover or — if not possible — compensate
for a lost function. Both motor and cognitive dysfunctions may result from lesions
to the central nervous system, especially the brain. There are multiple fundamental
factors influencing the rehabilitation course under the aspects of motor and cognitive
recovery (Sveistrup, 2004; Rose et al., 2005). One is early intervention, the others
can be summarised as task-oriented training and repetition intensity, and for both
of them VEs offer unique opportunities. The advantage of VEs concerning repeti-
tion intensity is straightforward: from the patient side, VEs may provide training
scenarios that are appealing and motivating for the patient, reducing the “boring
effect” that often hinders patient’s motivation, and by this way also the rehabilit-
ation outcome (Burdea, 2003). From the therapist point of view, the aid of VEs
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technologies, especially if combined with robotic devices for motor rehabilitation,
allow for an increased repetition intensity, as technologies do not become tired and
make possible for the therapist to follow more than one patient at a time.
Anyway, the crucial advantage featured by VEs is the kind of interactive environ-
ments provided (Rose et al., 1998, 2005). VEs can in fact implement task-oriented
scenarios that provide sensorimotor training in an enriched and motivating environ-
ment. Environmental enrichment consists of an increased level of interaction with
the environment, and it has proved to increase adult neurogenesis (Olson et al.,
2006) in an ecological-like approach. Elaborating on the prerogatives of VEs de-
scribed in section 2.3, VEs can provide an ecological context that engender enrich-
ment, while adapting to specific patients’ needs for rehabilitation, and maintaining
a continuous, real-time control in the stimuli-response relation.
In the context of cognitive rehabilitation (CR), diagnosing a dysfunction, identifying
cognitive weaknesses and strengths, and monitoring the course of the rehabilitation
outcomes are achieved through neuropsychological assessment (NA). NA is based on
psychometric tests, which should in principle measure simple, or complex cognitive
functions of an individual in a reliable and standardised form, while predicting the
level of functioning of the same person in the everyday life. Unfortunately, this has
since long been identified as a major issue of psychometric tests, because they often
miss the level of ecological validity necessary for generalising to lifelike situations
the functioning measures they yield. This issue has been only partly mitigated
by the shift from paper-and-pencil tests to computer-aided versions of the same
tests, which are now very commonly and widely used for NA. VEs technology, with
the capability to create a whole environment that is ecologically valid, and allows
for naturalistic interactions, yet keeping a strict control on the stimulus-response
function, has proved to be effective to further alleviate the problem originated by
the lack of ecological validity (Rizzo et al., 2000).
The term rehabilitation is far less used when dealing with therapies, and assessment,
of mental disorders pertaining to clinical psychology, and psychiatry. The two major
lines of application of VEs in this context are for virtual exposure therapy, as an
adjunctive intervention to standard cognitive-behavioural therapy, and for altering
the perception/representation of own body when this is disturbed. In the first case,
VEs are used as flexible and controlled environments where patients can engage in
systematic, natural, and realistic exposures to virtual stimuli that are critical for
arising and sustaining the symptoms of their mental disorder. In other words the VE
can be conceived also as an environment that affect patients’ emotional processing,
and facilitates learning of their dysfunctioning thoughts, beliefs, and behaviours. In
the second case, VEs are used to change the perception of own body representations
and somatoperceptions, in order to correct body image disturbances, or to enhance
control over pain.
Based on the proposed categorisation, the next sections of this chapter describe
the potential of the interaction-centred applications of VEs with a focus on neuro-
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psychological assessment and cognitive rehabilitation, and on psychotherapy and
psychiatry. Specific general prerogatives are introduced, before presenting prom-
inent examples in the specific domains of NA, CR, psychotherapy, and psychiatry.
The applications to motor training in neurorehabilitation are not discussed because
they go beyond the scope of this thesis, which is focused on cognitive aspects. Even
so, it should be noted that the potential of VEs exploited in motor rehabilitation
is largely the same as in cognitive rehabilitation, albeit robotic devices are more
often used in connection with VEs when motor training is the primary goal. In
addition, in many situations motor rehabilitation goes with therapies for enhancing
basic cognitive abilities and executive functions of patients. For example, this is the
case of stroke patients, for whom the value of VEs has been demonstrated for both
motor recovery and cognitive rehabilitation (see Henderson et al., 2007; Weiss et al.,
2005 for a review).
2.3. Prerogatives of Virtual Environments for
Interaction-Centred Applications
The potential of VEs for neuropsychological assessment, cognitive rehabilitation,
and, more broadly, for mental health have been discussed in several occasions since
the late 1990s (Rose et al., 1998; Rizzo et al., 2000; Schultheis and Rizzo, 2001;
Rizzo et al., 2002, 2004; Rose et al., 2005). The conclusions converge on a set
of key prerogatives of VEs that are largely independent of the specific cognitive
functions they apply to, and underpin also VEs value for motor rehabilitation, and
for neuroscientific research. These prerogatives are listed, and briefly discussed in
the following of this section.
Environmental enrichment is an important asset to the use of VEs for rehabilit-
ation purposes, as it promotes neuroplasticity, which is clearly crucial for recovering
the impaired function. The enrichment provided by a VE encompasses both in-
tegrated multisensory stimulation, and a highly-interactive setting for the patient.
Hence, a VE may counteract the reduction in interaction suffered by patients with
disabilities, and enhance their motor activity.
Improved ecological validity corresponds to the possibility to provide natural-
istic scenarios, relevant for predicting performance in everyday functional envir-
onments, for achieving more generalisable rehabilitation outcome, and for studying
brain activity in a real-world-like situation, which, however, maintains the controlled
characteristics of a laboratory experimental activity. This asset of VEs is a clear
example of the synergistic relationships connecting all the prerogatives towards a
common resulting action beneficial for NA, and CR, but also for sensorimotor train-
ing of neurological patients, and for basic research about brain function. Indeed, the
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ecological validity of a VE consists of a naturalistic, and contextually rich, interact-
ive environment, enabling naturalistic, and interactive behaviours of the participant
in the virtual experience, even during brain activity imaging (Bohil et al., 2011).
The lack of ecological validity has long been recognised as a major issue of psycho-
metric tests in NA, and of mainstream interventions in rehabilitation. VE has the
potential to overcome this issue, yielding scenarios and tasks for NA that provide
results applicable also to everyday contexts. This is also favourable in respect to
the recognition of the both the impairment, and the value of the aid offered by NA
and CR, from the side of the cognitive patients and their families.
Systematic and controlled delivery of 3-D multimodal stimuli resolves, in com-
bination with improved ecological validity, the dualism inherent to traditional NA,
CR, and basic research on brain activity. The dualism lies in the difficulty to keep
naturalistic a task and its context when probing brain activity, or psychometric prop-
erties of a patient. The same dualism can affect also rehabilitation procedures, in the
motor, cognitive, and psychiatric domains. Beyond the continuous control of stimuli
for reliable, and standardised deliveries, adaptation to patients’ needs, both general
and relative to their contingent response, is possible by tuning the parameters of
VEs. The 3-D characteristic of feedback, and the multiple modalities, primarily
visual and auditory, but recently also haptic, and in its infancy even involving taste
and smell, enable a more fully sensorimotor engagement. This is beneficial in several
ways, again in synergy with the other VEs prerogatives: psychometric and beha-
vioural responses are more realistic, participants may move about inside the VE,
increasing motor activations, and also the interaction level, in turns enhancing the
environmental enrichment. Furthermore, multimodal stimuli promote the immer-
sion of the participant in the VE, providing the ground for triggering a high sense of
presence in the VE, hence achieving engaging and highly-motivating contexts. The
sense of presence is a determinant factor for the functionality of a VE (Sanchez-Vives
and Slater, 2005), and high motivation to practice is fundamental for rehabilitation
purposes (Schuemie et al., 2001; Weiss et al., 2005).
Immediate multimodal feedback may be beneficial in several ways. Firstly, im-
mediate is referred to real-time feedback about the performance of the participant in
the virtual experience. Online feedback is important for every skills acquisition (Ber-
gamasco et al., 2012), and in rehabilitative contexts appropriate feedback is useful
for guiding the patient, and also for heightening her/his motivation to engage in the
rehabilitative task (Adamovich et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2005). Secondly, multimodal
feedback can be used to dynamically test learning processes, such as strategies for
acquiring spatial cognition, and navigation, which are important research topics per
se (see Bohil et al., 2011 for a review), and in relation to cognitive impairments, like
topographic disorientation (Livingstone and Skelton, 2007). Lastly, the feedback can
be deliberately altered to treat specific impairments, as unilateral spatial neglect,
or to test patients’ abilities to adapt to novel situations Baheux et al. (2007).
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Cueing stimuli to guide successful performance is a specific approach based on
error-free learning, in contrast to the trial-and-error approach, that appeared to be
beneficial, especially for procedural abilities, which can be spared in individuals suf-
fering from declarative memory disabilities (Rizzo et al., 2004). Cues are presented
in the VE prior to the participant’s response, in order to guide her/him to a suc-
cessful accomplishment of the task through an error-free performance. This is an
example of how VE can go beyond a mere mimicry of the physical environment: on
the contrary, the VE can provide stimuli fostering processes very difficult, or even
impossible to achieve in a real environment. Furthermore, in the VE the cues may
vanish as the patient progresses, and performance improves, and is retained.
Complete digital performance capture is a capability inherent in the the technologies
composing VEs, and in those used in combination with them, like motion capturing
systems for human motion analysis, and even brain activity recording systems (EEG,
but recently also fMRI). In particular, immersive VEs include tracking systems
affixed to participant’s head, for example to the eyegoggles used for stereoscopic
vision, and this information, normally used to update the graphic 3-D scene, may
also serve to monitor and record the patient state, or to effect changes on the VE.
This is important in rehabilitation, as patient’s progresses may be precisely measured
along several relevant dimensions of the performance, with the exact knowledge of
what were the natures and levels of the stimuli eliciting the measured response. In
psychotherapy, for example, the biofeedback of a patient may be connected with
the VE, and effect changes on it according to the patient state to help regulate
anxiety (Repetto et al., 2009).
Safety testing and training environments are a prerogative of VEs. The “vir-
tual” nature, and the possibility to mimic physical reality, and to adapt it to the
contingent situation by maintaining a naturalistic interaction, enable to test patients
in otherwise risky tasks (for example testing and training the ability to cross a road,
or to drive in patients with visual-spatial neglect, as in Katz et al., 2005). Moreover,
some patients need undergoing therapies objectively difficult in real settings, as ex-
posure therapy to alleviate fear of flying, and they might not accept exposure to real
phobogenic stimuli, in contrast to exposure to a virtual counterpart, in the sheltered
place offered by the VE (examples of this kind of applications are in VR exposure
therapy for the fear of flying, as reported in Rothbaum et al., 2006, and for spider
phobia as in Garcia-Palacios et al., 2002, and social anxiety disorder, as in Anderson
et al., 2005).
In next sections the reader may find examples of how these prerogatives have been
used in specific applications to virtual rehabilitation, and to mental disorders.
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2.4. Applications to Neuropsychological Assessment
and Cognitive Rehabilitation
The damage to the central nervous system that may cause dysfunctions are multiple,
either acquired, or congenital. Thus, one possibility for categorising applications of
VEs to NA and CR might be to use the origins of the dysfunction as categories: ac-
quired brain injuries, neurological disorders, and developmental disorders. However,
this does not seem to fit the purpose, because such categories are often the cause
of a wider range of dysfunctions, not limited to the cognitive domain. Most com-
monly, the scientific literature about cognitive rehabilitation interventions progress
by the cognitive abilities addressed. Here the same approach is taken, considering
the cognitive domains presented in Figure 2.3, and reporting prominent examples
of how VEs are being used for NA and CR within such domains.
CR and NA interventions are classified under five main cognitive domains: attention,
memory, visuo-spatial skills, executive functions, and language. Perceptual abilities
are implicitly included at different points in this categorisation (e.g., for visual and
spatial skills, and for the most general fact that they are a preparatory processing
step for the cognitive stage).
Figure 2.3.: Cognitive-domain-based categorisation of Virtual Environments applications to
neuropsychological assessment and cognitive rehabilitation.
Examples of Applications to Attention Disorders
Attention is a multidimensional concept, and should not be considered as a unitary
cognitive construct, or a single process. Rather, it is a property of multiple cognitive
operations (Chun et al., 2010), and is almost ubiquitous in everyday life, because
its central function is to select for processing relevant information, which would
otherwise be dismissed, never entering the conscious awareness of an individual.
A more accurate and detailed account of human attention, and of its role in the
human information processing is presented in chapter 3. Thus, here the discussion
is focused on the specific ways VEs have been applied to attention for NA and CR.
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The attentional abilities that may be impaired and require CR are defined according
to the skills required to perform one or more tasks, and several taxonomies have been
proposed (see Johnstone and Stonnington, 2009 for a review). Below is a list that
outlines what are the functional capacities implicated:
• Arousal is the level of alertness with respect to response to the environment.
There are both a tonic and a phasic arousal: the former is the day-to-day
alertness, independent of the immediate task demand, while the former is the
ability to respond to changes in the environment, or in task demand.
• Focused attention is one’s ability to focus on a specific object or stimulus,
especially visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli, and discretely respond to them
ignoring distractors.
• Sustained attention (a.k.a., Vigilance) is the ability to sustain a focused atten-
tion sate over an extended period of time, e.g., requiring a repetitive response.
• Divided attention is the ability to simultaneously attend to, respond to multiple
tasks at a time. It includes also the concept of alternating attention as the
ability to move between tasks, which have different cognitive requirements.
• Executive attention includes those attentional functions aimed at controlling
one’s thoughts and actions to produce a coherent behaviour (e.g., initiating
a task, making a decision etc.). However, when dealing with rehabilitation,
executive attention (often also referred to under the heading of executive con-
trol, cognitive control, or conflict monitoring) is usually not included in the
taxonomy of attention. Rather, it is associated to the executive functions.
In terms of VEs aids for NA and CR of attention, the most outstanding applica-
tion is for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which is a behavioural
disorder mostly affecting children, with symptoms of inattention and/or impulsiv-
ity or hyperactivity (Faraone et al., 2003). The Virtual Classroom designed and
implemented by Rizzo et al. (2006) is an immersive VE chiefly used for the assess-
ment of attention in children. The VE represent a school classroom, where the
child is immersed, with a first-person perspective. The child is transported in the
VE through an head-mounted display (HMD), and may interact using a joystick,
or a response box when asked to accomplish tasks. These tasks are intended as
psychometric tests of different attentional abilities. In the virtual classroom there
are virtual classmates, who may chat, and act as distractors for the child. There
is also a teacher, who provides the instructions for the tests. These are usually
conducted using the virtual blackboard: for example the teacher asks the pupils to
respond every time an animal drawing appears in a stream of non-animal drawings
presented on the blackboard. Meanwhile, the school principal may knock on the
door, and enter for a brief talk to the teacher; loud voices, may come from the open
window, or a coloured car may pass by it; some classmates may chat. In this way
sustained and focused attention of the child are assessed, in a naturalistic context,
and contributions of different kind of distractors may be evaluated. The “Virtual
Classroom” proved to be capable of effectively differentiating between participants
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with ADHD and normal control children, as it correlated with common tools used
for ADHD assessment (Parsons et al., 2007). Moreover, this VE has been used to as-
sess attention-related abilities in individuals with attention problems not descending
from an ADHD (e.g., children with traumatic brain injuries, as illustrated in Nolin
et al., 2009). In the scientific reports about studies using the Virtual Classroom as
a NA tool a frequent conclusion is that much sensitivity is achieved compared to
mainstream psychometric tools as the continuous performance test, because a major
advantage of the VE is its ecological validity.
Another interesting aspect of VEs for NA and CR underscored by the Virtual
Classroom is the possibility to adapt the technological platform underpinning the
application for a cognitive domain to another cognitive domain. Indeed, a “Vir-
tual Office” version of the Virtual Classroom is used for the assessment of memory
impairments in adults (this application — see Rizzo et al., 2002 — is recapped in
the following, when dealing with memory impairments).
Not many other applications of VEs for the assessment and rehabilitation of basic
attention abilities have been proposed. One is that brought forward by Lengenfelder
et al. (2002). This is an application for assessing the influence of divided attention on
driving performance of patients with traumatic brain injuries. The VE is a 1.75-mile
long road, with curves, presented on a computer desktop. The patient has a steering
wheel, and gas/brake foot pedals to simulate car driving. Using these tools, and
looking at the graphical VE on the screen as through the car windscreen, the patient
has to drive the virtual car controlling its speed, and keeping it at the centre of the
lane. In addition to this primary task, the patient’s divided attention is demanded
to accomplish a secondary task: speak aloud the 4-digit numbers appearing on the
screen while driving, and continue driving. The numbers may appear in a fixed
location or at different locations, and they may succeed one after another every
either 2.4 seconds or 0.6 seconds. The performance of a group of patients was
compared with the performance of a healthy group of matched individuals. The
results are positive for the potential of VEs to be used as an assessment tool of
divided attention. In fact, patients made more errors than healthy controls on the
secondary task as expected based on previous studies, and performance resulted
more influenced from the rate at which numbers appeared, than from the random
localisation of the numbers.
Attention impairments associated with spatial neglect have been also addressed
with virtual environments, and examples of these are briefly accounted in the one of
succeeding paragraphs, which introduces applications targeted to spatial abilities.
Examples of Applications to Memory Impairments
Also for memory, several taxonomies have been proposed and adopted over the dec-
ades. Some of them focus on functional processes (encoding, consolidation, and
retrieval of information or motor skills), others on the modality through which
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the information to be memorised was presented (auditory memory, visual memory,
and motor memory), and on the short-/long-term of the storage, i.e., whether the
memories are intended for immediate use, or they have to be permanently stored
as knowledge available for successive retrieval. Besides, memory may be incidental
or intentional, and retrospective or prospective, episodic or semantic, declarative or
procedural. Traumatic brain injuries (TBI), cerebral vascular accident, Parkinson’s
disease, and Alzheimer’s disease lead to memory impairments.
The “Virtual Office” evolved from the Virtual Classroom (Rizzo et al., 2002) has
been successfully used to assess recall of non-typical targets in TBI patients. The
VE again proved to correlate with measures taken through mainstream psycho-
metric batteries, seemingly induce the emergence of specific unimpaired memory
components not assessed by the usual test battery.
Brooks et al. (2002) used a VE simulating a four-room bungalow to assess pro-
spective memory in a sample of stroke patients, compared to an age-matched group.
Participants had to cluster furniture items to be removed for a move in a larger
house, according to the destination room; to indicate for a “fragile” notice suitable
objects, to grant the removal men access; to remember closing the kitchen door
every time to avoid the cat going outside; and to hit a button next to a virtual clock
exactly every 5 minutes. The results showed the usefulness of this VE to test pro-
spective memory of stroke patients, being sensitive to particular problems of what
and when to remember.
Pugnetti et al. (1998) compared different memory performance between multiple
sclerosis patients, and healthy controls for targets presented during either passive or
active navigation conditions in a VE. The VE was capable of revealing a different
spatial memory performance of patients according to the navigation modality —
either passive or active — utilised. This difference cannot be highlighted in standard
psychometric tests.
Parsons and Rizzo (2008) undertook the preliminary validation of a battery of psy-
chometric measures based on a VE presenting a city where a participant may immers-
ively navigate, while accomplishing assessment tasks. The VE includes a memory
assessment module, which measures correlated with standard psychometric memory
tests, and not with non-memory measures. However, the authors admit the necessity
to proceed with validation in respect to many aspects.
Examples of Applications to Impairments of Executive Functions
Executive functions are higher functions that majorly distinguish humans from other
mammalians. They can be summarised as those functions that enable planning and
organisation, initiation, self-regulation, monitoring and termination of activities,
sequencing of actions and time management. In a word, executive functions make
possible the effective performance. A major cause of executive dysfunction is brain
damage to the frontal lobe.
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The same 4-room virtual bungalow used in Brooks et al. (2002) for assessing pro-
spective memory impairments has been used by Morris et al. (2002) to assess the
ability in strategy formation and rule breaking of patients who had undergone frontal
lobe neurosurgery, in the same furniture removal task. Rehabilitation practices
for sequencing of actions, and multitasking were implemented within a virtual kit-
chen (Zhang et al., 2001) where the task was to prepare a meal going through a
specific series of steps, and in a VE simulating a super-market (Rand et al., 2009)
where a virtual shopping was undertaken. These same VEs, and similar ones, have
been extended and used to assess more generally activities of daily living, and they
demonstrated success in small groups of patients, although standardisation was lack-
ing. Also virtual equivalents of psychometric tests have been designed and studied,
although they still need extensive validation before achieving the status of a stand-
ard tool, usable in clinical practice. One example is a virtual equivalent of the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, Elkind et al., 2001). The setting is a virtual
beach scene, where virtual bathers are at umbrellas with different with particular
objects on each of them. Patients are requested to deliver beach-related objects to
the virtual characters according to a matching pattern alike in the standard WCST.
Patients may receive verbal feedback from virtual bathers. The results of the study
were encouraging, as the measures for executive dysfunction correlated, although
the virtual version resulted more difficult than the traditional one. Besides, an equi-
valent of the multiple errands test (Shallice and Burgess, 1991) for the assessment
of executive functions has been proposed by Raspelli et al. (2009). It is a virtual
shopping mall where the patients have to select and buy products, also obtaining
information, according to specific rules.
Examples of Applications to Impairments of Visual-Spatial Skills
Visual-Spatial skills are complex because they rely on many parts of the human
brain, and encompass perception, processing, and interpretation of visual-spatial
stimuli. Hence, many functions may be affected by impairments of visual-spatial
abilities. The visual spatial system may be seen as having two main functional
components (Johnstone and Stonnington, 2009): an input component, aimed at
the accurate perception of visual information, and an output component, aimed at
integrating this information with contextual cues, and with action. The percep-
tual component includes receptive visual functions (visual acuity, depth perception,
visual fields), visual-spatial attention, and spatial perception, whereas the integra-
tion component covers spatial orientation and body schema. Thus, it is clear that
some deficits of visual-spatial skills may be assigned to other cognitive domains, such
as attention, in different taxonomies. Virtual Environments have been applied to
the assessment, and rehabilitation of impairments affecting visual-spatial attention,
spatial orientation, and body image.
An important disorder of visual-spatial attention is the unilateral spatial neglect.
This neuropsychological condition often impairs stroke patients with a lesion in the
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right brain hemisphere. These patients are impaired at responding to stimuli occur-
ring in the hemispace contralateral to the brain lesion. VEs have been developed for
both the assessment, and the rehabilitation of unilateral spatial neglect. The fun-
damental idea is to track the head and eye movements of the patient while viewing
a VE — typically wearing a head-mounted display that delivers the VE shutting
out the physical environment — and to use moving cues, and possibly distortions
biassing the unimpaired hemispace, to measure and assist patient’s attention to the
neglected space. A review of these applications has been conducted by Tsirlin et al.
(2009). The main advantages of VR-based methods over traditional ones are in
tracking and multimodal capabilities of VEs, and in their potential for providing
lifelike tasks and contexts. Thereby, several parameters of the patients can be cap-
tured and tracked in real-time, revealing their inactivity during both the assessment
and rehabilitation phases, and prompting them to counteract the deficit. Several
sensory modalities may be used either for stimulating the patient, or investigating
the consequences of the neglect disorder. Finally, a VE may enable to assess and
intervene on the spatial neglect not only in the peripersonal space. The applications
are still to be led to a standardised profile, so that they can be applied in everyday
clinical protocols, but they have shown to be able to augment both assessment, and
rehabilitation of unilateral spatial neglect. Some concerns remain on the issue of
spatial perception in VEs: indeed, evidence exists about an impaired estimation
of spatial relations in stereoscopic VEs (Plumert et al., 2005). This might have
some effect on the applications for unilateral spatial neglect, and requires further
investigation.
Other applications for visual-spatial skills were for the neuropsychological assess-
ment of spatial perception in patients with Parkinson’s disease and closed head
injuries (Stirk and Foreman, 2005), and for training navigation and spatial orienta-
tion in patients with brain damage, and in the elderly population (Morganti et al.,
2007, 2009). The assessment of spatial abilities in patients with Parkinson’s dis-
ease involved mental rotation and manipulation of objects seen on a movable virtual
tray, and the memory and adoption of different viewpoints with respect to a target
object in a virtual golf playground where the patient can move about. The tool
for assessing topographic disorientation is instead based on a virtual maze, and a
virtual road through which participants have to move in order to reach a specific
location, which was previously located in a paper-version of the test. All these ap-
plications were successful as correlating with traditional psychometric assessment,
adding more capability in tracking patients’ behaviours, and in doing it in more
situated environments compared to mainstream test batteries. Also for patients
with early Alzheimer’s disease, or ageing people with a mild cognitive impairment,
Cushman et al. (2008) proposed a VR-based test for assessing navigational skills.
The VE was a detailed 3-D representation of the hospital lobby, and was presen-
ted on a laptop PC. Patients could navigate in the VE, and several navigational
subsets were administered to them (e.g., route learning, free recall, route drawing,
self-orientation, landmark recall, etc.). The test using the VE proved to yield close
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correlations with an equivalent real-world navigational test, although with a trend
for lower scores.
Body schema refers to the sensorimotor representation of own body, and is often
distinguished from body image, which is a body representation more dealt with
visual-spatial and semantic type of body awareness (de Vignemont, 2010). Both
these types of body representations may be disrupted by psychological or neurolo-
gical disorders. In some taxonomies body representation impairments are classified
under visual-spatial deficits, in other under the more general heading of neuropsy-
chological disorders. Here, for the sake of unity, VEs applications to patients with
disruptions of body awareness are all mentioned in the section about applications
to psychological and psychiatric disorders (section 2.5 ).
Examples of Applications to Language Disorders
Two main kinds of language disorders have seen the application of a VE: aphasia,
and deficit of productive language and communication skills, especially in children.
For aphasic patients Geiszt et al. (2006) developed a virtual therapy room, presented
to the patient via an head-mounted display. There are a single-patient, and a group
session version. In the single-patient session the patient interacts with the therapist
in the VE, while in the group session there is a virtual community of avatars, and
a virtual teacher, who comment on the patient’s performance, and in turn may
be called to respond themselves to questions. The questions, taken from standard
language rehabilitation instruments, or based on environments created purposely by
the therapist, appear on a virtual blackboard. The patient normally views the VE
in a first-person perspective, and the virtual group is sat around a virtual table.
However, in order to enhance motivational effect, the point of view of the patient
may be shifted in a third-person perspective after every correct response, so as to
let the patient see herself/himself while providing the correct response.
Especially for children suffering from autism spectrum disorders, VEs may be useful
to train social communication skills, for example by creating interactive narrat-
ives with virtual characters that respond to children gestures. This is believed to
facilitate therapy for all those children who have poor productive language and com-
munication skills. One such VE has been used also to analyse the virtual character
gestures and gaze-behaviours necessary for completing a joint attention task (Alcorn
et al., 2011), that is a task in the VE targeting joint attention, a crucial skill to be
trained in autistic children, as it induces many benefits, also on language perform-
ance. Joint attention is accomplished when the gaze or gesture of an individual can
be followed by the patient, who is able, when appropriate, also to respond. In the
VE a virtual character tries to attract the attention of the child to some objects by
using either the gaze or a pointing gesture. Furthermore, the environment may be
created starting from gestures of, or elements chosen by, the same child.
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2.5. Applications to Psychotherapy and Psychiatry
As depicted in Figure 2.4, the applications of VEs to clinical psychology and psychi-
atry cover a wide range of disorders, and are more oriented to therapy than assess-
ment. The bulk of the applications are for the Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy
(VRET), which is a VR-based version of exposure therapy. This therapy is chiefly
adopted for treating anxiety disorders, like specific phobias (as acrophobia, spider
and cockroach phobia, fear of flying), social anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Applications to body image disturbances are less wide-
spread, and mainly address patients with eating disorders. Pain control therapies
postulate that transportation in a distracting VE may help to control pain, and this
idea has been used primarily with burn victims. A more recent application of VEs
for analgesia exploits the possibility to trigger the illusion of ownership for a virtual
body part, and preliminary studies investigate the instantiation of this concept in
amputees to reduce phantom limb pain. This application attempts to achieve this
goal by affecting the body schema of the patient, but is aimed at controlling pain,
so we refer it in the examples of applications to pain control. Autism spectrum
disorders and Schizophrenia may benefit from social VEs, which foster attention to
virtual partners and social communication skills in autistic children, while assess-
ing and training schizophrenic patients about how hallucinations are dependent on
the social environment. The application to Obsessive-compulsive disorders is quite
limited at present, and is oriented to both assessment and therapy.
In the following some examples are reported to illustrate how VEs are applied to
mental disorders.
Figure 2.4.: Mental-disorder-based categorisation of Virtual Environments applications to psy-
chotherapy and psychiatry.
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Examples of Applications to Body Image Disturbances
The typical application of a VE for the assessment and treatment of body image
disturbances is to eating disorders. Body image distortion and dissatisfaction are
addressed by VE-based treatments, as a support to cognitive-behavioural therapy.
In a literature review Ferrer-García and Gutiérrez-Maldonado (2012) discussed how
VEs are useful to study, assess, and treat body image disturbances in patients with
eating disorders, because VR can represent a subjective concept as body image,
and can provide patients objective, solid, and therapist-independent information
about their erroneous mental representation of body image. In this line, the VEs
used to assess and treat body image disturbance usually consist of multiple virtual
rooms where patients are required to adjust their virtual counterpart body and
body parts size according to their perception of own body image in the assessment
phase, and to help to modify distorted thoughts about body size and shape. For
example, in the assessment phase it is evaluated how the body image of the patient
changes in terms of distortion and dissatisfaction before and after either having had
a low-calorie or high-calorie virtual meal in a virtual kitchen. In the therapeutic
phase the VE is exploited to facilitate the emergence of discrepancies between the
biased representation of body image, and the proprioceptive signals deriving from the
interaction with the VE. The initial studies of VEs applications to eating disorders
date from more than 10 years ago, and positive evidence has been collected on their
potential as a tool assessment and treatment of body image disturbances associated
to eating disorders. However, it has been underscored the need for further research,
and for more controlled studies with larger samples Ferrer-García and Gutiérrez-
Maldonado (2012), in order to stabilise the potential and the clinical use of this
tool.
Examples of Applications to Phobias and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
These disorders are considered together here because the related applications of VEs
are all based on Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy (VRET). Exposure therapy con-
sists of systematic graded exposure to anxiety-provoking stimuli in order to induce
desensitisation to the phobogenic stimuli, reducing the fear, and the consequent
symptoms (Foa and Kozak, 1986). The traditional exposure therapy is in vivo, as
the anxiety-provoking stimulus is physically delivered to the patient. Clearly, this
is not always possible, for inherent and cost-effectiveness reasons, and the patient
herself/himself may not accept this form of exposure. One option is then to use
imaginal exposure, with the patient instructed to imagine anxiety-provoking situ-
ations. This alternative has its own issues: it is difficult to control what exactly the
patient is imagining, and for some patients it is difficult even to imagine the stress-
ful situations they normally avoid. VEs may be an option for overcoming these
issues, and have a more natural and controlled exposure to the feared stimuli than
imaginal therapy, while delivering the treatment in a protected, and cost-effective
environment.
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Initial studies of VRET for specific phobias dates back to two decades ago, and
several specific phobias, as well as more general anxiety disorders have seen VRET
applications (see Gregg and Tarrier, 2007 for a review). For example, Krijn et al.
(2007) compared VRET, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), and bibliotherapy
with no contact with the therapist for patients suffering from fear of flying. The
VRET was delivered in 4 1-hour weekly sessions using a head-mounted display.
The VEs for exposure to fear of lying were two: a virtual airport where patients
could freely move in a 1m2area, and a seat inside an aircraft, where they experienced
vibrations typical of take-off, turbulence, and landing. As usual in exposure therapy,
the exposure to the anxiety-provoking situations was graded, starting from the less
feared, based on patient’s self-rating of any proposed situation in terms of a 0–10
scale of subjective units of distress. Results shown that bibliotherapy alone was not
effective, and that neither the sole VRET nor the sole individual CBT were able
to induce a sufficient decrease in fear of flying. However, group CBT, and VRET
were able to reduce negative cognition on flying. This is in favour of the view that
VRET may be an important adjunct to CBT, especially for those cases when in
vivo exposure is not feasible, but it is not yet as effective as necessary for replacing
mainstream CBT. In the same study by Krijn et al. (2007), also underlying phobias
were treated using VRET. They were claustrophobia and acrophobia. The first was
treated in 3 VEs: two elevators (a bigger and a smaller one), a hallway becoming
narrower as the patient walked towards its end, and a closet room which could be
made as narrow as a 1m2. The VEs used for exposure acrophobia-related anxiety
were a fire escape with 6 floors in open space, a garden on the roof of a building,
and virtual building with 8 floors. Both claustrophobia and acrophobia resulted
comparably effective with CBT, and capable of reducing anxiety. In other studies
VRET effectiveness on fear of flying was more substantial than in this study. This
is the case for example of the VRET for fear of flying presented in Rothbaum et al.
(2006). In this article a controlled comparison between VRET and standard in vivo
exposure therapy is presented. The results support a comparable effectiveness of
VRET and standard in vivo exposure, also at 6-month and 12-month follow up.
A reasonable explanation may lies in the difference between the VEs used, which
can affect the capability of the VE to actually elicit a real-like anxiety. In fact, a
posteriori, a number of patients included in the study of Krijn et al. (2007) were not
sufficiently feared in the VE.
Also for less specific anxiety disorders like social anxiety disorder (SAD) VEs proved
to be effective in reducing the scores in the respective anxiety scales, and in some
case studies also reducing avoidance of the feared situations at a 3-month follow-
up (Anderson et al., 2005). When a social anxiety component has to be treated,
the VEs need to include social stimuli, and these are essentially obtained by using
virtual characters who display, mainly through facial expressions and gestures, dif-
ferent attitudes that may provoke anxiety in a viewing patient, to different degrees.
Robillard et al. (2010) carried out a randomised controlled study on generalised
SAD patients comparing the effect of CBT with in vivo exposure, and the effect of
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VRET. Both treatments were superior to the no-treatment condition on the waiting-
list group, and effective at reducing the score of anxiety according to the Liebowitz
Social Anxiety Scale and on other measure variables. The authors claim this is a first
step to determine whether CBT combined with in vivo exposure, and CBT com-
bined with VRET, can be considered a substantially equivalent treatment for SAD.
Different VEs were used to present typical anxiety-provoking social situations: a
virtual bar, where the patient has to greet and take a seat at a virtual friends’ table,
a virtual dinner in a friends’ home, a presentation in a virtual job meeting, and an
assertiveness requirement with a virtual shop assistant. These applications of VEs
are particularly interesting per se, because they involve human-like virtual charac-
ters (commonly referred to as avatars), which bring both technical and behavioural
challenges. They have been used also for the treatment of fear of public speaking,
where typically VEs represent a meeting room or a virtual auditorium, including
small groups of attending avatars, or a larger conference audience (see Vanni et al.
(ress) for a review). The patient has to read a brief text, or introduce her-/himself
in front of the virtual audience, which shows different positive, encouraging, or neg-
ative, disagreement-like facial expressions, gestures, and comments. The successive
sessions of VRET are again graded starting from less fearful situations, and they
move to the more feared when the patient’s anxiety score in the previous exposure
has reduced. It has been shown that a relatively low visual fidelity is necessary for
eliciting the anxiety typical of fear of public speaking (Slater et al., 1999), whereas
it is more important that the virtual characters are not static, and display facial
expressions and seemingly autonomous behaviours able to trigger relatively marked
positive or negative attitudes. The evidence cumulated for these applications of VEs
are positive, in the sense that the virtual social scenes were able to elicit anxiety
similar to what happens in real in vivo situations. Moreover, the scores in scales as
the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS) were generally improved
after VRET. The limitations of the current available studies in this field are about
the patients population (they are mainly University students with low scores in
PRCS rather than patients with severe fear of public speaking or generalised SAD),
and the lack of controlled studies comparing on large clinical samples standard CBT
therapy and pharmacotherapy, with the outcome of VRET.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a disabling anxiety disorder, which may
result from the exposure to trauma, especially involving an actual or threatened in-
jury to themselves or to others. Consequently, combat-related PTSD exists among
soldiers who took part in wars, as well as PTSD may affect victims of a terror-
ist attack, or of a natural catastrophe, like a particularly destructive earthquake.
Imaginal exposure therapy and CBT with an exposure therapy component are thera-
peutic options effectively used for PTSD patients (Rizzo et al., 2009). Prominent
examples of VEs applied as a tool for implementing VRET of PTSD involved the
treatment of combat-related PTSD (Rizzo et al., 2009), and of PTSD in the af-
termath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist act (Difede et al., 2007). The VE for
combat-related PTSD presented by Rizzo et al. (2009) is a Virtual Iraq scenario,
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where desert roads, a city and marketplace, and a humvee patrolling the war area
can be presented. The patient — a soldier diagnosed with combat-related PTSD
— wears a head-mounted display helmet, and can travel on the humvee as a single
vehicle, or in a convoy, and virtual soldiers and pedestrians can be present around.
3-D directional sound, vibrotactile, and olfactory stimuli may be added, as well as
other specific virtual objects, in order to resemble the characteristic of the setting
and events related to the trauma, and to modulate patient’s anxiety in a way func-
tional to the therapy. Preliminary results are available from an open clinical trial,
and case reports using the Virtual Iraq environment, but they are not sufficient to
draw general conclusions. However, most of the participants who completed the
treatment (2 weekly sessions for 5 weeks, about 1.5–2 hours per session) showed a
significant reduction of the symptoms severity based on the PTSD check-list, also at
a 3-month follow-up. The benefit of a user-centred design of the VE, based on the
feedback of the patients about the resemblance of the virtual scene with a realistic
situation related to their actual traumatic setting came up from the studies conduc-
ted by Rizzo et al. (2009). Difede et al. (2007) presented a study comparing the
effect of a VRET integrated in a CBT comprising cognitive restructuring, relaxation
training, and psycho-education, to a waiting-list group. Participants were patients
diagnosed with a severe PTSD following exposure to the World Trade Center attack
as fire-fighters, or civilian personnel. The VE presented the World Trade Center
area, showing streets, buildings, and the sky. The patients wore a head-mounted
display, and could walk and look around, with the virtual scenery accordingly up-
dated in real time. Different 3-D sequences were used for graded exposure: a jet flies
over the towers, it may or may not crash them, the sound of the explosion may be
either presented or not, streets sounds may be altered with screams, the towers may
or may not collapse. It is the therapist that decides which sequences are delivered to
the patient. The results on the group of 10 patients found a significant improvement
of the Clinician-Administered PTSD scale compared to the waiting-list group, also
for patients who had undertaken with no improvements imaginal exposure therapy
prior to the VRET. also at 6-month follow-up 9 patients out of 10 had maintained
their improvements. Difede et al. (2007) remark that an important evidence of this
study, with its inherent limitations as it is carried out on a restricted group, and
comparing with a waiting-list group rather than a group undertaking standard ther-
apy, is the effectiveness of a VE that presented the same situations, albeit graded,
to patients who came from quite different exposures to the traumatic event.
Examples of Applications to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterised by the occurrence of obses-
sions and/or compulsive rituals, and the empirically-based psychotherapy is CBT
involving exposure and response prevention (Abramowitz et al., 2009). In this case
exposure is based on confronting with stimuli provoking the compulsive rituals and
anxiety. In addition, response prevention is intended to refrain from performing the
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rituals. The application of VEs for OCD is still minimal. Kim et al. (2008) used an
anxiety-provoking VE on patients diagnosed with OCD, and compared the outcome
of exposure to the VE with a group of healthy participants. The VE was a typical
home, with several rooms the patient could move about by using a joystick, and
wearing a head-mounted display. Participants were initially instructed to familiar-
ise with the VE, performing actions like opening the door, turning the gas valve on
or off, and switching the light. Then they had to take away specific objects. Finally,
they were allowed to freely check (the gas valve, the light switches, a water supply),
a behaviour that is typical for OCD patients. The results showed a longer checking
time than the control group, higher anxiety scores, but also a more rapid decrease of
anxiety in the VE. According to Kim et al. (2008) these results are a clear indication
that appropriately designed VEs have the capability to trigger anxiety and typical
behaviours in OCD patients, as required for their use as a tool for exposure and
response prevention. Kim et al. (2010) then extended their previous work by adding
an office-like VE, and proposed to use indices based on frequencies and durations
of checking behaviour in the VE as a novel behavioural measure for the compulsive
checking behaviour of patients diagnosed with OCD. The results were generally pos-
itive, as the indexes calculated as a result of the task in the VE positively correlated
with those based on self-reports and standard clinical measures. Although the same
authors underscored some discrepancies emerged from the results, and remarked
the need for further studies that corroborate this initial evidence, this study demon-
strates that VEs are a promising tool also for psychometric assessment of OCD, as
VR is able to deliver situations that elicit behaviours as-if-real in the patients.
Examples of Application to Autism Spectrum Disorders and Schizophrenia
As already pointed out in a previous paragraph about VEs application for language
disorders (section 2.4), children on the autism spectrum may benefit from VEs. Two
main kinds of use of the VE showed benefits for autistic patients, both exploiting the
potential of VEs as an enhanced learning environment: as a tool for enhancing social
skills, and as a tool for more general habilitation in autism (Standen and Brown,
2005; Bellani et al., 2011 for a review). For example, Mitchell et al. (2007) showed
that a group of adolescents diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder improved in
judgements and reasoning about whether and where to sit in videos of real café and
bus, following practise in a VE presenting them with a virtual café, filled with virtual
people. Participants had to sit down with their food tray either at a free table, if
available, or ask for permission to sit at a table already partially occupied, if no free
table was available, in a virtual café. Moore et al. (2005) used a collaborative VE
to evaluate the ability of autistic children to operate avatars and recognise emotions
presented by the avatars facial expression, and the virtual context. Participants
were successful at both operating the avatars, recognising the emotions expressed
by them, and identifying the appropriate context for those emotions. Cheng and
Ye (2010) used another collaborative VE, where autistic children participated in a
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virtual classroom with their avatar, and the avatar of a teacher. Social competence
learning was evaluated in terms of the ability to listen to others, eye-contact, and
understanding of others’ expressions and behaviours. The results were encouraging,
with performance in such abilities improved. Overall, the available evidence is pos-
itive for the use of VEs with autism spectrum disorders, and a key advantage seems
to be also the high acceptance of VR-based interaction of autistic patients, who
also might enable their social interaction following its deployment through avatars,
and in a protected environment as the VE is, with respect to the physical world.
This consideration, however, again leads to the notable fact that studies about the
generalisability of findings collected within the VE are fundamental.
As for application of VEs to schizophrenia, they are relatively more recent, and
mainly address the social interaction difficulties associated to this psychiatric dis-
order. For instance, Park et al. (2011) used a VE for a social skills training based
on role-play. Patients diagnosed with schizophrenia trained their conversational,
assertive, and emotional expression skills through role-playing either in a real en-
vironment, or a VE. Only the use of real actors and videos differentiated the social
training intervention in the real environment with respect to the VE. In the latter,
the social interaction and role play occurred through avatars. The participants in
the VR-based training reported higher motivation for the treatment, while overall
social skills were similar after the standard and the virtual interventions. Inter-
estingly, the participants in the VE-based role playing for social training showed
improved conversational and assertiveness skills over those who took the standard
role-play training. In contrast, the latter resulted better for training non-verbal
skills. Freeman (2008) highlighted also different purposes for VE applications to
schizophrenia. Social perception of others has been assessed on schizophrenic pa-
tients with a VE by Kim et al. (2006). They were successful at finding the social
impairments present in these patients in terms of interpretation of relevant cues
in the VE, and emotion recognition of avatars. Concerning the development VR-
based treatments for schizophrenia, their potential is discussed by Freeman (2008),
but their actual implementation and trial are still lacking. Freeman (2008) suggest
three possible ways of employing VEs for developing treatments for schizophrenia:
how symptoms are modulated by specific factors, e.g., by simulated hallucinations
in a VE after specific emotional manipulations; a kind of VRET to persecutory
fears; and training about how to maintain engagement in a social situation, when
the symptoms arise.
Examples of Applications to Pain Control
Applications of VEs to analgesia are based on the idea that the multimodal stim-
ulation provided by an immersive VE is able to alter the perceptual representation
of one’s body, thus shifting attention away from the pain perception, and induce
an analgesic effect. Furthermore, a higher sense of presence in the VE (Malloy and
Milling, 2010), and a more active participation in it, i.e., maximising interactivity
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with the VE Wender et al. (2009), proved to be factors influencing the pain relieving
effect of the virtual experience. The most studied VE application for pain attenu-
ation is to burn wound care. Hoffman et al. (2004) presented a water-friendly VR
system capable of delivering an immersive, three-dimensional VE to a patient while
undergoing wound care procedures in a hydrotank. The system is water-friendly
as electron-based images are converted to photon-based images, and conveyed to a
head-mounted display wore by the patient in the hydrotank via optic fibers, pre-
venting from any electrical shock risks. The VE represents an icy three-dimensional
canyon with a river and waterfalls, and the patient may shoot snowballs at snowmen,
igloos, robots, and penguins in the VE by pointing the gaze and hitting a button
on a joystick. Animations and spatial sound effects are associated to the snowballs
impact. The study compared a 3-minute wound care procedure without the VE
distraction, with a 3-minute procedure while experiencing the VE. It is a single case
study: on 0–10 scales, the patient rated a sensory pain decrease from 7 to 2, and
an affective pain decrease from 6 to 3 passing from the no-VE condition to the VE
condition. Also the amount of time spent thinking of the pain dropped significantly.
The sense of presence was rated as 7, qualified as moderate. Hoffman et al. (2008)
extended the research with a controlled study, which confirmed the reduction of the
worst pain severity, and highlighted a correlation between the sense of presence in
the VE, and how much the pain dropped.
A more recent application of VE to pain control capitalises on the plasticity of body
schema. In this framework VR seems capable to induce the sense of ownership for
a virtual limb (Perez-Marcos et al., 2009), and even to trigger out-of-body exper-
iences (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). In this context, research is probably still too
initial for considering clinical applications, however, Murray et al. (2010) presented
positive findings in an exploratory study that used VEs to harness visual imagery
of upper-limb amputees in order to reduce the phantom limb pain. VEs where the
patients can complete tasks with a virtual limb, gaining a more robust illusion of
owning and controlling the virtual limb, showed benefits when compared with the
mainstream approach of the mirror-box (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran,
1996), where instead the patient sees the image of the anatomical remaining limb on
a mirror in a location compatible with the amputated limb, and is instructed to move
the remaining one. The visual feedback actually reduces the phantom limb pain,
but the reduction is rapidly lost after removal of this visual feedback. VEs might
be useful to alleviate this problem. This may also be considered as an application
to pain control.
2.6. Summary Discussion
The applications of Virtual Environments to cognitive science considered in the
previous sections focused on the medical domain, for two main reasons. First, we
believe the categorisation proposed for medical applications is especially capable of
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underscoring and widely encompassing all the prerogatives of VEs useful for cognit-
ive science and beyond. Second, the applications to medicine are more numerous
compared to the non-medical ones in the field of cognitive neuroscience, which non-
etheless are growing in the recent years, because VR systems are becoming compat-
ible with neuroimaging techniques, and because of the advances in brain-computer
interfaces that open up new ways of research (see Bohil et al., 2011 for an up-to-
date review on applications of VR to neuroscience). Overall, we propose a summary
framework for VEs applications for cognitive science as depicted in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5.: Summary chart to graphically outline the categories of virtual environments applica-
tions for cognitive sciences. The background-shaded bubbles in the chart indicate the categories
that include applications for cognitive science. The links between “Interaction-centred Applica-
tions”, “Neuroscience Research”, and “Other domains” remark the possibility that interaction-
centred applications of virtual environments are not exclusively found in medicine.
Non-medical applications of VR to neuroscience research, which are not considered
in detail here, but are included in the framework, focus on spatial cognition and
navigation, and, more recently, on the ability of VR to induce body-transfer illu-
sions (Bohil et al., 2011), as briefly mentioned when introducing the most recent
applications to pain control.
In cognitive assessment and rehabilitation many applications have been proposed,
and, at least to some extent, evaluated. In particular, VEs have been proposed
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to address impairments of attention, memory, spatial abilities, executive functions,
and language. Generally, all the applications yielded positive results when evaluated,
demonstrating that the potential of VEs for NA and CR is concrete. In fact, studies
on psychometric tests in VE usually correlate with standard tests, and, when the
point has been addressed, also with functioning in the real-world. This correspond-
ence is one of the crucial advantages of VE applications in the field. Also VR-based
rehabilitation interventions were associated with positive outcomes, although a large
number of VEs applications are oriented to assessment. However, some limitations
are still present, which require additional research, and also design principles for the
VR systems which foster their spreading among clinicians and professional therap-
ists. First, there is a lack of large studies comparing the effect of VEs with those of
standard assessment procedures and therapies, and of standardisation of VR-based
protocols. This can be achieved over time (often the history of a VE application
hardly exceeds a decade), but the process might be hindered. The hindrance is the
second limiting factor of VEs applications in this field: the requirement of special
competences for handling the VR equipment, both during the intervention itself,
and for preparing the virtual tasks. This limitation can be overcome with the ad-
junct of user-friendly interfaces for the therapists, who can directly and dynamically
operate on the objects and the behaviours of a VE at a high abstraction level to
adapt the task for the patient, being understood the essential requirement that
medical, professional, engineering, and computer science components must cooper-
ate throughout the whole process from the design of the VE application for a well
defined target population and intervention, to its implementation, pilot validation,
and standard use. A general remark emerging from the discussions of the different
VEs applications, is that they are not intended and suitable to replace the current
tools. Rather, they deploy themselves as valuable adjuncts which solve limitations
of current standard interventions, and offer additional capabilities not conceivable
with mainstream paradigms.
Looking at the specific application sub-domains, the area of language disorders seems
to have been the less attractive for VEs applications, likely because contexts like
executive dysfunctions, and memory impairments more evidently and directly took
advantage from the impact of ecologically valid environments. Moreover, the pos-
sibility to move within a 3-D VE is a key benefit, which has anyway less impact
on language disorders. In the attention sub-domain, the number of applications is
not as large as the ubiquitous nature of attention would suggest. Indeed, the major
application is the “Virtual Classroom” (Rizzo et al., 2006), which mainly addresses
ADHD assessment. Also a VR-based assessment of divided attention during car
driving is proposed (Lengenfelder et al., 2002), but no applications specifically ded-
icated to the other abilities of attention are available. A final remark concerns the
applications of VE for assessment and rehabilitation of cognitive impairments as-
sociated to prevailing age-related diseases, like Alzheimer and Parkinson’s diseases.
Considering the pace at which the prevalence of such diseases is increasing, and the
effect this has on the society, it is expected in the near future that a burst of research
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and translational effort will be put on applications of VEs for the assessment and
treatment of these kinds of prevailing age-related impairments.
The applications in psychotherapy seem to be somewhat more advanced — also due
to a relatively longer history —, at least for the virtual reality exposure therapy
in the treatment of anxiety disorders (specific phobias, social anxiety disorder, and
post-traumatic stress disorder). Also these applications are not yet become standard
clinical protocols, but a significantly greater number of controlled studies have been
carried out to compare them with standard psychotherapies. Furthermore, the psy-
chological connotation of the disorders targeted within this category, in contrast to
the neurological prominence of the disorders considered in the NA and CR categor-
ies, contributes to boost part of the research related to VEs applications to mental
health, because such research lies on the same line of emerging research challenges
about more basic neuroscience, which are studying the transformational power of
VR, i.e., how VR can affect body perception and representation, the sense of self,
and the sense of agency. The ability to leverage this power of VR would constitute
an extraordinary breakthrough towards a brand new generation of interventions. A
similar argument is valid for applications involving autonomous virtual characters,
very useful for social skills training, and exposure therapy to treat social anxiety
disorder . Indeed, devising applications of new technologies in order to promote
social inclusion, especially of those impaired due to ageing, is a hot topic in the
current research agenda of information and communication technologies for health.
Lastly, a kind of application of VEs which did not emerge from the examples presen-
ted in the previous sections is the use of serious games for rehabilitation purposes.
The issue is worthy the mention, notwithstanding it is not a VE application in a
strict sense. Serious gaming applications are the implementation of rehabilitation
tasks as game-like tasks, in the attempt to strengthen the patient’s motivation, and
focus her/his attention on the rehabilitation process, rather than on the pain, also
avoiding mind wandering during the exercise. These applications, which may be
used for both sensorimotor training and cognitive rehabilitation (Rego et al., 2010),
differ from those described previously, because they are computer games, not ne-
cessarily VEs, but they use technological components of VR systems. Technologies
capturing the patient’s movement and gestures are used, like structured 3-D laser
scanners and accelerometer-based motion sensing systems used in commercial game
consoles. These technologies enable a natural interaction paradigm with the com-
puter presenting the game environment, and allow for the digital capture of patient’s
performance. Given the motion component usually inherent in these games, most
applications are for motor rehabilitation (e.g., balance and upper limb rehabilitation
for patients with spinal cord injuries, and post-stroke respectively). For cognitive re-
habilitation and psychotherapy, only a few studies have been undertaken, and they
offered a complementary therapy of impulse-related disorders (Fernández-Aranda
et al., 2012), and a training means for spatial and verbal memory rehabilitation in
patients with traumatic brain injuries (Caglio et al., 2009). These 3-D video games
may associate sensorimotor and cognitive training in the same environment. Thus,
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when adopting VR technologies they are transversal within the framework proposed
in Figure 2.5, as they may apply to either cognitive or mental disorders, and may
even encompass both sensorimotor and cognitive training in the same application.
2.7. Motivation for Virtual Environments for
Studying Attention
All the cognitive domains considered in the proposed categorisation (see Figure 2.3)
are important for human adaptive functioning in daily living. However, compared to
the other domains attention is rather special, as it is a multidimensional construct,
which affects multiple perceptual and cognitive operations. Indeed, attention se-
lects incoming information and modulates its processing, so as to privilege relevant
information, and block out the noise, which is determined dynamically, according
to the current goals of the individual, and to the state of the environment. This
influences also other cognitive domains: for example visual attention is necessary
for an appropriate spatial behaviour, and selective attention biases what is stored
in memory. The different attentional abilities referred to in section 2.4 are the mac-
roscopic evidence of this process, and they are often assessed in task contexts which
are abstract, making it difficult to motivate the patient, and to yield results gen-
eralisable to the daily living functioning. As discussed above, this problem can be
partly tackled by leveraging on the VEs prerogatives, but a common characteristic
shared among non-medical and medical applications of VEs to cognitive science is
that they both somewhat neglect the study of attention. Some attention abilities
are assessed in children suffering from ADHD(Rizzo et al., 2006) and in patients
with TBI (Lengenfelder et al., 2002), while VEs applications to basic neuroscience
do not consider attention as a primary focus.
Additionally, the studies of applications found in the scientific literature generally
evaluate attention at a macroscopic time scale. The time course of attention is chiefly
considered for assessing vigilance, i.e., over an extended period of time — several
seconds, or minutes — while the basic time course of attention influencing which
stimuli are brought to an individual’s awareness, and which are not, operates on the
time scale of a few hundred milliseconds, or less. At the best of our knowledge these
temporal aspects have not yet been studied within a virtual environment, leaving
two questions open. Firstly, whether the time course of selective attention in a VE
is similar to that in a real environment, or to that expressed when interacting with
a computer, like in a video game. Secondly, whether stimuli presented in a VE,
which may be more natural per se and included in a meaningful context, are able to
elicit an attentional response different than the simpler, abstract stimuli commonly
used in laboratory tests. The answers to these two questions are useful also in view
of possible applications to assess the time course of selective attention in a neuro-
psychological assessment perspective, as well as in a perspective assessing attention
biases in mental disorders. Indeed, biases of the time course of attention have been
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postulated, and partially demonstrated for emotional processing in general, and also
studied in relation to anxiety disorders (de Jong et al., 2010, 2009). Therefore, before
thinking about the potential incorporation of assessment tools of the time course of
selective attention in a VE application, it is necessary to investigate the more basic
research questions formulated above.
In the present thesis the two questions are instantiated in two experiments. In both
instantiations the empirical probing task is the typical experimental paradigm used
for studying the time course of selective attention, that is the attentional blink. This
is an attentional deficit that may arise when an individual is requested to report two
targets appearing in a rapid serial presentation of distractors, and the two targets
onset asynchrony is shorter than 400–500 ms. A similar experimental paradigm has
been used in two empirical studies reported in the following chapters (chapter 4 and
chapter 5). In the first study the time course of attention has been assessed with
simple, abstract stimuli, in the real environment. In this case the capability of a
relatively short and mild integrative body-mind training to make more efficient the
temporal distribution of attentional resources has been investigated. The modified
attention distribution is reflected by a quicker time course of attention processing.
In the second study, the two research questions mentioned above in relation to VEs
are considered more directly. In fact, the attentional blink paradigm is explored
in the VE compared to its classical administration on a computer screen, and the
visual stimuli used are less abstract and meaningfully related to the used VE.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical basis about attention, and the attentional blink
phenomenon, while chapter 4 and chapter 5 introduce the specific rationale for,
describe, and discuss the two empirical studies undertaken.
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This chapter introduces the cognitive component of the thesis. Indeed, the funda-
mentals about human attention and its temporal aspects, with a special emphasis on
the attentional blink phenomenon are presented. These aspects are in fact explored
in the empirical case studies described and discussed in next chapters. Several tax-
onomies are possible for attention, reflecting its multifarious nature as well as the
multiplicity of processes and behaviours it prominently influences. Attention has
been widely studied in virtually all of these aspects, but its time course has been
addressed more recently. Rapid Serial Visual Presentations (RSVP) are the typical
experimental paradigms used to tap temporal attention, and the attentional blink
(AB) is probably the most studied phenomenon arising from dual-target RSVP. In
the following sections, after the provision of background information about atten-
tion and its major characteristics and properties, the AB is introduced with the
associated empirical findings. Formal and informal models of AB are summarised,
and some open issues are proposed that will serve as the rationale for the empirical
case studies presented in next chapters.
3.1. Human Attention
The word attention is a very common one, widely used in diverse contexts. However,
the specific meaning it takes is not always the same, although a shared idea underpins
all such meanings.
For example, the first meaning reported by the online version of the Oxford Dic-
tionaries Online (2012) is: “notice taken of someone or something; the regarding
of someone or something as interesting or important”. The first meaning indic-
ated by the Cambridge Dictionaries Online (2012) is even more general: “notice,
thought or interest”, but it explicitly introduces a mental connotation of atten-
tion. This connotation is still more clear in the definitions of attention found on the
Merriam-Webster Dictionaries Online (2012): “the act or state of applying the mind
to something” and “a condition of readiness for such attention involving especially
a selective narrowing or focusing of consciousness and receptivity”. Another inter-
esting observation is that often attention is defined in reference to an action. In this
respect, the other definitions of attention from the Cambridge Dictionaries Online
(2012) report of “catch somebody’s attention”, “pay attention to something”, “turn
your attention to something” and “the centre of attention”.
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These definitions, albeit not so specific, still provide important distinctive elements
of attention. First, rather than defining what attention is, they suggest what at-
tention does. Indeed, according to all the definitions, attention is some unspecified
act, state or condition that notices, regards as interesting or thinks of something or
somebody. Second, attention is connected to the human mind: it works by applying
the mind. Third, attention can be directed to a centre of attention, as attention can
be caught, payed and turned to. Lastly, attention is also connected to readiness,
and, especially, to selection and focus of consciousness and receptivity.
These distinctive elements actually reflect important characteristics of human at-
tention, and show, as already pointed out in 1890 by James (1890) — and quoted
in almost every textbook including a chapter about attention — that “everyone
knows what attention is.”. Indeed, everyone knows what attention does, at least at
an overt macroscopic level: attention refers to the ability to attend to stimuli, but
this is only part of the story about attention; and the wide use and intuitive, almost
innate, nature of the concept of attention has contributed to a twofold situation.
On one side the amount of scientific research works conducted on attention over
the last century and more is huge, addressing many different aspects of attention;
on the other side, attention is often treated as a catch-all term, lacking the details
of the different mechanisms and functions that attention moderates or contribute
to. Next sections of this chapter cannot of course be exhaustive about attention.
Rather, they attempt to provide an overview about its characteristics and functions
that should prove useful to understand the rationale and results of the empirical
case studies presented in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
3.2. Attention in Human Information Processing
Attention has a crucial role in performance. In fact it is through attention that we
are able to achieve our goals, essentially because we are able to maintain a coherence
between our perceptions and our actions in view of our intentions and goals.
Several accounts have been proposed to explain attention and the functions it serves
in performance, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to present an extensive
compendium of these theories and their differences. Instead, it is possible and
productive for this work to outline the basic characteristics of attention emerged
from different research works. These basic characteristics can be considered as the
fundamentals of human attention.
A first step to understand the role of attention in performance, and also what are
some related research questions, is to consider how information is processed by the
human mind. A basic information processing model is shown in Figure 3.1.
This three-stage model is an adaptation of what proposed by Proctor and Van Zandt
(2008) and Johnson and Proctor (2004). Their accounts are not the uniqe general
frameworks proposed for describing the flow of information in the human from the
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Figure 3.1.: A basic model of the human information processing. The major stages are reported:
usually in this kind of models each stage represents a set of processes or functions.
perception of an environmental stimulus up to the execution of a response. Several
models have been discussed, also for specific sources of information, e.g., visual or
auditory information, and each stage in the model need to be further developed to
a greater detail for in-depth analysis and understanding of information processing.
However, the three-stage model allows to catch the fundamental elements of human
information processing, to highlight the different roles of perception and cognition
— although the boundaries between the two are quite elusive — and the role of
selective attention.
Each stage of the nodel indicates a major function or process accomplished on the
information coming from various sources. Actually, as already mentioned, the pro-
cesses are composed of sub-processes, but they are grouped in a single stage because
they can be mapped onto the three general domains of perception, cognition and
action.
In the first stage perceptual processing occurs: the stimuli coming from the en-
vironment reach with their physical properties the sensory systems. The different
physical properties elicit responses from different sensory modalities (e.g., visual,
aural, somatosensory), therefore the information associated to a modality uses an
input channel to the brain that is dedicated to that specific modality. Clearly, mean-
ingful stimulations are often multimodal, i.e., they are composed of stimuli coming
from sources with physical properties characteristic of different sensory modalities:
the information processing must be able to “recompose” the component stimuli,
which are unimodal, and interpret the resulting pattern to execute in the end an
appropriate response, i.e., to show an appropriate behaviour, part of a consistent
performance. This is achieved in the subsequent stages. Perceptual processing is the
first step towards the “recomposition”, and its goal is to detect, discriminate, and
identify stimuli. This stage is mainly a bottom-up processing, driven by the sensory
inputs.
The top-down processing intervenes in the second stage, the cognitive stage, that
resorts to comparisons, arithmetic operations and decision-making in order to de-
termine the appropriate response to the stimulation. Important characteristics of
this stage are the potential recourse to knowledge stored in memory, and the com-
parison of the stimuli among them or with the retrieved memories. The appropriate
response is selected among different alternatives according to the circumstances.
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The final stage is aimed at executing, if necessary, an overt response. In some
accounts the actual response selection is shifted from the cognitive stage to this stage.
Then the response is programmed, i.e., the movement is planned, and translated into
neuromuscular commands used to control the effectors, e.g. the hand or limbs, which
execute the response.
It is worthy noticing that there is no direct matching between a single stage in the
information processing model, and a single structure in the brain: multiple struc-
tures contribute to the three processing functions, and there is no exact mapping of
the model functions in the cortical topography.
The role of attention in the framework of human information processing is to con-
trol the flow of information. Such a control can be exerted at different levels and
with different mechanisms. This general role of attention is also a reason for the
impossibility to isolate attention as a single process, because it encompasses both
the perceptual and cognitive domains. Attention cannot be regarded as a unitary
construct. An interesting characterisation is proposed from Chun et al. (2010), who
consider attention as a fundamental property of multiple perceptual and cognitive
operations.
From a general point of view, it should be considered that every stage of the in-
formation processing can be affected by different types of limitations, and that there
is an overall limited capacity to the amount of information that can be processed
moment-to-moment. At any moment in our life, we are bombarded with an un-
countable bunch of stimuli coming from the environment and stimulating our sens-
ory systems. In fact, our behaviours are appropriate only if we can efficiently cope
with all this information. Since our information processing resources are limited,
some sort of filtering is then indefeasible. Attention just comes at this point, i.e., to
enable a selection process of the incoming information. This fundamental function of
attention is referred to as selective attention (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Desimone
and Duncan, 1995). The limited capacity at processing the information relevant for
achieving intended goals has been postulated as the necessity out of which attention
evolved (Pashler et al., 2001).
Another function of attention is modulation. The difference between selection and
modulation is that attention biases the competition among competing options in
favour of one of them through selection; then it influences the processing of the
selected item. The influence exerted once selection is accomplished is modulation,
which cannot occur without selection (Levin and Simons, 1997). Attention with
modulation determines the extent to which information is processed, but also speed
and accuracy of a response, and if the associated event will be remembered. There-
fore attention affects various stages of the information processing. Vigilance, i.e.
attention sustained over time, which is very important for many everyday tasks, is
related to the modulatory effects of attention: modulation is the immediate effect
of attention on selected stimuli and is necessary to sustain attention over extended
periods of time.
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As to the relationship of attention with information processing, a still controversial
issue is where does selection occur in the flow. Two views are possible: an early-
selection view and a late-selection view. The former considers the locus of selection
at the perceptual stage, in a way that some stimuli are almost completely ignored,
without undergoing any semantic processing. In contrast, in the late-selection view
information is selected after the perceptual stage, when some dgree of semantic pro-
cessing has been carried out. Therefore, the question is about the processing of
unattended stimuli. A recent approach to this problem proposed by Lavie et al.
(2004) considers that the two views are not mutually exclusive, rather, they might
be both applicable depending on how difficult is to process the target stimuli. Spe-
cifically, if the attended target is easy, i.e., it has a low perceptual load, then there is
an excess of attentional resources that go to the processing of the unattended stim-
uli, entailing a late selection. On the contrary, when the attended target (possibly
a task) is difficult, it draws all attention, and distractors go less processed, as in
early-selection views.
Perceptual load is thus a determinant of task difficulty. Typically, perceptual load is
manipulated in the visual modality, and it includes the number of competing items
in a display and the similarity between targets and non-targets (Torralbo and Beck,
2008).
3.3. Attention Metaphors
Due to the lacking of a simple defintion of what attention is, and in view of the
importance of attention in human performance, also some useful metaphors of at-
tention have been used in the history of attention studies to operationally deal with
attentional experiments.
The Spotlight of Attention This is a metaphor that could be also named the
focus of attention, and reminds to the dictionary definition mentioning “the centre
of attention”. This metaphor has an inherent spatial connotation, but it can be
enunciated in general terms. Attention selects the information that is relevant for
the task at hand, and modulates its processing. Within the spotlight of attention
the processing is more efficient: the reaction times are faster, the features composing
the stimuli are bounded in a single object that can be recognised as a whole, and
discrimination is firmer (Shipp, 2004). The focus of attention identifies the core
of the spotlight, and it reminds of another property of attention according to the
dictionary definitions: the possibility to direct attention. The focus of attention,
that can be thought of as anchored to the spotlight, can be directed to different
sources of information or stimuli.
Spatial attention is the term used to indicate the property of attention to be allocated
to different locations across space. For example, one can visually track a moving
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object: in this case the spotlgiht, or the focus of attention is moved across space,
and the stimuli occurring outside such a spotlight are unattended — unless they are
particularly salient. When spatial attention is guided by eye movements it is said to
be overt, whereas it is covert when a location is attended without acccompanying
eye movements.
A metaphor similar to the spotlight of attention is that of a gradient of attention
in space: there is still a focus, but as the distance from the focus increases, the
perceptual efficiency decreases.
Attentional Resources This metaphor refers to a limited resource model of atten-
tion, which can be allocated to the different tasks under the control of an executive
system (Fernandez-Duque and Johnson, 2002). Attention is considered as a resource
available up to a limited amount. This amount has to be shared among the multiple
tasks to be accomplished in parallel. When the requirements of attentional resources
exceed the limit, performance degrades, and prioritisation of tasks execution may
be activated (McDowd, 2007). This metaphor originally foresaw a single pool of
attentional resources (Kahneman, 1973), and it was useful to explain dual-task in-
terference. However, this view of the metaphor has then been criticised, based on
evidence that increasing the difficulty of a primary task, does not necessarily entail
a degradation of the performance of a secondary effortful task. Consequently, mod-
els foreseeing multiple reservoirs of attentional resources have been proposed (Navon
and Gopher, 1979) and (Pashler, 1998), postulating that the interference occurs only
when two tasks spill resources from the same reservoir.
The advantage of this limited capacity metaphor over the spotlight one is that the
latter does not account for a graded allocation of resources to different tasks, since
even the gradient version of the metaphor does not allow for a reduction in the “light
intensity” at the primary focus when a secondary task comes at hand.
Attentional Effort Here the effort refers to the experience of “paying more at-
tention” when confronted with a challenging task, also based on the motivation to
maintain attentional performance (Sarter et al., 2006; McDowd, 2007).
In general the metaphor of attentional effort is less central in the scientific literature
about attention than the capacity-limited-based metaphors described in previous
paragraphs. Anyway, there are two conceptions of this attentional metaphor. The
more general one regards the attentional effort as a function of task difficulty, and
is incorporated in the limited capacity models of attentional processing. In this
conception the attentional effort essentially depends on the task demands, and spe-
cifically it increases as a function of tasks demands. Another conception proposed
in the work by Sarter et al. (2006) posits the attentional effort is a cognitive incent-
ive on attentional performance. Particularly, the attentional effort is “activated”
by top-down mechanisms to counteract the decline in performance. The top-down
activation depends on the motivational contingencies of the performer.
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3.4. Attention Taxonomies
Assuming that attention is a ubiquitous concept as it is crucially involved in virtually
all human behaviours, that no unitary construct of attention exists, and that the
general role of attention is to control information processing, several taxonomies can
be built for attention.
One of these taxonomies, commonly used when dealing with rehabilitation of atten-
tion impairments, is based on attentional abilities to be deployed in the context of
specific tasks:
• Arousal is the level of alertness with respect to response to the environment.
There are both a tonic and a phasic arousal: the former is the day-to-day
alertness, independent of the immediate task demand, while the latter is the
ability to respond to changes in the environment, or in task demand.
• Focused attetnion is one’s ability to focus on a specific object or stimulus,
especially visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli, and discretely respond to them
ignoring distractors.
• Sustained attention (a.k.a. Vigilance) is the ability to sustain a focused atten-
tion sate over an extended period of time, e.g., requiring a repetitive response.
• Divided attention is the ability to simultaneously attend to, and respond to
multiple tasks at a time. It includes also the concept of alternating attention
as the ability to move between tasks, which have differrent cognitive require-
ments.
• Executive attention includes those attentional functions aimed at controlling
one’s thoughts and actions to produce a coherent behaviour (e.g., initiating
a task, making a decision, etc.). However, when dealing with rehabilitation,
executive attention (often also referred to under the heading of executive con-
trol, cognitive control, or conflict monitoring) is usually not included in the
taxonomy of attention. Rather, it is associated to the executive functions.
Another interesting taxonomy differentiates external attention from internal atten-
tion (Chun et al., 2010). This taxonomy is particularly valuable because it incorpor-
ates several other distinctions used to classify attention, and highlights its linkage
to information processing. Specifically, external attention selects and modulates in-
formation coming from the sensory systems, whereas internal attention selects and
modulates internally-generated information, such as the content of working memory,
or a task set.
Thereby, exogenous attention, also referred to as bottom-up or stimulus-driven atten-
tion, which is captured for example by salient, modality-specific stimuli in the envir-
onment, falls under external attention. On the other hand, the complementary form
of attention, that is endogenous attention, or top-down attention is goal-directed,
and falls under internal attention. In fact, stimulus-driven attention may have as
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a target spatial locations, time points, sensory modalities, elementary features, and
entire objects. Instead, goal-directed attention has as targets cognitive representa-
tions, such as the representations in working memory, and long-term memory, the
rules, and the reponse selection appropriate for achieving the goals set out for the
task at hand. From this view a distinction between spatial attention and temporal
attention emerges, which is of special importance for the empirical work presented
in this dissertation.
Spatial attention prioritises spatial locations in the environment, and may be overt,
or covert with respect to the use of eye movements to guide attention to attend
a spatial location. In contrast, temporal attention deploys over time, by attending
objects all appearing at the same spatial location, but at different time points. Both
of these attention types have limited capacity: there is a limited number of objects
which can be attended across space, and a limited number of objects that can be
attended over time. Specifically, this capacity-limited aspect of temporal attention
is a key point in the study of the time course of attention, which is less studied
than spatial aspects of attention, and is the target of the experiments presented in
chapter 4 and chapter 5 of this dissertation. The role of attention in information
processing entails that the time course of attention, or rather the limited number of
objects that may be attended over time, is a constraint to the rate of information
processing. This is linked also to the limited capacity of working memory, so that
temporal attention manifestations are explained in frameworks that implicate not
only attention, but also perceptual stages of processing, and encoding/consolidation
of information in working memory. Next section (section 3.5) delves into this aspect,
by presenting the attentional blink phenomenon, widely adopted to tap temporal
attention, the associated empirical evidence, and the models proposed to explain it.
A complementary view for a framework of attention is based on functionally and/or
anatomically distinct brain networks underpinning attention-related mechanisms.
Two frameworks have been proposed, and are reported here, because although less
directly linked to temporal attention, they introduce dissociable systems of attention
mentioned in scientific works about the relations between attention and meditation
(see for example Jha et al., 2007).
One framework is that of Attention Netwroks, proposed by Posner and Petersen
(1990). Here there are three brain networks corresponding to three dissociable
functions of attenion: alerting, orienting, and executive attention. Alerting is the
achievement and maintenance of a vigilant and alert state of high sensitivity to
incoming stimuli. Orienting is the selection of information from sensory input, es-
pecially as a result of moving the attention focus across space, and engaging it on
targets. Executive attention encompasses mechanisms for monitoring and resolution
of conflicts among competing options (thoughts, feelings, responses). These net-
works have correspondent anatomical structures in the brain (Posner and Rothbart,
2007): the locus coeruleus, right frontal and parietal cortices for alerting; super-
ior parietal cortex and temporal parietal junction, frontal eye fields and superior
colliculus for orienting; and anterior cingulate, lateral ventral and prefrontal cor-
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tices, and basal ganglia for executive attention. Norepinephrine, Acetylcholine, and
Dopamine are the respective chemical modulators involved in the attention networks.
There is substantive behavioural and neuroimaging evidence about predictions for-
mulated relying on the attention networks framework. Those about meditation and
attention are reported in section 4.1 for corroborating the rationale of our empirical
Study 1.
In the same rationale for our Study 1 it is mentioned another framework that indi-
viduates two dissociable systems in the brain: the dorsal system of attention, and
the ventral system of attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). The dorsal sys-
tem is implicated in preparing and applying goal-directed selection of stimuli and
responses. It is modulated by stimuli detection, and includes intraparietal and su-
perior frontal cortices. The ventral system works as a circuit breaker for the dorsal
system, directing attention to salient or unexpected events. The ventral fronto-
parietal system is right-lateralised. In terms of the relationship between attention
networks and dorsal/ventral systems of attention, there is evidence of activation of
dorsal sub-regions for input-level and response-level selection in correspondence to
orienting and conflicts monitoring respectively (Jha et al., 2007).
3.5. Temporal Attention and the Attentional Blink
(AB)
A fundamental role of attention is to select and modulate the processing of in-
formation relevant for performance, to the detriment of irrelevant information. This
selection is required to cope with the limitations inherent in human information pro-
cessing. As briefly mentioned in section 3.2, perceptual, cognitive and action stages
of human information processing may all be affected by three kinds of limitations:
data-limited processing — when the input information is degraded; resource-limited
processing — when the processing system does not have the ability to efficiently
handle a piece of information if certain requirements are exceeded; and structurally-
limited processing — when the system is unable to accomplish several operations
at once (Proctor and Van Zandt, 2008). A limitation that is critical in the inform-
ation processing flow is that imposed by working memory, which may contain only
a limited number of items at a time. When attending to several concurring stimuli,
the ability to explicitly report them depends on their encoding in working memory.
Therefore the interaction between attention and working memory is important. This
particularly emerges in temporal attention, i.e., when attention is allocated to a
stream of stimuli appearing at different time-points, but in the same location in
space, and this stream is characterised by a high rate, e.g., 8–10 stimului/s. In this
situation there may be interference between the presentation of the stimuli to the
senses, their selection by attention, and their encoding and retrieval from working
memory.
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3.5.1. Attention and Working Memory
Along with attention, memory plays an important role in human information pro-
cessing. A typical distinction when dealing with memory is between long-term
memory and short-term memory. The attributes long-term and short-term refer to
how long — or short — is information maintained in the respective memory stor-
ages. Working memory is a system that has a short-term storage as its component,
but also includes the ability to manipulate the information temporarily maintained
in such a storage (Hitch and Baddeley, 2010).
One of the most influential models of Working Memory (WM) is the Baddeley and
Hitch’s one (Baddeley et al., 1974). It posits a system comprising at least three in-
teractive subsystems: an attentional control system, and two short-term storages for
visual and acoustic material respectively. In a successive evolution (Baddeley, 2000)
the model included a third temporary store, the episodic buffer, which holds mul-
tidimensional episodes combining multimodal information. Therefore, the episodic
buffer is the component of WM where information encoded from different sensory
modalities interact, and this interaction is also extended to the content of long-term
memory (Baddeley, 2010). In the light of the three-stage model introduced for hu-
man information processing in section 3.2 and depicted in Figure 3.1, WM is part of
the cognitive stage, and it has important interactions with attention, especially in
relation to the attentional blink deficit, which will be introduced in subsection 3.5.2.
An important characteristic of WM is that it is capacity-limited, i.e., at any moment
in time it can maintain a limited amount of information. In particular, the episodic
buffer is assumed to have a maximum capacity of four episodes (Baddeley, 2010),
and there is evidence that visual WM capacity is of about four objects, while the
maximum capacity of WM for verbal information is about seven chunks (Chun et al.,
2010).
As for the Baddeley’s model of WM, attention selects what perceptual information
enters into WM, and this function is especially critical just for the capacity-limited
nature of WM. Perceptual characteristics of the material to be encoded may affect
the capacity limit for maintenance in WM: for example binding multiple features
in a single object increases the capacity of visual WM (Luck et al., 1997), whereas
more copmlex features may reduce WM capacity (Alvarez and Cavanagh, 2004).
However, it should be noted that there is also a position that explain such findings
by assuming a fixed number of items maintained in visual WM, independent of
their complexity (Awh et al., 2007). Errors found in change-detection tasks when
the items complexity changes would be attributable to high similarity between the
items, without any change in the number of objects currently maintained in WM.
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies have shown that attention modulates
both the encoding of sensory information, and the encoding at a post-perceptual
stage (see Awh et al., 2006 for a review). In particular, the competitive advantage
granted by selective attention for post-perceptual encoding of attended items has
been interpreted as a clear interaction between attention and WM.
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Encoding/consolidation processes in WM are implicated in the models accounting
the attentional blink phenomenon, an attentional deficit which arises when in a rapid
stream of stimuli all appear at the same spatial location. The carachteristics of this
phenomenon makes it especially suitable for studying temporal aspects of attention.
3.5.2. Attentional Blink
The phenomenon most often singled out for studying temporal aspects of attention
is the attentional blink (AB). AB is not a fresh effect since it was first observed in
1987 (Broadbent and Broadbent, 1987) during an experiment differentiating detec-
tion and identification processes of a target within a rapid serial visual presentation
(RSVP). This effect was then named attentional blink by Raymond et al. (1992),
as alike eye blink it hampered reporting of a target that had to be seen in a serial
visual display.
The visual AB appears when the second (T2) of two targets embedded in a RSVP
of distractors is presented within 200–500ms after the first target (T1). The RSVP
entails that all stimuli, both targets and distractors, appear serially in the same
location of a display for a fraction of a second (typically 100ms or less). Specifically,
the subjects are often not able to report the identity of T2 at the end of the stream,
even though they correctly reported that of T1. When subjects are instructed
to ignore T1 in the same condition — i.e., same perceptual characteristics of the
RSVP stimuli — T2 is usually correctly reported. This means that the AB is not a
perceptual deficit, rather it is attentional. The ususal outcome measure to quantify
the AB is the conditional accuracy of T2 reports, calculated by taking only trials
with a proper report of T1 — referred to as the T2|T1 conditional accuracy.
The AB deficit is experimentally elicited through the AB paradigm that in its
classical form manipulates the Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) between targets
(a.k.a. Target Onset Asynchrony, TOA), i.e., the period of time elapsing between
the onset of the two targets T1 and T2 in a RSVP. T1–T2 SOA is manipulated
in successive different RSVPs. Participants are asked after every RSVP to make
an unspeeded report of the targets in their order of appearance. Usually, targerts
and non-target items have an equal presentation duration, and, if present, also the
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) is constant throughout the RSVP. T1–T2 SOA is of-
ten measured in terms of lags since T1 onset: lag-1 means that T1–T2 SOA is
equal to the duration of T1+ ISI if present, that is no items intervene between T1
onset and T2 onset, while lag-3 means that T1–T2 SOA equates the duration of
3 items+3 ? ISI, so 2 targets intervene between T1 onset and T2 onset, etc. In other
terms T1 is in position ’0’, the post-T1 item in the series is in position ’lag 1’, the
second follower is in position ’Lag 2’, and so on. A pitcture illustrating the paradigm
and terminology is presented in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2.: Schematic illustration of a typical AB paradigm with T1–T2 lag=3. The distractors
are letters, while the targets T1 and T2 are the numbers 7 and 2 respectively.
A bunch of studies have undertaken experiments with the classical AB paradigm,
and a typical characteristic of the conditional T2|T1 accuracy compared with the
T1 accuracy has been established (Figure 3.3).
In the last two decades many studies were carried out to elucidate mechanisms and
causes underlying the AB. Although the final word on these issues has not yet been
written, a clear change of perspective may be followed in the scientific literature
about AB (Martens and Wyble, 2010). During the first decade of studies since
the AB discovery, the leading view held that AB derived from a central hard-wired
bottleneck due to a capacity-limited post-perceptual stage of the human information
processing. In particular, in this framework all items presented in a RSVP, targets
and non-targets, are processed up to the formation of semantic representations.
However, in order to be reported after viewing the RSVP, a target requires to reach
the level of conscious awareness, or, in other words, to be encoded and consolidated
in WM; this is achieved by means of a central stage of information processing that is
capacity-limited. Consequently, the consolidation of T1 in a reportable WM content
saturates the capacity of the central stage, and prevents the semantic representaion
of T2 to be consolited in WM, hence precluding the participant in an AB experiment
to report T2 when temporally too close to T1. In other words, it is a resource-
depletion account that prevailed during the first decade of AB studies, attributing
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Figure 3.3.: Typical characteristics of the T2|T1 conditional reporting accuracy and of the T1 re-
porting accuracy as a function of T1–T2 lag, for lag 1=100ms, measured in an AB experimental
paradigm.
to the depletion of limited processing resources operated during T1 processing the
subsequent miss of T2.
More recently, the capacity-limited central stage of human information processing
as the unique mechanism underlying the AB has been questioned (see Martens and
Wyble, 2010; Dux and Marois, 2009 for a review). Specifically, several findings
converge to the conclusion that the structural bottleneck of human information
processing may be a contributing factor underpinning the AB, but not the only
or fundamental one. Some form of attentional control seems instead to play an
important role, and the AB appears to arise from the separate or interacting action
of mechanisms intended to enhance targets or suppress distractors for an efficient
encoding in WM and retrieval for their unspeeded report.
3.5.2.1. Empirical Evidence about the Attentional Blink
The different theories proposed to explain the AB are assessed on the basis of the
extent to which they can account for the diverse empirical findings collected by
means of the AB paradigm and some specific variants. Thence, before outlining the
different theories it is important to describe at least the most prominent findings
connected to the AB.
A first important consideration is the robustness of AB. The effect has been elicited
with diverse types of stimuli, including alphanumerical characters (this is the case
presented in the largest number of works, including the seminal ones), symbols
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(Chun and Potter, 1995), words (Barnard et al., 2004; Luck et al., 1996; Sergent
et al., 2005), pictures (Evans and Treisman, 2005; Potter et al., 2010) and faces
(Einhäuser et al., 2007; Awh et al., 2004), as well as auditory tones (Tremblay et al.,
2005; Duncan et al., 1997) and tactile stimuli (Dell’Acqua et al., 2006). In all these
manifestations, the AB induces an interval lasting for several hundred ms during
which the conscious awareness of a stimulus is impaired.
The AB has not been studied only in a within-modality scheme, with both targets in
the rapid streak belonging to the same modality, being it visual, aural, or tactile. A
fairly debated issue regards indeed whether the AB is a cross-modal deficit or if it is
confined within a specific modality. Controversial results emerged from these stud-
ies. For example Haroush et al. (2011) found that auditory processing is enhanced
during a visual AB: still, their interpretation is not in terms of a visual AB caused
by attentional resources engaged by the auditory T2; rather, they argue that the oc-
currence of the visual AB releases resources, which become available for the auditory
target, hence benefitting of an attentional enhancement. On the contrary, Jolicoeur
(1999) found that a speeded two-choice discrimination task for a sound caused an AB
for detecting the presence of a visual target in a RSVP. Differently, no impairment
at identifying a second visual or auditory target was found by Duncan et al. (1997)
when attending to a concurrent target presented in an independent stream and in
another modality (vision or audition). Cross-modal effects are in favour of views
that assumes the existence of an amodal pool of attentional resources, which are
accessed for identifying targets in dual-task serial presentations independent of the
targets modality. Conversely, experiments showing no between-modality effect on
the AB support the existence of modality-specific resources, which pose restrictions
on attention. A recent study exploiting the individual differences in the magnitude
of observed AB provides important evidence of a cross-modal AB (Martens et al.,
2010). A caveat that is often discussed when challenging the cross-modal AB issue
is that of task switching. There are in fact also results going in the direction of the
necessity of a task switching between the responses required by the two targets for
eliciting a cross-modal AB, e.g., in an audiovisual case (Potter et al., 1998), while a
simple switching between modalities would be not sufficient for an AB (Soto-Faraco
and Spence, 2002).
Another interesting aspect of AB is that its magnitude significantly varies across
individuals, up to an extreme that is represented by non-blinkers, who even do not
show any AB, and are estimated to be the 5% of the general population (Martens
et al., 2006). This inter-individual variability of AB magnitude counteracts the idea
of a structural nature of the AB, opening an avenue for studies that hypothesise
a plasticity of the AB (Slagter et al., 2007; Green et al., 2003). In addition, non-
blinkers have been found better at ignoring distractors (Martens and Valchev, 2009),
with no differences in working memory capacities (Martens and Johnson, 2009). In-
dividual variability of AB magnitude could therefore depend on attention allocation
policies that an individual adopts from trial to trial, determining which objects de-
serve further processing and consolidation in memory (Martens and Wyble, 2010).
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The fact that AB occurrence might depend on individual strategies of attention
allocation is in agreement with another surprising result about the AB: the ad-
dition of concurrent task-irrelevant activity attenuates the AB magnitude (see for
example Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Lapointe-Goupil et al., 2011). The
AB attenuation has been found with the addition of different kinds of task-irrelevant
activity: listening to task-irrelevant music or free task-irrelevant mental association
(Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005), inward/outward visual motion and flickering su-
perimposed on the RSVP (Arend et al., 2006), change in task instructions (Ferlazzo
et al., 2007; Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006), and a concurrent secondary task (Oliv-
ers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Taatgen et al., 2009; Lapointe-Goupil et al., 2011). The
evidence of an alleviated AB has been interpreted in different ways: as the result
of a more diffuse attentional state (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005), as a reduced
interference thanks to less focused attention, which limits the number of atten-
ded distractors, or as an enhanced cognitive flexibility fostered by the concurrent
task (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006). In Arend et al. (Arend et al., 2006) AB atten-
uation roots in the decreased attentional allocation to T1 caused by the concurrent
moving visual background.
Actually, the manipulation of resources allocation to T1 and T2 in the RSVP has
proved to affect AB magnitude. When T1 identification is more difficult, a larger
AB can be found (Taatgen et al., 2009). Also perceptual, spatial, and temporal cues
displayed an effect on AB. If T2 is preceded by a non-target sharing the same colour
in a classical dual-target RSVP, or spatially pre-cued in a dwell-time paradigm, the
AB induced by T1 may be alleviated (Nieuwenstein et al., 2005). Besides, the AB is
postponed, i.e., it appears at longer lags since T1 onset, as long as dostractors sharing
a target-defining feature are used to mask T1 (Olivers and Meeter, 2008). As for
temporal target cueing, Martens and Johnson (2005) found that providing explicit
knowledge about the temporal lag between T1 and T2 for the different trials, either
symbolically or directly showing a couple of cueing symbols with an inter-stimulus
interval corresponding to the temporal information to be conveyed, correspondend
to a reduction of the AB magnitude. The authors’ proposed explanation was in favor
of some degree of top-down attentional control, governed by participants’ intentions,
as a strategy that may in part overcome the restrictions causing the AB.
Lag-1 Sparing The main outcome of an AB paradigm is an impairment at report-
ing T2 in a dual-target RSVP when T2 appears between 200ms and 500ms since T1
onset. However, there is another outcome that somehow deviates from this trend,
and which has been found in more than a half of the experiments studying the AB: it
arises when T2 appears at lag 1 in the stimuli stream. Indeed, looking at Figure 3.3,
the T2|T1 report accuracy is often unimpaired, i.e., no AB is observed, when T1
and T2 are consecutive. This effect is named “lag-1 sparing”, and is reliably found
in many experiments (Visser et al., 1999). Lag-1 sparing is explained in different
ways by the different theories about AB roots and causes. A major distinction
across all the accounts is whether lag-1 sparing depends on the temporal separation
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between T1 and T2 or on the nature of the stimulus appearing at lag-1 position.
The lag-1 sparing phenomenon has been studied also in paradigms that add a spatial
displacement between targets to the temporal separation typical of the AB, and in
paradigms assessing a possible multisensory AB, by using targets eliciting different
sensory modalities, e.g., a visual T1 and an auditory T2. When the spatial location
of T2 changed relative to T1 location, no lag-1 sparing was generally found (Visser
et al., 1999). In addition, the lack of lag-1 sparing is commonly found when there
is a multidimensional change between the defining attributes of T1 and T2 (Visser
et al., 1999). Finally, lag-1 sparing observation depends on how correct reports are
counted: if the reporting order of T1 and T2 is taken into consideration for determ-
ining the correctness of atrial, the lag-1 sparing effect often disappears (Hommel
and Akyürek, 2003).
In the following an overview of the main models proposed to account for the AB and
related empirical evidence is provided. The overview follows a distinction between
informal and formal theories proposed in a review by Dux and Marois (2009). The
section closes with a summary of the main points that can be drawn from the
comparison of the different models, and their analysis in the light of the evidence
cumulated by means of AB-related experiments.
3.5.2.2. Informal Theories
Inhibition Model One of the first informal theories proposed to explain the origin
of the AB was the Inhibition Model (Raymond et al., 1992). The model derived from
a paradigm where T1 was a white letter in a stream of black letters, and T2 was a
black ’X’. According to this model, the detection of T1 physical features (i.e., the
white colour) at an early perceptual stage triggers an attentional response intended
to facilitate T1 identification. Attention is considered to be allocated episodically,
therefore the attentional response corresponds to the initiation of an attentional
episode. Such initiation is metaphorically depicted as a gate that opens to allow
the processing of T1 until its identification is completed. However, if the series
item at lag-1 — indicated as the T1+1 item — is presented before T1 identification
completion, T1 features and T1+1 features would be available together for the iden-
tification process, hence providing a high potential for confusion and identification
errors. For this reason a suppressive mechanism is triggered by T1+1 occurrence,
which inhibits post-perceptual processing of the items trailing T1. This is likened to
the gate closing. Thus, the AB appears because T2 is suppressed until T1 identific-
ation is completed. The exception of lag-1 sparing is motivated by a slow dynamic
of the suppression activation, i.e., the gate closure is slow, and lets T2 pass to the
identification process when it appears as the T1+1 item. Therefore, lag-1 sparing
depends on the temporal proximity between T2 and T1.
Interference Theory The AB occurs also when detection and not identification
of T1 is required (Shapiro et al., 1994). This evidence challenges the inhibition
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model hypothesis that the root of the AB is a mechanism intended to avoid a
features conjunction error during target identification. Specifically, the interference
model posits that the AB deficit occurrence depends on the result of matching items
representations with featural and identification object templates in visual WM (the
terms visual short-term memory, VSTM, is used in the original paper). All items
undergo perceptual processing, and typically T1, T1+1, T2, and T2+1 items gain
access to the VSTM, where they are assigned with weights and interfere for being
retrieved as required by the reporting task. The assigned weighting depends on the
limited capacity of VSTM, and on the degree of similarity between the items. The
AB arises because T2 has a lower weight since VSTM is already close to saturation
of its limited capacity. In contrast, lag-1 sparing occurs because when T2 is in lag-1
position, one less item occupies VSTM (the T1+1 and T2 items coincide in this
case), hence diminishing the interference that causes T2 representation decay in the
AB condition. The explanation of no AB for T1-T2 SOAs longer than 400 ms is not
very specific, mentioning that VSTM is periodically flushed.
Two-Stage Theory An influential model for the AB, which can be considered the
prototype of the so-called bottleneck accounts is the two-stage theory presented
by Chun and Potter (1995). According to such a theory, when a RSVP is presen-
ted, almost all items access a stage 1 of processing, they are recognised, and their
conceptual representations activated. However, in stage 1 each item representation
is volatile, subject to decay or to be overwritten by the trailing items. Therefore,
in order to be later reported, target representations require to undergo a stage 2
of information processing, which encodes and consolidates them in WM. Specific-
ally, when in stage 1 a likely target is detected, a transient attentional response is
triggered, which enhances the target and first post-target item for selection to enter
stage 2. Nonetheless, stage 2 is capacity-limited and its latency exceeds the item
presentaion duration of RSVP. Hence, T2 has to wait for the complete processing
of T1 at stage 1, before entering stage 2 for consolidation in WM and successive
report. The AB arises when T2 appears during T1 processing in stage 2, and its
representaion is lost during the waiting. In this theory, lag-1 sparing is explained by
the fact that the dynamic of the attentional enhancement is not rapid, enhancing
T1 and the item at lag-1 postion: so if T2 appears at lag-1 position, and particularly
within 100 ms from T1 onset, the probability of an AB is dramatically reduced.
The two-stage model derives from the observation that also categorically defined
targets, as black letters in a stream of black digits, may trigger an AB. This is not
in agreement with the inhibition model (Raymond et al., 1992), that argued the
origin of the AB as an error in the conjunction of features with target identity.
Central Interference Theory In this framework, Jolicoeur (1998) extended the
two-stage model with a theory that incorporates both the AB and the psychological
refractory period (PRP). PRP occurs in dual-task paradigms, when paricipants
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have to make separate responses to a primary and a secondary task. The latter is
sequentially presented with respect to the primary task, and partially overlapped,
as it stimulates the participant before she/he has responded to the primary task.
PRP consists in slowing down responses to both tasks (Pashler, 1984). The central
interference theory posits that there is a single locus of interference between the
response to the secondary task and the concurrent processing of the primary task:
this locus is the encoding of information in short-term memory (STM) for T2 in the
AB, also termed consolidation in short-term memory, and the response selection for
the secondary task in PRP. Such processes indeed requires central mechanisms that
are capacity-limited, that is they require certain operations to be performed serially.
For the AB the consolidation of T2 is subject to interference, but the interfering
operations may be multiple, including the encoding of T1 in short-term meory, but
also response selection for T1, retrieval from long-term memory, and the switching
between the primary and secondary task. In this view, the two-stage model (Chun
and Potter, 1995) may be considered as a special case of the central interference
theory, as the former considers the consolidation of T1 in STM the unique source
of AB, whereas the former considers multiple possible causes, as response selection
for T1 (Jolicoeur, 1998).
Attention Dwell Hypothesis This account is against the view of visual attention
as a serial system, capable of rapidly shifting among objects. Specifically, Ward
et al. (1996) formulated the attentional dwell time hypothesis following a series of
experiments manipulating the SOA between targets but also targets spatial loca-
tions. The proposed framework foresees that objects compete in parallel, according
to their matching to a target template, for the allocation of visual processing re-
sources that are limited. The competition process lasts for several hundreds of ms,
and the winning objects undergo extended processing at the expenses of the other
objects, forming representations that contribute to a sustained state in which these
selected representations and their properties are available to guide behaviour. In
this context, AB arises because T1 wins the competition over T2, as T1 enters first
the competition process, and T2 is subject to masking and interference. A greater
number of competing objects, like in a typical RSVP, induces a greater demand on
the capacity-limited visual resources, thus contributing to the AB. No explanation
for lag-1 sparing is offered by the attentional dwell model, since this effect was not
observed in Ward et al. (1996) experiments. This might be due to the spatial dis-
placement among targets adopted for their experiments: indeed, lag-1 sparing is
rarely found when target stimuli appear at different spatial locations (Visser et al.,
1999).
Two-Stage Competition Model This is an extension and modification of the two-
stage theory by Chun and Potter (1995), and it has been proposed in Potter et al.
(2002). The model relies on empirical findings derived from experiments that study
very short T1-T2 SOAs in a variant of the classical AB paradigm. The two stages
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of Chun and Potter’s model are maintained: the first for detection of a potential
target, and identification of the target as its end, and the second, initiated by such
identification resulting from stage 1 and subject to limited capacity, to consolidate
the target in short-term memory. The new claim is that if T2 appears before T1
identification, as attention in stage 1 is labile, T2 attracts attention, accruing re-
sources faster thanks to the attentional response triggered by T1 detection. This is
the reason of the lag-1 sparing effect, and of an accuracy superiority of T2 over T1,
with a relevant proportion of reversals in T1-T2 reporting, at very short SOAs (e.g.,
shorter than 53 ms in Potter et al., 2002 experiments). Especially, for lag-1 sparing,
what might happen according to this model is that T1-T2 SOA is shorter than the
time needed to identify T1 such that T2 enters stage 2 for consolidation and later
report, but enough long for T1 to be briefly retained without stage 2 processing, and
be correctly reported with T2. The temporal position of T1 in the RSVP becomes
determinant for a privileged access to stage 2 as long as the SOA with T2 increases.
Other Bottleneck Models Further accounts of the AB deficit either extend the
two-stage theory or share some important points with it. The key one is that the
major reason for the AB to arise is a central bottleneck due to some capacity lim-
itation of the information processing. Another debate is about the amodal nature
of such a central bottleneck. Actually, AB has been found also for auditory and
tactile presentations (Duncan et al., 1997; Dell’Acqua et al., 2006), and always in-
duced an attentional failure over a few hundreds milliseconds. In addition, also
cross-modal AB has been studied (Haroush et al., 2011). In this case, the ques-
tion is whether attentional resources allocated to one modality deteriorate attention
to another modality, i.e., if the central bottleneck is amodal, or capacity-limited
sepecific-modality resorces may be separated independently. A prevalent evidence
is in favour of an amodal central bottleneck, although AB might arise from both
a limitation at the amodal stage of processing, and at the visual processing stage
(see Dux and Marois, 2009 for references to this line of debate). An alternative
account for the AB (Awh et al., 2004) proposes a multi-channel model, where separ-
ate channels process feature-based and configural information respectively, against
a unique central processing bottleneck. But this account has been criticised as it
uses faces as target stimuli, and faces salience might have been a major determinant
of these experiments findings, biasing their processing.
Temporary Loss of Control Model This model, proposed by Di Lollo et al. (2005),
questions the assumption of almost all the above described models, that AB arises
due to the depletion of limited resources caused by T1 processing. In their exper-
iments the AB occured when T1 and T2 belonged to different categories, whereas
no AB was found when both T1 and T2 belong to the same category. This evidence
is obviously against an account that based on depletion of resources allocated to
the target leading the stream. Specifically, Di Lollo et al. (2005) found that when
three targets T1, T2 and T3, are presented sequentially in a RSVP, T3 suffers no
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report impairment when sharing the same category with T1 and T2. This effect
was also found in successive experiments, and it has been named “Spreading the
[lag 1] sparing” by Olivers et al. (2007). The crucial claim of the temporary loss of
control (TLC) account is that an input filter configured to pass target items and re-
ject non-target items governs the initial processing of incoming stimuli. The filter is
maintained by a central processor that is capacity-limited: indeed this processor can
perform one function at a time. When a target is detected and initially identified the
central processor switches from monitoring to consolidation operation, and the input
filter passes from the endogenous control of the central processor to the exogenous
control of the trailing items. If the trailing item is intra-categorical with the target
currently under consolidation, it matches the filter and it is efficiently processed,
being its reporting accuracy limited only by the short-term memory span. Con-
versely, if the trailing item does not belong to the same category, it will take longer
to be processed as it does not match the input filter configuration, becoming sus-
ceptible of masking from the following items, and the input filter configuration will
be disrupted, and requires time to be reconfigured for the new category. These two
consequences of target category change determine the AB. According to this model,
lag-1 sparing and its spreading are possible as long as the consecutive targets belong
to the same category.
Delayed Attentional Reengagement Account The finding that a blank gap sep-
arating two targets elicits an AB questions the TLC hypothesis of a major role
of distractors interference in inducing an AB (Nieuwenstein et al., 2009). In ad-
dition, Nieuwenstein (2006) found that the AB may be mitigated if the target is
pre-cued by a distractor sharing a target-defining feature. In order to account for
these new findings Nieuwenstein and colleagues proposed the delayed attentional
reengagement account (Nieuwenstein, 2006; Nieuwenstein and Potter, 2006). This
working hypothesis argues that T1 presentation triggers the deployment of top-down
(i.e., goal-directed) attentional resources: when T1 information is no longer avail-
able due to a post-target replacement, the resources are disengaged and allocation
of attention is delayed. Such a disengagement particularly occurs when T1+1 is
either a distractor or a blank item. AB arises when the participant in the paradigm
is not efficient at rapidly reengage top-down attention to T2 shortly after disen-
gagement. Lag-1 sparing is possible because attention is sustained for T2, as it
bears goal-relevant information. Both the nature of T1+1 and the duration of T1
enhancement (i.e., engagement of top-down attention) contribute to lag-1 sparing.
An empirical finding compatible with this theory is the result of the experiments
carried out in Nieuwenstein and Potter (2006). Here a superiority in the accuracy
of a “whole report” condition — i.e., the report of all the letters in a RSVP — was
found with respect to a “partial report” condition — when only coloured or specific
letters of the stream had to be reported. The proposed account explains the whole
report superiority as fostering a state that sustains attentional engagement through-
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out the entire task. On the other hand, the target pre-cuing in Nieuwenstein (2006)
reduces the AB by helping re-engagement of attention.
3.5.2.3. Formal Theories
There have been both incorporation of the AB phenomenon in more general neuro-
commputational models, and the proposal of new dedicated models. In the following
only some of them are considered, which account for most of the different approaches.
Locus Coeruleus Model Locus coeruleus (LC) is a nucleus located in the brain-
stem, which is thought to influence attentional control (Aston-Jones et al., 1999). LC
activity leads to the release of norepinephrine, which is projected to many cortical
areas, especially in regions thought to play a role to direct attention. Specifically,
Aston-Jones et al. (1999) developed a neurocomputational model that links phasic
and tonic modes of LC activity to the facilitation of focused attention and scanning
with more labile attention, respectively. A focused attention state should lead to
an increased accuracy at responding to task-relevant stimuli, while scanning should
increase response to task-irrelevant stimuli. In monkeys the LC-mediated noradren-
ergic innervation increases the reponsivity of target neurons when a target stimulus
is visually presented, and this is interpreted as a facilitation of processing in response
to a task-relevant stimulus. Following the rapid, phasic response to the task-relevant
or salient stimulus, the local release of norepinephrine within the LC causes a sort of
refractory period, during which the facilitating effect of LC-norepinephrine system
is not available. This refractory period has a duration that is similar to that of the
AB (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Therefore, the LC model for the AB postulates that
the AB and the LC-norepinephrine system share the same dynamics: in particular,
when T1 appears in a RSVP, LC neurons should fire and induce a noradrenergic
modulation that enhances attention thus enabling T1 encoding in WM. By 200 ms
since T1 onset the LC refractory period starts, and no further attentional enhance-
ment may be triggered for several hundred ms — the AB interval. Lag-1 sparing is
instead possible if T2 appears within the attentional enhancement window triggered
by T1, i.e., before the refractory period of the LC starts.
Although it is not demonstrated that the administration of a noradrenergic agonist
may affect the time course of AB, LC model contributes to the evidence that lag-1
sparing depends on the temporal sepration between T1 and T2, despite a non-target
intervenes or not between prior to T2.
Global Workspace Model This is a formal theory that emphasises the relation-
ship of AB with consciousness. The global workspace model has been proposed
by Dehaene et al. (2003) to account for the processing of stimuli from their early
sensory representations to conscious events, available for multiple processes, e.g., for
delayed report as in the AB. The global worspace model has proved able to simulate
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an AB. In general, according to the model, a stimulus has to trigger the coordin-
ated activation of a large neuronal population, comprising sensory and high-level
areas interconnected by long-distance axons, in order to access conscious awareness.
When a stimulus activates a sufficient sub-set of neurons in the workspace the neur-
onal activity becomes self-sustained, and the information associated to the stimulus
becomes available and can be projected to higher-order processing areas. However,
the neurons of the workspace activated by the stimulus inhibits their neighbours,
preventing a subsequent stimulus to trigger the activation of the global workspace.
This is the reason for the AB: sensory processing of T1 and T2 proceeds in parallel,
as no inhibition is foreseen, then, when T1 invades the global neuronal workspace
the processing of T2 at the same level is inhibited, and T2 may be blinked. Lag-1
sparing effect is not explicitly incorporated into this model, although a possible in-
terpretation of it would be that of a delay in the T1-locked inhibition mechanism
concurrently with a T2 appearing at short SOA.
Episodic Simultaneous Type/Serial Token Model The episodic simultaneous
type/serial token model (Wyble et al., 2009), also named eSTST, is the extension of a
theory about temporal attention and WM known as simultaneous type/serial token,
STST (Bowman and Wyble, 2007). The two models are neuronal networks describ-
ing the extraction of information and encoding of targets from a serial presentation,
by preserving temporal order. According to the STST model, visual WM uses types
and tokens, operating in two stages, similarly to the two-stage theories like that
of Chun and Potter (1995). Targets and non-targets of a RSVP are processed up
to the activation of their semantic representations (i.e., their type), but episodic
information, like the temporal order and repetition of the item in the series, is re-
quired to report the targets in their order. Episodic information is stored in WM as
tokens. In order to report an item, the latter must be encoded in WM, and a link
between its token and its type must be established for retrieval. In the RSVP, T1
detection triggers a brief transient attentional that enhances also the post-T1 item,
originating the lag-1 sparing effect if such item is T2. In contrast, if T2 appears
during T1 encoding in WM, the AB arises, as attention to new inputs is suppressed
to protect T1 type-token binding and consolidation, and T2 type cannot be linked
to a token in WM for later retrieval. The STST model does not account for spread-
ing the sparing findings. This is one main reason for the extension into the eSTST
model. The key difference is that eSTST foresees an interaction between excita-
tion of attention triggered by a new target, and the suppressive effect provided by
WM encoded. As long as consecutive targets arrive, the suppressive effect is not
triggered, and the non-specific attentional enhancement allows the binding of the
types to the tokens in WM. This explains the spreading of lag-1 sparing, but comes
at a cost: a decrease in T1 accuracy, a high proportion of T1-T2 reversals when
reportingthem, and inaccuracies at detecting stimuli repetition.
An important characteristic of this model is that it hypothesises a function for the
AB: it is a self limitation to visual encoding brought forth to parse visual input in
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distinct episodes. The AB works as a cognitive strategy that is flexible, because
sparing occurs when targets are presented uninterruptedly. However, this comes at
a cost, indeed items may be encoded in parallel in WM, but with no assurance that
their episodic distinctiveness is maintained.
Boost and Bounce Theory The Boost and Bounce theory by Olivers and Meeter
(2008) essentially proposes two interacting stages of processing, but capacity limits
are not the determinants of the AB. During sensory processing perceptual repres-
entations, but also semantic and categorical representations of items are activated.
However, these representations are susceptible to decay, and their activation is in-
fluenced by the masking effect of the preceding and following items, depending on
their similarity to the current item, i.e., on their saliency (a stimulus is salient to
the extent that it differs from its preceding and trailing stimuli). WM is the second
stage of this model: it implements an attentional set according to task instructions,
it stores encoded target representations linked to a response, and employs the atten-
tional set as an input filter implementing a gating mechanism for enhancing stimuli
matching the attentional set, and blocking out those whch do not match it. The
attentional set enhances task-relevant sensory representations (the boost), while ir-
relevant sensory representations are inhibited (they are bounced). In such a way,
enhanced items access WM and can be consolidated for being later reported. In the
model the strength of the modulation depends on the sensory evidence strength,
therefore it does not depend only on the stimulus triggering the modulation, but
also on the similarity between targets and distractors, and on the current state of
attention (i.e., the current amount of excitatory and inhibitory feedback is affected
by, but also affects sensory evidence).
In this framework, when a classical AB paradigm is administered, initially a stable
bouncing state prevent distractors from entering WM. Then T1 is represented at
the sensory stage, and its sensory signals trigger a boost, which enables T1 identity
to enter WM. However, in a RSVP the boost peak arrives after T1 onset: it actually
benefits the T1+1 item. Therefore, when T1+1 is a non-target, it receives the max-
imum enhancement intended for T1, and this strong signal of an item not matching
the attentional set enters WM and reaches the gating neurons thus inducing a strong
bounce. This bounce has maximum amplitude on the post T1+1 item: if T2 falls
under such bounce it cannot access WM, even though it triggers per se a boost, as
the bounce inhibitory activity is too strong compared to the presentation time of
T2. Consequently, according to the boost and bounce theory of temporal attention,
the AB is not caused by a central capacity-limited bottleneck and the processing
load of T1; it instead depends on the timing of inhibitory and excitatory feedback
elicited by T1 and its trailing stimuli in the RSVP.
As for lag-1 sparing, the boost and bounce theory explains it in the same way as
the AB: the attentional boost peak coincides with T1+1 item arrival, therefore it is
spared by the blink. Also the spreading-the-sparing effect has this cause: as long as
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post-T1 items are task-relevant, they benefit of the attentional boost and may be
identified and consolidated in WM (which anyway has a maximum storage capacity
of 5 items in this model). The lag-1 sparing effect is thus time-based, and not
item-based as other models propose.
Threaded Cognition Model This model of the AB proposed by (Taatgen et al.,
2009), combines the viewpoints attributing the AB to control issues (as the TLC and
Boost and Bounce models) and two-stage theories attributing the AB deficit to a
conflict between fast target detection and capacity-limited, slow WM consolidation.
The model assumption is that during RSVP target detection and memory consolid-
ation operate in parallel, being in fact sub-tasks of a single task, which is the RSVP
task. Thus, these sub-tasks compete for cognitive resources in a multi-tasking con-
text. Multi-tasking is modeled by threaded cognition: a set of cognitive resources
may operate in parallel, but a single cognitive resource can serve a single task at a
time. Without an additional control, for a default task, a resource is assigned to the
first task needing it, and released when the task no longer requires it. In the case of
RSVP a control production rule is used in order to protect consolidation from con-
flict with target detection. This overexertion of control suppresses target detection,
hence originating the blink of T2 when it appears during T1 consolidation. How-
ever, (Taatgen et al., 2009) emphasises that the conflict between target detection
and memory consolidation is only apparent, and it would not require the protec-
tion rule causing the AB, since the two processes only share procedural resources.
Therefore, in this view the AB would derive from an unnecessary overzealous control
mechanism. Lag-1 sparing and spreading are explained by this threaded cognition
model as the result of recognition by the control that the items following T1 are tar-
gets, thus not applying the protective rule. Threaded cognition model is interesting
also in further respects because it accounts for some additional important evidence
connected to the AB. One explanation it offers is for non-blinkers. Several studies
found that, although AB is a fairly robust phenomenon, individuals exist that do
not show any AB when confronted with RSVP (Martens et al., 2006; Martens and
Valchev, 2009). In the threaded cognition model account (Taatgen et al., 2009) pro-
pose that non-blinkers behaviour depends on not applying the control production
rule suppressing target detection during consolidation of T1. The threaded cognition
model might also explain the finding that the addition of distraction concurrently
to the dual-target RSVP task can attenuate the AB. Indeed, additional distraction
corresponds to additional demand on cognitive resources. In default situations this
would slow down pwerformance, since concurrent tasks should wait for their chance
to access the requred resources. In contrast, when a RSVP is running, there is not
enough time for waiting, so production rules activation is dropped, and the protect-
ive control production rule that blocks target detection has the lowest utility being
thus the first to be left out. Therefore, AB is reduced, not completel eliminated,
because only concurernt tasks that provide enough prduction activations, i.e., are
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not successfully ignored, set the conditions to supersede the control production rule
eliciting the AB (Taatgen et al., 2009).
3.6. Introduction to the Empirical Studies
One of the chief objectives of this thesis is to provide an empirical case study of
using VEs to investigate cognitive processes. For this purpose, attention has been
chosen as the target process, essentially for its importance in human performance,
its interaction with multiple cognitive operations, and the limited number of studies
considering attention in VEs, at least on the time-scale typical of attentional blink.
In this framework, the following two chapters present two empirical studies — Study
1, and Study 2 — addressing temporal attention, and using the performance in AB-
like paradigms as the main outcome measure.
Study 1 does not involve a VE, but serves as a starting point for elaborating the
rationale of Study 2. It evaluates whether a short-term mindfulness practice may
influence the allocation of attentional resources over time as indexed by changes
in the AB magnitude. The link with Study 2 is the attention allocation policy
(Taatgen et al., 2009) or diffuse attentional state (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006,
2005) referred to as a possible cause of AB modulation, for example when concur-
rent task-irrelevant activity is added to the dual-target RSVP task. On the one
hand, a diffuse attentional state as opposed to a focused attentional state is one
apsect of the typical definitions of mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004). On the other
hand, a concurrent sound distraction, and a background including visual motion, or
flickering, have been proved capable of alleviating the AB deficit, possibly inducing
a similar diffuse attentional state. Consequently, a concurrent sound presented in a
dual-target desktop-displayed RSVP and a three-dimensional VE meaningfully re-
lated to the dual-target RSVP presented therein may be considered as two different
forms of concurrent distractions, and they might show a similar modulatory effect
on the AB magnitude.
Thereby, Study 2 explores AB performance in an immersive three-dimensional VE,
and constrasts the results with AB performance scored using bidimensional versions
of the same stimuli in a classic desktop-display version of the RSVP, with and
without a concurrent sound distraction. The prediction that a concurrent distraction
alleviates the AB magnitude is tested, and a potential relationship between the
sound distraction and the distraction possibly introduced by the three-dimensional
stimuli in the VE and the virtual landscape is discussed too. Furthermore, while in
Study 1 letters and digits are used as visual stimuli, road signs are used as stimuli in
the RSVP of Study 2, allowing for a discussion of the effects of less abstract symbols,
and their inclusion in a meaningful context (a virtual motorway) in the immersive
three-dimensional VE display condition.
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4. Study 1 – AB Modulation After a
Short-Term Mindfulness Yoga
Training
In Study 1 we explored whether a 7-week training programme based on an integrat-
ive body-mind approach relying on Tibetan Yoga including mindfulness meditation
can improve the distribution of attentional resources in a group of adult meditators,
as indexed by the magnitude of attentional blink (AB) measured across dual-target
rapid serial visual presentations (RSVPs) of letters (the to-be-ignored distractors)
and digits (the to-be-reported targets). The objective is to contribute to the em-
pirical evidence about the possibility to modulate the AB through mental training,
adding the specificity of Tsa Lung Tibetan Yoga as a means of training that includes
a bodily component along with the mental practice. The main result of the study is
that this Yoga practice enables a better allocation of attentional resources, as the AB
magnitude is reduced after the training. This chapter describes the rationale for the
study, and presents the details of the conducted experiment in terms of procedure,
methods, results, and conclusive discussion.
4.1. Study 1 Rationale
As illustrated in chapter 3, attentional blink (AB) is a robust phenomenon that
arises when an unspeeded dual-target identification task is required for two targets
embedded in a rapid stream of distractors, all appearing at the same spatial location
of a display. Actually, the robustness of the AB goes beyond the visual modality,
since also auditory and tactile AB have been observed, but in the experiments
presented herein only the visual AB is considered.
The exact causes of the AB are still not clear, but it appears to originate from the
combination of depletion of capacity-limited processing resources by the first target
(T1) in the RSVP, with attentional control mechanisms (see subsection 3.5.2 for a
more detailed discussion of the topic). At any event, the original hypothesis that AB
reflects a structural bottleneck in central processing capacity is no longer accepted,
also because evidence about a large individual variability of AB magnitude is now
demonstrated, and several conditions proved to be capable of significantly alleviating
or modifying the duration of an AB (Arend et al., 2006; Olivers and Nieuwenhuis,
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2005; Stein et al., 2010; Einhäuser et al., 2007; Martens et al., 2006; Green et al.,
2003).
According to some recent theories about AB causes, the large individual differences
found for this attentional deficit might be the consequence of different allocation
policies these individuals adopt for the deployment of attention(Taatgen et al., 2009;
Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006). Consequently, if AB is not hard-wired in our brain
structures and reflects some cognitive strategy for the allocation of attention, it
might be possible to modify the AB performance of an individual through some
sort of mental training, possibly by producing a long-lasting change in the adopted
attention allocation policy. Therefore, the AB paradigm is appropriate as an index
of allocation of attentional resources.
4.1.1. Training-Related Alterations of the AB in Video-Game
Players and Meditators
Several studies evaluated the effect of training on AB performance. Green et al.
(2003) compared habitual video-game players with non-video-game players in dif-
ferent aspects of visual attention, and evaluated the change of attentional abilities
following the training of non-players on a an action video game. Firstly, the results
displayed enhanced attentional capacity, and enhanced allocation of spatial atten-
tion to the visual field, even outside the game-playing zone, for video-game players
compared to non-players. Secondly, they specifically examined the temporal char-
acteristics of video-game players visual attention by using an AB paradigm. The
RSVP included a white letter as T1, and a white ’X’ as T2, among black letters
serving as distractors. The task was to identify T1, and detect the presence of T2,
which actually appeared only in 50% of the trials. Letters duration was 15ms, sep-
arated by 85ms blanks. The video-game players featured a reduced AB, and general
higher report accuracies at every T1–T2 SOA. Finally, the last experiment in Green
et al. (2003) tested the AB performance — as well as other attentional capacities —
of non-video-game players prior to and after 10 days of 1-hour training per day. The
participants were split in two groups: one training on an action video-game that
required attention to be switched/distributed around the visual field, and another
training on a video game that required to focus on one object at a time. Parti-
cipants trained on the action video game featured a faster recovery from the AB,
and a marginal correlation of AB performance improvement with video-game play-
ing improvement. This is an evidence of the ability of action-video game training to
alter visual attention processing, and namely to overcome a limit in the distribution
of attentional resources over time, as measured by the AB.
Another form of training correlated with improvement of the performance in AB
tasks is meditation. Many different styles of meditation exist, and univocal defini-
tions for the specific types are not readily available. However, the different medit-
ation practices may be regarded as “a family of complex emotional and attentional
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regulatory practices, in which mental and related somatic events are affected by en-
gaging a specific attentional set.”(Raffone and Srinivasan, 2010). A useful scientific
framework that attempts to conceptualise a number of meditation types has been
proposed by Lutz et al. (2008). In this framework the role of attention is crucial,
and serves to define two classes of meditation styles: Focused Attention meditation
(a.k.a. FA meditation), and Open Monitoring meditation (a.k.a. OM meditation).
While FA meditation requires to sustain and monitor an explicit focus (e.g., the
own breath, a specific location in the environment, or a certain thought), OM med-
itation implies the non-reactive monitoring of the ongoing experience, but without
the selection of any explicit focus. Importantly, FA and OM meditation categories
have been able to predict relevant neurofunctional aspects consistent with the dis-
sociable systems of attention identified in the human brain (Posner and Petersen,
1990; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
As seen in chapter 3, attentional capacities have been associated with dissociable sys-
tems in the brain: the three attentional networks identified by Posner and Petersen
(1990) dissociate alerting, orienting, and executive control; instead, Corbetta and
Shulman (2002) proposed a model dissociating between a dorsal system, and a vent-
ral system of attention. Alerting entails the achievement and maintenance of a
vigilant and alert state, orienting means the selection of information from sensory
input, and executive control is designated to monitor and resolve conflicts among
responses. On the other hand, in the dorsal/ventral model of attention, the former
system prepares and applies goal-directed (top-down) selection, being modulated by
stimulus detection, whereas the ventral system is stimulus-driven, directing atten-
tion to behaviourally-relevant stimuli, especially those salient, or unexpected.
In FA meditation alerting is used to sustain the explicit focus, orienting to select it,
and executive control to detect distraction, and re-engage the focus of attention. The
dorsal system is expected to be more implicated with FA meditation, as it underlies
the selection of stimuli. OMmeditation, which also initially uses focused attention to
reduce distraction, in its mature form relies on brain regions implicated in sustaining
attention for monitoring the ongoing experience, as the executive control network,
and the ventral system, which is stimulus-driven.
Thus, the expectation is that both FA meditation, and OM meditation practices
may have a training effect on attentional processes. Neurophysiological and beha-
vioural evidence exist to corroborate this general prediction. In fact, Carter et al.
(2005) used a binocular rivalry task administered with an head-mounted display
to Tibetan Monks during and after either an FA meditation practice, or a form of
“compassion” meditation that does not require to sustain attention on an explicit
object. The result was that the group performing the experimental task during and
after FA meditation was able to sustain for a significantly longer duration the stable
image of one of the two competing percepts, underscoring the ability of the FA med-
itation state to improve the dorsal processing of attention. MacLean et al. (2010)
demonstrated an improvement in vigilance (vigilance decrement was reduced) during
sustained visual attention in a group of meditators trained in an FA style entailing
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5 hours of daily meditation for 3 months. Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007) found that
expert FA meditators showed stronger activations, measured in fMRI scans, than
novice meditators in brain areas implicated in monitoring, attention engagement,
and selective orienting. However, less activation was necessary in certain regions
of expert meditators’ brains, showing a correlation between the activation decrease
and the increase of amount of meditation experience (hours of practice). This latter
evidence has been associated with the reduction of the effort necessary to sustain the
attentional focus as long as the meditation experience grows. Also OM meditation
training showed consistent effects on attentional processes. Specifically, many stud-
ies addressing OM meditation centred on mindfulness training programmes, which
incorporated OM meditation as one of their components.
The debate about the definition of mindfulness is still open (Baer et al., 2009), but
in its various conceptualisations it deals with particular qualities of attention and
awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Specifically, Bishop et al. (2004) proposes an opera-
tional definition, which sees mindfulness as a state consisting of two components: a
self-regulation of attention, and an open, non-judgemental orientation to the ongoing
experience. Self-regulation of attention, and orientation to experience achieved in a
mindfulness state imply sustained attention, attention orienting, and non-reactive
awareness of the stream of experience. These skills are trained through forms of med-
itation, also OM meditation, and are being applied for several years as clinical tools
in psychotherapies. Especially, the main reference about mindfulness-based treat-
ments for mental health is mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn,
2003), which includes a meditation practice ascribable to OM meditation. Jha et al.
(2007) assessed with attention network test (ANT) two groups of participants: a
group was naïve to mindfulness, and participated in an 8-week MBSR training on
concentrative, i.e., an FA meditation type; another group was composed of expert
meditators who participated in a 1-month retreat of mindfulness meditation, i.e.,
an OM meditation type. A waiting list group was used as a control. Improvements
in conflict monitoring, and orienting were found in expert meditators prior to the
retreat, and in novices after the MBSR training. In addition, expert meditators
showed increased alerting scores after the mindfulness retreat. Tang et al. (2007)
found that even a short-term training program including OM meditation compon-
ents induced improvements in conflict monitoring as measured by the ANT (and the
reduction of stress-related indexes). These findings together point to the fact that
early stages of mindfulness training may improve the function of the dorsal system
of attention (orienting, and executive control), whereas intensive medium-to-long-
term mindfulness training as in the 1-month retreat condition of Jha et al. (2007)
may improve the ventral system function in terms of alerting (see Hölzel et al., 2011,
and Chiesa et al., 2011 for a review on mindfulness impact on cognitive abilities).
As anticipated, also the AB has been used to assay the effects of meditation training
on attention processing (Slagter et al., 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2009). The idea
generally underpinning these studies is that meditation practice may train atten-
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tional abilities that lead to a reduced AB because they allow the release of limited
brain resources.
Slagter et al. (2007) conducted a longitudinal study to evaluate the effect on the AB
of a 3-month intensive meditation training. Two groups participated in the study:
a practitioners group, and a control group. Practitioners had previous experience
in several different meditation styles, and participated in a 3-month retreat, which
foresaw 10–12 hours of meditation per day. The meditation practised in the retreat
was an OM meditation, supposed to ultimately broaden the attentional focus, and
cultivate a non-reactive form of attention that does not judge, or affectively respond
to sensory and mental stimuli. These attributes of attention are similar to those
included in the definition of mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004). The control group
participants did not have any prior experience with meditation, and took a single
1-hour meditation class. Then, they were instructed to meditate 20 minutes per
day in the week preceding the experimental session. The experimental task was a
classical AB paradigm: the targets were two black numbers embedded in a stream
of 15–19 letters. Two target onset asynchronies were tested: a short one, 336ms
(lag 4), and a long one, 672ms (lag 8), and stimuli were presented for 50 ms each,
with a 34ms inter-stimulus interval. Experimental trials might be either single-
target or dual-target, in order to accurately evaluate the effect of meditation training
on T1 processing. Both behavioural, and electrophysiological data were collected
and analysed: namely, T1 and T2|T1 report accuracies, and the T1-elicited P3b
component of scalp-recorded event-related potentials (ERP) acquired during the
streams presentation.
The results in Slagter et al. (2007) were a smaller AB, and a reduced amplitude
of T1-elicited P3b potential, with a positive correlation between the size of AB re-
duction, and the extent to which P3b decreased. These findings corroborate the
argument that AB depends upon the deployment of attentional resources to T1,
and show that a pure mental training consisting of 3 months of intensive OM med-
itation practice can allow for an increased control over the allocation of attentional
resources to the processing of T1. Specifically, these conclusions agree with those
in Green et al. (2003), and extend them because based on a pure mental train-
ing rather than an action video game. In addition, they are also compatible with
the hypothesis that an over-investment of attentional resources on T1 may cause
the AB, as opposed to a diffuse attentional state, which would counteract the con-
sequences imposed by the limited attentional resources when they need be shared
between rapidly succeeding targets as in a RSVP (see Olivers and Nieuwenhuis,
2006, and the section 5.1 for more details about the over-investment hypothesis).
According to Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2006), the diffuse attentional state would
distribute attentional resources without allocating too a strong focus on the task,
and this would prevent non-target items from accidentally accessing the capacity-
limited stage of processing, and interfering with targets in that stage. In Slagter
et al. (2007) the diffuse attentional state could be induced by the OM meditation
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retreat, and no over-investment of attention to T1 would be demonstrated by the
reduced amplitude of T1-elicited P3b potentials.
The cross-sectional study of van Leeuwen et al. (2009) assessed age-related effects
on the AB in meditators, starting from the consideration that attentional abilities,
and also the performance in the AB, drop with age. Specifically, they conducted a
study on three groups of subjects: two older, age-matched groups (mean age around
50 years old), one composed of long-term meditation practitioners, and one with no
prior meditation experience serving as a control; and a third control group of younger
participants who never engaged in meditation (mean age around 24 years old). The
meditation practitioners regularly practised both FA and OM meditation, with a
wide range of experience, spanning from 1 to 29 years. All the groups participated
in two blocks of trials, and their task was to identify two numbers embedded in a
stream of black letters. T1 was red, while T2 was black. Each visual item in the
stream was presented for 100 ms, and lag 1–lag 7 were tested.
The results of this study by van Leeuwen et al. (2009) confirm the authors’ prediction
of an aid offered by long-term meditation practice to overcome age-related decline
in the AB performance. In fact, the meditators group showed a smaller, and shorter
AB than the age-matched control group on lag 2, lag 6, and lag 7, and even a better
performance on lag 2 than the younger control group. The better performance on
long lags may be related to an increased ability in sustaining attention.
In Slagter et al. (2007) the meditation was based on the OM meditation practice,
although participants had previously practised several types of meditation. In van
Leeuwen et al. (2009) the participants in the experimental group practised both
OM meditation and FA meditation. As discussed by van Leeuwen et al. (2009),
the comparison between the two studies seems to suggest that OM meditation pre-
vents over-investment of resources, and a quick disengagement of attention from T1,
whereas FA meditation might be responsible for the increased ability of expert med-
itators to sustain attention, leading to a better performance on longer lags. However,
it has not been possible neither to directly connect the attentional improvements
to a specific meditation style, nor to correlate the improvements to the amount of
meditation practice. This is due to the fact that practitioners came from different
meditation experiences in Slagter et al. (2007), and did meditate for quite different
durations at different times in van Leeuwen et al. (2009).
4.1.2. The Present Study
The findings summarised in previous paragraphs may be globally interpreted as an
indication that meditation is a form of mental training that is able to train atten-
tional processes. In particular, it can induce changes in how attentional resources
are shared over time, and across targets and distractors, as measured by the per-
formance in an AB task. A possible explanation for this evidence is that a more
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distributed attentional focus is induced by OM meditation practice, which reduces
the investment of attentional resources to the first target in a dual-target RSVP.
Mindfulness is a kind of OM meditation, and Tsa Lung is a particular Tibetan
Yoga practice, which combines body exercises typical of other Yoga traditions, with
mindfulness meditation (see section A.1). Our Study 1, presented in next sections of
this chapter, is a longitudinal study evaluating whether a 7-week Tsa Lung training
programme on a group of adult meditators induces changes in AB performance. The
prediction to be tested was that AB performance at post-training should be better
than at pre-training. The peculiarity of the study compared to those of Slagter et al.
(2007), and van Leeuwen et al. (2009), and, in general, to those assessing the effects
of meditation on attentional processes (see Chiesa et al., 2011) is that, along with a
mindfulness meditation practice, the training included also a mild physical exercise.
Namely, in Tibetan Yoga, the mindfulness state is achieved through body exercise,
and OM meditation. Hence, these are the components of the training evaluated in
the present study.
A previous study by Tang et al. (2007) found that executive control was improved
as measured by ANT through an integrative body-mind treatment. This treatment,
however, although including relaxation, mental imagery, and mindfulness training,
was different from Tibetan Yoga, because the latter includes also postures to be
maintained, associated with visualisations and controlled breathing. Tibetan Yoga
has been studied on patients suffering from lymphoma, and it showed to reduce sleep-
related disturbances (Cohen et al., 2004). However, to our knowledge, Tibetan Yoga
has not been studied in terms of its potential effects on attention processes.
The objective of the present study was just to explore whether a 7-week Tibetan
Yoga training delivered to habitual meditators had some effect on the AB perform-
ance. In the affirmative case, this result would add to the evidence that a mindful-
ness training is able to change attention allocation over time, with the peculiarity
that this particular training — Tibetan Yoga — also incorporates a mild physical
exercise among its components.
4.2. Study 1 Material and Methods
Participants
25 adult meditators participated in the present study, but only 21 complied with
the training requirements, and underwent both experimental sessions (see the de-
scription in Procedure).
The 21 participants who completed the Tibetan Yoga training were 9 males, and 12
females (median age 44 years old, ranging from 26 to 64 years old). They all had
either normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all came from the Lama Tzong
Khapa Institute in Pomaia (Italy), where the two experimental sessions, prior to
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and after the training programme respectively, and the classes for explaining the
training programme requirements and operations took place. These participants
were all familiar with meditation, and they habitually practised different styles,
categorised as both FA and OM meditation practices.
The participants provided self-reports of demographic information, and about the
amount of training (physical and meditative) undertaken during the training period.
They took part in two experimental sessions: one used as the baseline, immediately
prior to starting the Tibetan Yoga training, and another just after the end of the
7-week training programme. Both sessions lasted for two experimental days. No
control group was used in this study. The duration of an experimental session for a
single participant was approximately 30 minutes.
Tibetan Yoga Training Programme
All participants performed different amounts of Tibetan Yoga exercises and medita-
tion, but all for a minimum of 2 hours per week, over a period of 7 consecutive weeks.
The physical component included 5 exercises, while the mental component required
to engage in a kind of OM meditation, credited to the rubric of mindfulness. In fact,
the result of this practice should develop the ability to achieve a mindfulness state
as described in previous paragraphs of this section. A summary description of the
Yoga exercises resembling how they were explained to the participants is included
in section A.1.
Stimuli, Task, and Apparatus
Participants’ task in the two sessions was to identify, with no time pressure, two
single-digit white numbers (the T1 and T2 targets) appearing in a stream of white
letters (the distractors). Two types of trials were used: short-lag trials, in which
the second target digit (T2) appeared in serial position 3 (i.e., at lag 3) after the
first target digit (T1), and long-lag trials, in which the second target digit (T2)
appeared in serial position 7 (i.e., at lag 7) after T1. All the visual stimuli in a
trial appeared sequentially for 90ms each, with no inter-stimulus interval, and at
the same location, in the centre of a 24-inch LCD computer screen, against a grey
background (Fig. 4.1a). The whole experiment, including visual stimuli presenta-
tion, and participant’s responses collection, was implemented in Matlab®(MATLAB
R2011b, The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA), using the Psychophysics Toolbox
extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997).
Procedure
Each participant took part in the 7-week Tibetan Yoga training programme, and
in two experimental sessions. Besides, participants provided information about the
hours of meditation practised at baseline, and during the training period. The
pre-training session was to measure the baseline AB performance, whereas the post-
training session served to collect the data for comparison with those at the baseline,
in a within-subject design.
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(a) Graphic representation of a typical trial in
Study 1.
(b) Graphic representation of an experimental
session in Study 1.
Figure 4.1.: Study 1 – Graphical description of experimental task, and sessions structure.
The two sessions were composed of three blocks of trials: the first was a practice
block, including 8 trials with feedback about the correctness of the responses, used to
familiarise participants with the experimental equipment, and task. The second and
third blocks included 72 trials each, and each trial consisted of an RSVP of 2 single-
digit numbers drawn without replacement from the range 2–9, embedded among
13–17 different letters. In every block half of the trials were long-lag, and half were
short-lag, and they were randomly intermixed within each block. The participant’s
task was, at the end of each trial, to answer to the two questions “What was the
FIRST number?”, and “What was the SECOND number?” by typing the respective
target on the numeric keypad of a computer keyboard. Participants had no time
limit to make their responses, and were instructed to type a ’0’ only when they were
sure to have not seen a target.
Data Analyses
Only participants’ responses in the two experimental blocks of the two sessions were
collected and analysed in order to answer to the following research questions:
1. Is an AB present in the tested population at baseline?
2. Does the meditation experience of participants at baseline affect the AB per-
formance?
3. Does the body-mind training based on Tibetan Yoga modify the AB perform-
ance?
For questions 1. and 3. separate general linear models (GLM) were implemented
to conduct repeated measures ANOVA, using “Lag” as the single within-subject
fixed factor for addressing the first question, and “Lag” and “Session” as the fixed
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within-subject factors for addressing the third question. Both “Lag” and “Session”
had 2 levels (lag 3/lag 7, and Pre-/Post-training). The primary outcome measure
was the proportion of correct reports for the second target (T2), conditional upon
the correct reports of the first target (T1), averaged across the trials of the two
experimental blocks for each participant. This variable is referred to in the following
as P(T2|T1). The mean proportion of T1 correct reports averaged across the trials
of the two experimental blocks for each participant is considered as well, and referred
to as P(T1). Indeed, the AB consists of a decrease of P(T2|T1) relative to P(T1)
at short lags.
For question 2. a separate 2-way mixed ANOVA was carried out. Participants were
split in two groups based on the average amount of meditation practised per week in
the 4 weeks prior to starting the Tibetan Yoga training (tM0). One group comprised
participants for whom tM0 > 20hrs, and another group included the remaining of
them. Such groups yielded the 2-level between-subject grouping factor “Meditation
experience at baseline”, which was included in the ANOVA model along with the
“Lag” factor. The response variable in the ANOVA was again the T2|T1 report
accuracy resulting from the first experimental session, i.e., P(T2|T1) at baseline.
4.3. Study 1 Results
Is an AB present in the tested population at baseline?
The results of the one-way repeated measures ANOVA with “Lag” as a single fixed
factor revealed a statistically significant main effect of “Lag” (p-value<0,001) for
both T2|T1 accuracy and T1 accuracy. As depicted in Figure 4.2, T2|T1 accuracy
is lower than T1 accuracy at lag 3 (270ms), the short SOA, whereas it is similar to
T1 report accuracy at lag 7 (630ms). Therefore, the population of adult meditators
recruited for the Tibetan Yoga training in fact shows an AB deficit prior to the
training when confronted with the RSVPs delivered in the present experiment.
Does the meditation experience of participants at baseline affect the AB
performance?
However, these meditators came from different experiences, and amounts of practice.
Especially, it is interesting to test whether their performance in the AB task at
baseline is affected by the amount of meditation practised in the 4 weeks immediately
prior to the first session day. The results of the separate ANOVA analysis adopting
“Meditation experience at baseline” as a further between-subject factor showed no
significant effect (p-value=0,711) of the latter on T2|T1 mean accuracy, and no
significant interaction with “Lag” (p-value=0,604), which instead had a statistically
significant effect (p-value<0,001).
Does the body-mind training based on Tibetan Yoga modify the AB per-
formance?
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Figure 4.2.: Study 1 – Mean proportions of T2|T1, and T1 correct reports versus T1–T2 lag level.
T2|T1 accuracy at lag 3 (66,662%) is significantly lower than at lag 7 (94,895%), and at lag 7
it is similar to T1 accuracy. The latter is greater also at lag 3 (79,497%). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
The most important analysis for the present experiment is to test whether a differ-
ence exists in the AB performance of participants between baseline, and the end of
the Tibetan Yoga training programme. The 2×2 “Lag”×”Session” repeated meas-
ures ANOVA yielded the results reported in Table 4.2, based on the descriptive
statistics in Table 4.1.
P(T2|T1) – Cell means, Marginal means, and Grand mean
Session
Lag Baseline Post-training Marginal Means
3 66,662% 77,086% 71,874%
7 94,895% 95,377% 95,136%
Marginal Means 80,779% 86,232% µG = 83, 505%
Table 4.1.: Study 1 – Summary of the means of proportions of correct trials (T2|T1) in the
different experimental conditions (µG denotes the grand mean).
Both “Lag” and “Session” resulted to have significant main effects on T2|T1 report
accuracy, and also a significant interaction of these factors was found. The main
effect of “Session” on T2|T1 was detected, following an increase of the mean T2|T1
accuracy across lag levels from 80,78% to 86,23% (grand mean µg = 83, 51%). As
for the main effect of “Lag”, T2|T1 mean accuracy across baseline, and post-training
sessions, spanned between 71,87% at lag 3, and 95,14% at lag 7.
The interaction plot is shown in Figure 4.3a. A substantial invariance is measured at
lag 7 for T2|T1 accuracy between baseline session and post-training session (94,90%
at baseline, and 95,38% at post-training), whereas a larger difference is found for
lag 3: 66,66% at baseline versus 77,09% at post-training. Actually, post-hoc tests
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(a) Summary statistical results of Lag×Session re-
peated measures ANOVA on T2|T1 accuracy.
Factors F-ratio p-value
Lag F1,20 = 18, 16 <0,001
Session F1,20 = 13, 83 0,001
Lag × Session F1,104 = 14, 88 <0,001
(b) Summary statistical results of Lag×Session re-
peated measures ANOVA on T1 accuracy.
Factors F-ratio p-value
Lag F1,20 = 29, 12 <0,001
Session F1,20 = 16, 29 0,001
Lag × Session F1,104 = 15, 50 <0,001
Table 4.2.: Study1 – Results summary of 2×2 Lag×Session within-subject ANOVA on T2|T1 and
T1 accuracies.
according to the Tukey’s method showed that the difference between sessions at
lag 7 is not significant, whereas at lag 3 it is statistically significant. Thus, there
is a statistically significant increase in T2|T1 report accuracy at lag 3 following the
Tibetan Yoga training, or, putting it in different terms, there is a reduction in the AB
magnitude following the Tibetan Yoga training. The post-hoc analysis on T1 report
accuracy proved a significant difference between T1 accuracy at baseline at lag 3
(79,497%), and T1 accuracy after the 7-week Tibetan Yoga training completion,
when T1 report accuracy at lag 3 is 90,41%.
(a) Study 1 – Lag×Session Interaction Plot of
mean T2|T1 report accuracy. Error bars rep-
resent standard errors of the mean.
(b) Study 1 – Lag×Session Interaction Plot of
mean T1 report accuracy. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
Figure 4.3.: Study 1 – Lag×Session interaction plots for means of T2|T1 report accuracy, and
T1 report accuracy.
4.4. Study 1 Discussion
The objective of Study 1 can be summarised as to evaluate changes in the allocation
of attentional resources over time in adult habitual meditators, following a 7-week
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Tibetan Yoga training. How attentional resources were allocated was measured
through the performance in terms of AB magnitude in dual-target RSVPs, namely
looking at the mean report accuracy of T2|T1. The expected outcome was that the
Tibetan Yoga training improves the AB performance of participants, i.e., their mean
T2|T1 report accuracy should increase after the training completion, in the condition
where T2 is in serial position 3 after T1 (lag 3, 270 ms). The peculiarities of the
Tibetan Yoga training underpinning this prediction were essentially two: (1) an OM
meditation component, which can be categorised as a mindfulness practice, was part
of the training programme, and as such it was a kind of mental training that had
already proven to be capable of changing the AB performance (Slagter et al., 2007;
van Leeuwen et al., 2009); (2) The mild physical exercise, performed as a preparatory
activity to meditation, and accompanied by mental visualisations, should contribute
to produce a similar effect on the distribution of attentional resources. However, the
amount of meditation practised in the weeks prior to starting the Tibetan Yoga
training might have affected participants performance in the AB task at baseline.
The results of the statistical analyses carried out on the collected data showed that
an AB is indeed present prior to the Tibetan Yoga training start, but that it was
not affected by an High vs Low “meditation experience” factor based on the average
amount of hours of meditation practised per week in the last 4 weeks preceding the
baseline experimental session. This is in agreement with the findings that AB is
a robust deficit, and with the prediction that it can be produced by a dual-target
RSVP, where letters are to be ignored, and two numbers are to be reported, all
flashing at a rate of about 11 items/s.
Also the prediction that a 7-week Tibetan Yoga training including a mild physical
exercise preparatory for the mindfulness meditation is able to change the AB per-
formance was confirmed. This result adds to the evidence that mindfulness practices
are capable of alleviating — but not eliminating — the AB, reflecting a more effi-
cient distribution of limited resources over time, and among targets and distractors.
The behavioural measure adopted in this study, however, is not able to determine
per se the exact temporal dynamic of the processing connected to the two targets, as
an event-related potential study could do. Nonetheless, another finding arising from
the present study was that also on T1 accuracy there is a main effect of Lag, and
Session, as well as an interaction effect of those factors. Specifically, T1 accuracy
at training completion for lag 3, i.e., for a T1–T2 SOA causing the AB, increased
as it had happened in Slagter et al. (2007). This pattern, with both T1 and T2|T1
report accuracies increasing, indicates that T2|T1 accuracy improvement did not
come at the expense of a T1 report impairment. Consequently, these results are
compatible with accounts of the AB that do not entirely ascribe T2 impairment to
depletion of limited resources on T1 identification, and consider the possibility that
an over-exertion of control (Taatgen et al., 2009), or an over-investment of atten-
tional resources on the stimuli (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006) might be the causes
of the AB. Besides, it seems unlikely that after 7 weeks the better performance in
the dual-target task was determined by some form of perceptual learning, or even
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by participants’ ability to predict the lag level in different trials, which had been
randomly distributed in each experimental block.
One interesting observation spontaneously made by several participants was that if
they actively tried to lessen the focus on the RSVP, while “opening” their attention,
just as explained in the descriptions of OM meditation, and mindfulness, they felt to
achieve a higher reporting accuracy. This fact has two consequences: firstly, it seems
to go in the same direction of the hypothesis put forward in Olivers and Nieuwenhuis
(2006), according to which a more diffuse attentional state, corresponding to a lessen
focus on the RSVP, should lead to an alleviation of the AB, independently of how
such a diffuse attentional state has been achieved. Secondly, it should be taken into
account that unfortunately some participants’ effort to adopt an OM state might
itself have confounded the final outcome. Indeed, the resulting improvement of the
AB performance might depend on both the Tibetan Yoga training, and the OM
meditation-like state possibly practised during the experiment. The hypothesis that
a diffuse attentional state may benefit the AB performance is at the root of part
of our Study 2, presented in chapter 5, where it is assessed whether an auditory
distraction, which is supposed to foster a more diffuse attentional state, has on the
AB magnitude a similar effect as an immersive 3-D virtual environment meaningfully
connected with the visual stimuli used in the AB paradigm. Details are presented
in chapter 5.
A final remark is about the distinct contributions, if any, of the physical exercise
component and the meditation component of the training, to the effect on the AB
magnitude. A further step for extending this study would indeed be to try isolating
the contributions to AB alleviation of the physical exercise component, and the
mental component of Tsa Lung Yoga. In fact the physical exercise is a peculiar
component of this kind of training, and of other integrative body-mind training,
and it might represent a specificity of these training protocols compared to pure
mental training.
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5. Study 2 – AB with Road Signs:
an Exploration in Virtual
Environments
In Study 2 we explored the Attentional Blink (AB) with two specificities: first, the
visual stimuli presented in the dual-target RSVP are road signs, showing arrows pic-
tograms as distractors, and pictograms of animals and vehicles as targets; second,
one of the three tested display conditions presents the RSVP in a 3-D VE repres-
enting a motorway junction with the rapid stream of stimuli appearing on a virtual
portal-like signpost. The other display conditions are classical 2-D presentations
of the road signs RSVPs on a desktop computer screen, either with or without the
concurrent delivery of an auditory distraction. The auditory distraction is the sound
of a car engine, which can be either idle or accelerated. The AB performance in
the different conditions is evaluated considering three SOA between the two targets,
including when they are consecutive (the lag-1 level). This chapter describes the
rationale for the study, and presents the detail of the conducted experiment in terms
of procedure, methods, results, and conclusive discussion.
5.1. Study 2 Rationale
A recent interesting finding of the AB research is a concurrency benefit alleviating
the AB magnitude found when one of different kinds of concurrent task-irrelevant
activity is added to the primary RSVP task. Visual motion superimposed on the
visual stream, a concurrent sound or music, and free mental association have been
tested and generated an attenuated AB magnitude (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005;
Arend et al., 2006; Taatgen et al., 2009; Lapointe-Goupil et al., 2011). These effects
have been explained in terms of either cognitive flexibility or a more distributed
form of attention, which overcome the limitations that usually induce the AB.
The presentation of stimuli in a 3-D immersive VE that represents a meaningful
context for the visual items used to elicit the AB seems to be a special sort of
distraction whose effect is worthwhile investigating and comparing with a more
standard distraction, like that provided by a concurrent sound in a 2-D display
condition.
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Besides, as discussed in Study 1, an attentional distribution similar to that trained
with Tibetan Yoga including mindfulness meditation has shown to alleviate AB after
a short-term practice of a few weeks. We argue this is another finding compatible
with the view of an important role on AB modulation of personal cognitive strategies
applied to attention distribution.
Moreover, it is interesting to start answering the more general questions about
whether the time course of attention in a virtual environment is similar to that
targeted by a classical AB experiment, which is undertaken looking on 2-D symbols
on a computer screen.
Finally, the investigation of AB performance by using less abstract stimuli, even
incorporated in a meaningful related context, as the use of a VE makes possible, is
interesting per se. Indeed, this investigation may add to research works connecting
natural scenes perception and AB (Evans and Treisman, 2005; Einhäuser et al., 2007;
Potter et al., 2010), studies elaborating on possible functions of the AB (see Martens
and Wyble, 2010 for a brief review), and future hypotheses to use VEs for the
assessment of temporal aspects of attention in more ecologically valid settings.
5.1.1. AB with Less Abstract Stimuli
Visual AB arises with a variety of stimulus types, including alphanumerical symbols,
words, and pictures. However, different characteristics have been found when using
abstract symbols, words and pictures of natural scenes faces in the RSVPs. Effects
on AB magnitude and duration of targets category in a single stream, and of whether
targets identification or simple detection is required, have been found by Evans and
Treisman (2005) and Einhäuser et al. (2007); and also emotional stimuli affected
performance in an AB paradigm (Stein et al., 2010; Arnell et al., 2007). In order to
understand if the AB has a specific function, and if its suppression, either inherent
or induced, comes at some cost, it would be helpful to capture the AB in everyday
life. One way to stride in this direction is to generalise the abstract stimuli usually
adopted in laboratories to elicit the AB. VEs can be very useful in this sense, since
one of their distinctive properties is the possibility they offer to provide rich stimuli,
which maintain a rigorous control of the stimulus-response function, yet enabling
for ecologically valid stimulations, more inclined to be generalised to daily living
performance. Nonetheless, at the best of our knowledge no study of the effect on
AB of a 3-D immersive presentation in a VE of the RSVP has been conducted until
now.
Evans and Treisman (2005) studied the perception of objects in natural scenes by
means of RSVP paradigms, starting from an apparent conflict. On the one hand,
humans are able to grasp the gist of a complex everyday scene, and assess some
of its high-level properties, especially if they are meaningful or threatening, in a
fraction of a second (less than 100ms). On the other hand, a marked impairment —
they name it a capacity limitation — of visual attention emerges when two targets
98
5.1 Study 2 Rationale
as simple as alphanumeric characters appear a few hundred ms from one another
in a RSVP. Specifically, Evans and Treisman (2005) explored whether an AB arises
when the task is to detect and/or identify two targets embedded in natural scenes
appearing in close temporal proximity (220ms – 880ms). The two targets might
belong to the same category (either two animals or two means of transportation),
or to different categories (one animal and one means of transportation). The res-
ults of Evans and Treisman’s series of experiments were that the performance in
online detection of targets was good, independently of whether target categories
were congruent or not. Instead, an AB arose for identification, and it was more
marked in magnitude and duration when the two targets belonged to different cat-
egories, and participants did not have prior knowledge about such categories. No
lag 1 condition was tested, but they found an AB up to a SOA of 880ms, which was
more profound for targets belonging to different categories, than in a same-category
condition. Conditional T2 accuracy rates varied approximately between 60% and
slightly more than 90% over the SOA span used. Another series of experiments,
which used RSVPs of natural scenes at higher rates (about 13 items/s) than those
used to study the AB (about 9 items/s), showed that natural scenes categorisation
can occur at a pre-attentive stage. The conclusions of Evans and Treisman (2005)
were in favour of a view according to which detection is possible at a pre-attentive
stage, based on the presence of a set of disjunctive features detected in parallel,
without the binding process, and the object representation that requires the selec-
tion from attention. Thus, it is possible to semantically identify a relatively complex
object in a natural scene even only with some of its features detected in parallel;
however, if the target object is no longer available when attentional resources can
be drawn to bind its features and make its representation available to conscious
awareness, the identification is more prone to errors, because the features binding
stage is serial. In terms of AB, one prediction supported by these experiments is
that when T1 and T2 belong to the same category, there is a priming effect of T1
features on T2 detection that is more pronounced when participants know in ad-
vance targets categories, but that still provides a sort of passive advantage when
participants ignore T2 category. Thus, the same-category condition triggers in any
case a less deep AB than the different-category condition.
Einhäuser et al. (2007) presented RSVPs of natural photographic stimuli at different
rates (6 Hz – 40Hz), including two to four targets. Targets identification was then
tested at the end of the RSVP for two of the targets with a 2-alternative forced
choice between similar exemplars belonging to the same category. Target category
might be either “faces” or “watches”, and the questions used for requesting the 2-
alternative forced choice — “Which watch?”, “Which face?” — did not reflect the
order of appearance of the two categories in the RSVP. As to the within-category
AB, this experiment found it for both faces and watches as a dip at short T1–
T2 SOAs (around 300ms), but with the watches category displaying a longer and
slightly delayed AB (the AB impairment lasted until about 590ms for “watches”,
against about a SOA of 410ms for “faces”), suggesting a category-dependence of
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the phenomenon. The results across categories attested an effect on the AB of the
target category, and of the difference in category between the two targets. Namely,
T2 recognition performance was better when T1 belonged to a different category.
This finding is not aligned with the results in Evans and Treisman (2005), where
the AB increased in depth and duration when T1 and T2 were drawn from different
category sets. Einhäuser et al. (2007) does not specifically address this difference
in the results of the two studies, however, they highlight the differences between
them: the use of different categories (faces and watches vs animals and means of
transportation); the use of a single, quite low (8Hz) presentation rate in Evans and
Treisman (2005) versus a plurality of (higher) presentation rates in Einhäuser et al.
(2007); the forced choice decision for target identification in Einhäuser et al. (2007)
against a free sub-category identification in the other experiments series; and finally,
the different method used to analyse the data and draw conclusions.
Dux and Harris (2007) used line drawings of familiar objects as visual stimuli in RS-
VPs to study whether viewpoint costs arise during an initial identification stage, or
during consolidation. To this end, either distractors or T1 were rotated in separate
experiments. The results revealed a robust AB, unaffected by distractors orienta-
tion, but augmented by a 90° rotation of T1. Distractors orientation did not affect
the AB magnitude for both colour-defined and semantically-defined targets. This
evidence was interpreted as an indication that preliminary recognition of familiar
objects is view-point invariant, and view-point costs arise in the consolidation stage.
Interestingly, no lag-1 sparing effect was found, and no explanation is offered for
this observation.
Potter et al. (2010) tested the ability of identifying the specific category of two
target pictures appearing in an RSVP among pictures of single objects and scenes,
when the superordinate category is communicated to the experiment participant
immediately prior to every trial. Lags 1, 2, and 4 were tested, corresponding to
110ms, 213ms, and 427ms respectively. Colour pictures were used. The objective
was to test whether the lag-1 sparing effect is present when the targets are pictures
never seen before, and only their superordinate category (e.g., a fruit, a vehicle, etc.)
is known just a little in advance of the trial by the participant in the experiment.
The two targets of a trial belong to the same superordinate category. The results of
these experiments showed that an AB is present at lag 2 and lag 4, when the recovery
from the attentional deficit is started. Furthermore, a lag-1 sparing effect is present,
and the authors consider this evidence against the theory proposed by Evans and
Treisman (2005), and in favour of a transient attention account for lag-1 sparing, as
proposed by Wyble et al. (2009). Actually, Evans and Treisman (2005) did not test
the lag 1 condition, but as the identification stage is serial, no lag 1 sparing should
occur in their model, as T1 and T2 cannot be identified simultaneously. This is
against the finding in Potter et al. (2010), which instead agrees with the hypothesis
that transient attention triggered by T1 “opens” an attentional window such that if
T2 appears within this window, i.e., 150ms since T1 onset, it can be identified as it
is the case of lag-1 sparing. The same transient burst of attention is responsible of
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the AB, in that it is suppressed around 150ms after T1 onset in order to separate
the encoding of two different targets, and preserve episodic information. When T2
appears during the suppression, an AB arises.
These studies, although starting from differently conceived experimental designs,
converge on two conclusions: (i) the generalisation of AB results found with simple
abstract stimuli to the AB manifestations with natural stimuli is possible, yet not
straightforward; and (ii) targets category congruency, or even target category type,
affect the magnitude and duration of the AB.
The AB performance with complex stimuli has been also studied using faces as tar-
gets. Marois et al. (2004) found an AB for the detection of pictures of indoor/outdoor
scenes used as T2, when a face appeared as T1, and scrambled scenes were used as
distractors. T2|T1 accuracy was tested for T1–T2 SOAs of 200ms, 400ms, and
800ms, with the impairment that was particularly prominent for T2 appearing at
200ms and 400ms within T1 onset. Awh et al. (2004) challenged the view of a
central amodal bottleneck at the root of the AB by investigating the effects of di-
gits as T1 on faces and letters as T2 in RSVPs. The main finding was that faces
discrimination as T2 was not impaired with the same digits discrimination task at
T2, which in contrast impaired letters discrimination at T2. These results were
proposed as the grounds to propose the multi-channel model account for the AB.
The latter assumes the existence of separate channels for processing feature-based
and configural information respectively, hence predicting that AB interference arises
only when T1 processing occupies every channel available for processing T2. In the
case of faces as T2 and digits as T1, since digits are discriminating using only the
feature-based channel then the T2 faces have the configural channel available during
the AB period, and do not suffer from the interference as in the T2 letters case.
Faces were also used in RSVP paradigms for studying the effect of emotional-laden
stimuli on attentional resources by using the AB.Stein et al. (2010) used an emotion-
ally neutral face as T1, and either a single happy or fearful face as T2. Scrambled
faces were used as distracting fillers in the RSVP. The perceptual load of T1 was
manipulated by using two intact faces flankers of T1 face (which was presented cent-
rally at fixation). In the low-load condition the flankers and target were the same
face, whereas in the high-load condition the two T1 flankers, and T1 itself were three
different neutral faces. The task was to identify T1 gender, and detect T2 presence,
without any prior knowledge on its emotional connotation. The results of the ex-
periment demonstrated an AB attenuation for fearful expressions relative to happy
faces in the T1 low-load condition, while in the T1 high-load condition the advant-
age of fearful faces disappeared, but the AB effect on the face detection accuracy
remained, and affected similarly both happy and fearful facial expressions. The pro-
posed explanation was that the extraction of emotional meaning from visual stimuli
requires attentional resources, which are made unavailable when T1 perceptual load
becomes high.
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Arnell et al. (2007) found that an involuntary AB can be initiated by sexual or taboo
words used as a critical distractor in a RSVP where the task is to remember a single
different target. In these situations the high-arousal distractor word acted as a T1
in the RSVP, resembling an AB interference on T2. A similar pattern emerged when
using negative pictures as distractors Most et al. (2005). However, current evidence
is rather in favour of a role for arousing quality of stimuli in capturing attention,
and inducing an AB.
Overall, in light of the studies conducted so far on the AB using natural scenes, faces,
and words as stimuli, it seems clear that the AB can be induced also by such kinds of
stimuli. Nonetheless, there are factors that may modulate its magnitude, postpone
its manifestation, and affect its duration. Such factors are essentially related to the
task requirement, either the detection or identification of a target, to whether the
two targets belong to different categories, to the similarity of the features composing
the categories, to the arousal in emotional terms of the stimuli, and to the perceptual
load associated to T1. A role for the elicitation and characteristics of an AB with
natural stimuli might also be played by the familiarity of the targets, the variety of
the experimental set, and the level of specificity of the category required to define
the targets, as briefly discussed in Potter et al. (2010).
5.1.2. Concurrency Benefits in AB Performance
A beneficial effect of concurrent task-irrelevant activity has been found on the AB
in works conducted by separate groups, and with several types of concurrent tasks.
Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005) found that T2 detection accuracy improved relat-
ive to a group performing a standard AB paradigm in groups whose participants
were instructed either to think of their holidays or listen to a rhythmic tune dur-
ing the RSVPs. The hypotheses provided by those authors to explain their results
were three: an effect of overall arousal induced by the free-association thoughts
about holidays and the rhythmic tune, a positive affective state, and an inherent
widening of attention up to the inclusion of T2 in selective processing, triggered by
the multi-tasking requirement itself. The same group of researchers in a successive
study Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2006) tried to elucidate the mechanisms underlying
the beneficial effect of distraction on the AB magnitude. For this purpose, they
investigated the effect on AB of a concurrent task, a concurrent stimulus, and the
voluntary lessening of concentration during the RSVP. The concurrent task was to
retain in memory, and recognise at the end of the RSVP a simple lines pattern. The
concurrent stimulus consisted in a positive affective picture briefly displayed before
the RSVP. Finally, the third experiment was to compare a group of participants
undertaking the usual AB paradigm, with another performing the same, but with
the instruction to reduce the concentration on the task during the RSVP. In all of
these conditions an improvement was obtained in T2 detection performance.Olivers
and Nieuwenhuis (2006) explained these findings with two hypotheses: the over-
investment hypothesis, and the positive-affect hypothesis, which both ascribe the
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improved T2 detection to a more diffuse attentional state. According to the over-
investment hypothesis the probability of an AB is increased when attentional re-
sources are over-invested on the RSVP. In such a case indeed, more distractors gain
access to a capacity-limited stage of processing, where they interfere with targets en-
coding and may impede their consolidation for subsequent report. On the contrary,
when attentional resources are drained by either the additional task or the explicit
instruction to reduce concentration on the detection task, fewer distractors reach
the capacity-limited processing stage, and targets are less exposed to interference.
Additionally, the positive-affect hypothesis suggests that positive affect induce an
increased cognitive flexibility, and putatively also short-term memory capacities, so
as to reduce the AB because of a more flexible orienting towards multiple and/or
novel stimuli. The most important obstacle to the reconciliation of these theories
with the bottleneck theories proposed for explaining the origin of the AB, is the
claim of AB as the consequence of a fundamental limitation in human cognition.
As we have seen in chapter 3, this notion of a fundamental cognitive limitation is
now criticised by further evidence, and eliminated in some AB accounts (see for
example Martens et al. (2006); Olivers and Meeter (2008); Taatgen et al. (2009)).
Further evidence about the decrease in AB magnitude induced by concurrent task-
irrelevant activity has been collected by several other research groups. Arend et al.
(2006) studied whether a spatial manipulation of the visual background for the
RSVP can induce an effect on AB magnitude similar to that revealed by Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis (2005). To this aim, Arend et al. (2006) introduced a task-irrelevant
background consisting of either a starfield simulation with dots illusory moving in
the depth plane away from the centre of the screen where the RSVP streamed, a
starfield moving in the opposite direction, i.e., towards the centre of the screen, or
a flickering starfield, creating a distracting background as well, but without any
illusion of motion. The results showed again an attenuation in the AB relative to
the control condition with static visual background for all the backgrounds, with a
more successful attenuation for the outward motion condition. With respect to the
study by Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005), the authors claim the demonstration that
the effect arises also from the same modality to which the AB is presented, and that
it definitely depends on decreased, and not on increased attention. In particular,
the postulated explanation for the AB attenuation is the reduction in the allocation
of attention to T1 as a result of reducing spatial attention to the location of the
RSVP.
Another means found successful at reducing the AB was the peripheral dot detection
task, added as a secondary task to the dual-target RSVP by Taatgen et al. (2009).
In this condition, along with reporting the two targets appearing in the RSVP,
participants had to respond to a red dot moving in their peripheral visual field.
Also this manipulation attenuated the AB magnitude, and the authors used this
evidence to support their model of the AB — the threaded cognition model —,
which regards the AB as the manifestation of an overexertion of cognitive control.
The secondary task with the moving dot to be detected is able to relax control.
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Finally, Lapointe-Goupil et al. (2011) investigated whether AB is attenuated by
a concurrent task demanding central resources throughout the entire RSVP. They
also examined a possible effect of decision criteria on the AB performance. The
concurrent central demanding task was a timing task, which required participants
to reproduce for its actual duration, a tone heard during the whole extent of the
RSVP. The results demonstrated the ability of such a central demanding concurrent
task to alleviate the AB, no modulation of T1 report accuracy was revealed, and a
role of shift in decision criterion was detected as participants who first performed
the single-AB condition became more liberal at identifying T2 in the concurrent-
AB condition. The authors remark these findings are in agreement with both the
over-investment hypothesis of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2006), and the threaded
cognition model of Taatgen et al. (2009). Essentially, it is a demonstration against
the inflexible structural bottleneck at the roots of the AB, and in favour of some
flexibility in attention limitations.
5.1.3. The Present Study
We undertook the present study, often mentioned as Study 2 in the following, with
two main objectives: (1) to test whether an AB deficit is elicited by a dual-target
RSVP consisting of road signs as both distractors and category-defined targets,
and (2) to test the hypothesis that an immersive 3-D VE has an effect on AB
performance compared to a 2-D display condition and to the effect of a concurrent
auditory distraction.
The prediction for objective (1) was to find an AB, likely with some difference
with respect to the classical findings observed with letters and digits. The main
predicted sources of variability in the performance are the categorical definition of
the targets with respect to distractors, and the different categories (animal and
vehicle) found in every target couples, following the considerations in Evans and
Treisman (2005), Einhäuser et al. (2007), and Potter et al. (2010). The prediction
for objective (2) was that the AB magnitude in the 3-D VE and in the condition
with a concurrent auditory distraction are different from the AB magnitude in the
2-D Desktop visualisation. A specific goal of Study 2 is to explore whether the
sign of this difference is the same for distraction-free 3-D stimulation and auditory-
distraction 2-D stimulation, which is in turn expected to show an AB alleviation
as reliably found in the studies mentioned above (Arend et al., 2006; Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis, 2005; Lapointe-Goupil et al., 2011).
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5.2. Study 2 Material and Methods
Participants
12 adult participants (2 females and 10 males between 25 and 40 years old, median
age 32 years old) participated in the study. They all had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were recruited among the personnel, PhD students, and faculty
members of the Perceptual Robotics Laboratory (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa,
Italy). All participants undertook 3 separate experimental sessions in three differ-
ent days, each including two blocks of actual experimental trials along with initial
training and practice phases to ensure the understanding of the experimental task
and procedure (see the Procedure paragraph). Every session corresponded to one
of three possible display conditions for the experimental task. Participants had to
respond to each task trial as specified below. The order of participation in the
three sessions was counterbalanced across participants, yielding 2 participants for
each of the 6 possible orders of participation in the 3 display conditions (Table 5.1).
The duration of an experimental session for a single participant was approximately
40 minutes.
Display Conditions Orders No. of Participants
“Desktop” “Distraction” “mini-CAVE” 2
“Distraction” “Desktop” “mini-CAVE” 2
“Desktop” “mini-CAVE” “Distraction” 2
“Distraction” “mini-CAVE” “Desktop” 2
“mini-CAVE” “Desktop” “Distraction” 2
“mini-CAVE” “Distraction” “Desktop” 2
Table 5.1.: Study 2 – Possible display conditions administration orders. Administration order was
counterbalanced across participants, so as to have 2 participants per display condition order.
Stimuli and Apparatus
During the experiment, except in the training phase undergone prior to the prac-
tice and actual experimental trials of each session, participants watched rapid serial
visual presentations composed of 16 non-target stimuli to be ignored (a.k.a. dis-
tractors) and 2 target stimuli (a.k.a. targets) to be later reported. The two targets,
indicated in the following as T1 and T2 based on their order of appearance in the
RSVP, were embedded in the distractors stream and might be presented at a dif-
ferent SOA from one another (lag 1, lag 3, or lag 7, with lag 1=90ms). T1 might
occupy either position 5, 6, or 7 in the series. A fixation symbol was displayed at the
beginning of each trial. All the mentioned visual stimuli were square road signs, com-
posed of two elements, a yellow background, and a black pictogram (see Figure 5.1).
The pictogram was the distinctive element of each stimulus. The complete sets of
targets and distractors, and the fixation symbol are depicted in Figure 5.1.
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The targets were drawn from two sets including 5 vehicle-targets and 5 animal-
targets. In the streams of practice and experimental trials each of the two targets
belonged to either the vehicle or animal set, and no two animals or two vehicles
were allowed in the same stream. The 16 distractors of each stream were a random
permutation of a 16-element set of directional road signs, i.e., road signs showing
only arrows pointing at different directions. The fixation symbol was a cross-road
sign.
In the training phase practised at the beginning of each session, images of all the
targets were displayed at a low pace (presentation duration of 1.5–2 s for every target
image) with or without the respective target name, according to the specifications
presented in the Procedure description.
(a) Fixation (the cross sign) and distractors stim-
uli used in the RSVP trials. The fixation was
always the first symbol in the RSVP trials,
while all the distractors appeared in every trial,
but in randomised order.
(b) Targets stimuli used in the RSVP trials,
and in the training phase. Two different tar-
gets, one from the animals set, and another
from the vehicles set, drawn randomly, and
presented in a random order, appeared in
each trial. The SOA between the two tar-
gets might equate lag 1, lag 3, or lag 7, i.e.,
no distractor, two distractors, or six distract-
ors could intervene between the presentation
of the first and second target. In the train-
ing phase, the target stimuli first appeared
one after another with their name at the bot-
tom, then the name was not presented, and
the participant had to choose the target name
from a list.
Figure 5.1.: Study 2 – Visual stimuli used as fixation, distractors, and targets in the RSVP trials.
For the “Desktop” and “Distraction” conditions, stimuli were presented on a 24-
inch LCD computer display (60Hz refresh rate). The participants’ viewing distance
was approximately 70 cm, yielding a viewing angle on the display for the bounding
yellow background of 5,2°×5,2° and for the pictogram of 2,5°×2,5°. In the “mini-
CAVE” condition, visual stimuli were presented in a 3-D VE projected in a mini-
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CAVE visualisation system (Figure 5.2). The mini-CAVE is a system composed of 4
rear-projected screens, surrounding part of a participant’s peri-personal space. One
screen is right in front of the sat participant, two screens are on the left and right
side of the participant field of view, and a fourth screen serves as a plane for the
upper limbs reaching plane of the participants. The VE is projected onto these 4
screens. Shutterglasses enabling the stereoscopic visualisation of the VE in the mini-
CAVE, and mounting the head-tracking sensors, were wore by the participant for
providing in real-time an adequate viewpoint of the 3-D scene. Participants sat at a
viewing distance of approximately 120 cm from the central rear-projected surface of
the mini-CAVE, staring at visual stimuli centrally appearing and covering a viewing
angle of 2,7°×2,7°. In the mini-CAVE the stereoscopic virtual scene represented a
motorway junction extending to the horizon in front of the viewer, with a portal-like
signpost indicating the different directions through the junction and overarching the
motorway. The experimental RSVPs and the visual stimuli of the training phase
appeared onto the portal.
Figure 5.2.: Study 2 – A participant in the “mini-CAVE” display condition.
The visualisation of the RSVPs in the training, practice, and experimental phases
of all the experimental conditions, and the rendering of the VE in the “mini-CAVE”
condition were realised in XVR (Carrozzino et al., 2005; Tecchia et al., 2010).
Procedure
Each participant took part in three experimental sessions, and each session, corres-
ponding to a different display condition, was carried out in a different day:
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• “Desktop” session: 2-D presentation on a desktop computer screen of RS-
VPs made of coloured road signs against a black screen background. No VE
and no concurrent auditory distractions were presented throughout this ses-
sion. Participants’ task in the experimental trials was to report T1 and T2 in
the order they appeared in the trial.
• “Distraction” session: 2-D presentation on a desktop computer screen of
RSVPs made of coloured road signs against a black screen background, and of
a concurrent stereophonic sound of a car engine synchronised with the RSVP
duration. No VE was presented throughout this session. Participants’ primary
task in all experimental trials was to report T1 and T2 in the order they
appeared in the trial. In addition, for one block of trials, participants also had
to indicate whether the concurrent sound was regular or not.
• “mini-CAVE” session: 3-D VE depicting a motorway junction with a portal-
like signpost (Figure 5.3) showing the RSVPs made of coloured road signs. No
concurrent auditory distraction was presented throughout this session. Par-
ticipants’ task in the experimental trials was the same as in the “Desktop”
session, i.e., to report T1 and T2 in the order they appeared in the trial.
Figure 5.3.: Study 2 – A screenshot depicting the VE used for the “mini-CAVE” display condition.
The road signs RSVP replaced the cross fixation symbol in the rightmost signpost on the portal.
Specifically, every session was organised in four successive phases as depicted in Figure 5.4:
1. A preparation phase to give instructions about the session task and proced-
ure to the participant, and familiarise her/him with the experimental equip-
ment. A brief questionnaire with demographic information and a self-rating of
previous experience with computers, video games and VEs was administered
to the participant in this phase at the first session they underwent. A sample
copy of the questionnaire is reported in section A.4.
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2. A training phase intended to ensure that the participant was aware of ap-
pearances and names of the targets to be looked for in the RSVP trials of the
subsequent phases. This phase consisted of a preliminary passive observation
of all the possible targets, each appearing for 2 seconds above its name, and of
a target-name association test during which each target appeared without its
name for 1,5 s, and the participant was asked to choose from a comprehensive
list the name of the viewed target. Besides, in the “Distraction” session also
the difference between the “regular” and the “irregular” sounds used as concur-
rent distractions in the practice and experimental trials was aurally presented
to the participant. No data were collected from participants’ responses in this
phase.
3. A practice phase consisting of a block of 9 trials, each resembling a typical
trial of the subsequent experimental phase. All the three possible lag levels
were present in the 9 trials in a random order. In the practice phase of the
“Distraction” session all trials were accompanied by the concurrent sound,
but only half of them included also the question about sound regularity after
the usual question of reporting the two targets. No data were collected from
participants’ responses in this phase.
4. An experimental phase, the only one collecting data then used in the ana-
lysis. This phase comprised two blocks, each composed of 54 trials. A 2-minute
rest interval was foreseen between the two blocks. 18 lag-1, 18 lag-3, and 18
lag-7 trials constituted a block, but in random order. Every trial consisted of
an RSVP including the 16 distractors and 2 targets. In the “Desktop” and
“mini-CAVE” sessions participants’ task was to unspeededly report, at the
end of each trial, the two targets in the order they appeared. The report-
ing consisted in the selection of the two targets names from a list containing
all possible targets names, using the arrow keys of a computer keyboard to
browse the list, and selecting the intended name with a spacebar press. T1
was selected first and T2 just after T1. In addition, only in one block of the
“Distraction” session, after reporting the two targets, participants were asked
to indicate if the sound heard in concurrence with the RSVP trial was regular
or not.
Participants received instructions about their tasks in the different phases at the
beginning of every session. In the “Distraction” session they were instructed to
attend also to the sound regularity during the trials of both experimental blocks,
since they would be required in some trials to judge about the regularity of the
heard sound.
In all sessions the participant sits in front of the computer screen or mini-CAVE
visualisation system (Figure 5.2). Responses are made by choosing with arrow keys
and the spacebar of a computer keyboard a target name from a comprehensive list
including all the 10 target names.
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Figure 5.4.: Study 2 – Prototype of an experimental session. Each session corresponded to one of
the 3 display conditions: “Desktop”, “Distraction”, and “mini-CAVE”. Demographic information
and the answers to the questionnaires about familiarity of use with computers, video games,
and virtual environments were collected once from each participant, at the starting of the first
session. Training and Practice were repeated at every session.
Measures and Data Analysis
The data collected in the experimental phase were analysed in order to answer the
following research questions:
1. Is an AB present in the tested population?
2. Is the lag-1 sparing effect present in the tested population?
3. Does the display condition makes a difference on the AB performance?
Questions 1. and 2. addressed the more general issue about whether the classical
findings arising with the AB paradigm are replicated in the present study. Instead,
question 3. is the key one of this study, addressing the differences in AB performance
possibly induced by the VE, and between the auditory distraction, and the kind of
distraction introduced by the VE.
The experimental design adopted for this study foresaw a single group of par-
ticipants, tested under experimental conditions based on two three-level factors:
“Display Condition” and “lag”. Possible levels of the former factor were “Desktop”,
“Distraction” and “mini-CAVE”, while “lag” had three possible values — 1, 3 or 7
— corresponding to the serial position of T2 relative to T1 position in the RSVP.
A further factor was the block, i.e., whether the measures of reporting performance
came from the first or second block of the session experimental phase. However, in
no case a statistically significant main effect or interaction of the “block” factor was
found on the selected outcome measures.
In order to tackle the three questions, the primary outcome measure calculated for
each participant in each experimental condition was the proportion of accurate T2
reporting trials contingent on T1 correct reporting, a.k.a. conditional accuracy, cal-
culated as the mean across each of the two blocks run in the experimental phase
of every session. The proportion was expressed as a per centum and is indicated
in the following as P(T2|T1). Also the mean T1 accuracy across trials, P(T1), has
been calculated as the percentage of T1-correct trials (including T2-incorrect tri-
als) to serve as an unimpaired accuracy benchmark. P(T2|T1) scores T2 reporting
accuracy in the attempt to ensure a common processing and memory load (based
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on T1 accomplished identification and unimpaired report). Although some previ-
ous studies used unconditional accuracy on T2 trials (see for example Potter et al.,
2002), the majority of recent studies used the P(T2|T1) measure, and also elabora-
tions about the lag-1 sparing effect were chiefly conducted on conditional T2 report
accuracy (Martin and Shapiro, 2008; Hommel and Akyürek, 2003).
A General Linear Model (GLM) was used to implement Repeated Measures ANOVA,
since each participant was scored for every level of the two experimental factors (Lag
and Display Condition). Separate analyses were performed adopting P(T2|T1), and
P(T1) as the response variable. A fully related 2-way ANOVA for “lag” and “dis-
play condition” was performed over the whole dataset. Then, in order to interpret
a slightly significant interaction effect of “display condition”×“lag” revealed by the
latter analysis, post-hoc tests based on Bonferroni and Tukey’s methods were per-
formed to analyse simple effects of the factors. For the “Distraction” session, the
factor “block” was introduced in a two-factor repeated measures ANOVA to reveal a
possible difference in reporting performance due to the explicit additional questions
about the regularity of the concurrent auditory stimulus posed in one of the two
experimental blocks of such a session.
All statistical analyses were carried out by means of two software packages, namely
MINITAB® 16 Statistical Software (Minitab Inc., State College, PA, USA) and
MATLAB® Statistics ToolboxTM (MATLAB R2011b, The MathWorks Inc., Natick,
MA, USA).
5.3. Study 2 Results
A summary of the mean proportions of correct T2|T1, and T1 trials adopted as
response variables, and calculated across participants and experimental blocks, is
reported in Table 5.2.
The GLM implementing the 2-way Lag×Display Condition repeated measures AN-
OVA carried out on the whole dataset yielded the results summarised in Table 5.3.
Is an AB present in the tested population?
The factor “Lag” has a main effect that turns out to be statistically significant (p-
value<0,001) on both T1 and T2|T1 accuracies. On the other hand, a main effect
of “Display Condition” is significant only for P(T2|T1) (p-value=0,015), indicating
that T1 accuracy is not affected by the concurrent auditory distraction, and by the
3-D presentation of the RSVPs in a stimuli-related context. The interaction “Lag x
Display Condition” is not highly significant for any of the tested response variables,
with only a weak evidence of possible significant interaction (p-value=0,068) on
P(T2|T1).
The graphical presentation of of P(T2|T1) and P(T1) as a function of lag, and across
display conditions, is depicted in Figure 5.5. T2|T1 accuracy is different relative to
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(a) Summary of means for P(T2|T1) across participants and experimental blocks.
P(T2|T1) – Cell means, Marginal means, and Grand mean
Display Condition
Lag “Desktop” “Distraction” “mini-CAVE” Marginal means
1 93,2096% 92,6382% 90,8748% 92,2409%
3 92,2777% 96,5887% 88,7476% 92,5380%
7 97,5646% 96,7739% 93,0872% 95,8086%
Marginal means 94,351% 95,334% 90,903% µG = 93, 529%
(b) Summary of means for P(T1) across participants and experimental blocks.
P(T1) – Cell means, Marginal means, and Grand mean
Display Condition
Lag “Desktop” “Distraction” “mini-CAVE” Marginal means
1 80,3241% 82,4074% 79,8611% 80,8642%
3 96,2963% 95,1389% 97,4537% 96,2963%
7 96,7593% 96,7593% 96,0648% 96,5278%
Marginal means 91,13% 91,44% 91,13% µG = 91, 2294%
Table 5.2.: Summary of the means of proportions of correct trials in the different experimental
conditions (µG denotes the grand mean) calculated across participants and experimental blocks.
Conditional accuracy of T2 report, P(T2|T1), was analysed for T2. P(T1), calculated by in-
cluding every trial with a correct T1 report independently of T2 performance, was taken as a
measure to index performance on T1. The values in these tables refer to means estimated from
the whole experimental dataset, by collapsing the two experimental blocks in a single pool, and
averaging across all participants in the experiment.
T1 accuracy at lag 3 and lag 1, while the two proportions are similar at lag 7.
Specifically, T1 accuracy at lag 1 (80,86%) is lower than T2|T1 accuracy at lag 1
(92,24%), whereas T2|T1 at lag 3 is 92,54% against a T1 accuracy basically steady
at lag 3 and lag 7 (96,3% and 96,53% respectively). This indicates a rather high
T2|T1 accuracy values, and a little AB on the overall collected dataset.
Is the lag-1 sparing effect present in the tested population?
No lag-1 sparing pattern is present on the overall dataset. Instead, there seems to
be a T2 superiority at lag 1. In order to have a graphical reference to compare
accuracies involving T2 report with T1 report rates, and because of the substantial
independence of P(T1) on the display condition, P(T1) calculated as a mean ac-
curacy across Display Conditions and against lag levels has been considered as the
term of reference with the interaction plot of P(T2|T1) as reported in Figure 5.6a.
Looking at the interaction plot of P(T2|T1) for the different display conditions
(Figure 5.6a), which is only weakly significant from a statistical point of view, the
situation somehow changes since at lag 1 T2 conditional accuracy is higher than
at lag 3 for the “Desktop”, and “mini-CAVE” conditions, and for the latter the
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P(T2|T1) P(T1)
F-ratio p-value F-ratio p-value
Lag F2,22 = 6, 3 0,007 F2,22 = 56, 32 < 0,001
Display Condition F2,22 = 5, 11 0,015 F2,22 = 0, 02 0,984
Lag×Display Condition F4,152 = 2, 23 0,068 F4,152 = 0, 83 0,509
Table 5.3.: Summary of statistical results from a Repeated Measures ANOVA on mean report
accuracies using Lag and Display Condition as fixed factors. P(T2|T1), which is the usual
conditional measure for indexing the AB magnitude, undergoes significant main effects of both
Lag and Display Condition, and a weakly significant interaction effect between Lag and Display
Condition. In contrast, only Lag has a significant main effect on P(T1), for which neither
evidence about an effect of any Display Condition, nor an interaction of the experimental factors
are found.
Figure 5.5.: Study 2 – Mean proportions of T2|T1 and T1 correct report versus T1–T2 Lag across
display conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
rates are lower. A particular shape characterises the “Distraction” condition, with
a T2 conditional accuracy at lag 3 similar to that at lag 7. Therefore, the U-
shaped characteristic of T2 conditional accuracy versus T1–T2 lag is only partially
found when considering the interaction effect of Lag and Display Condition (this is
the case for “Desktop” and “mini-CAVE” conditions), but it is completely absent
when considering the “Distraction” condition, or the whole dataset across display
conditions.
The rate of T1 correct reports at lag 1 is quite lower than at lag 3 and lag 7
(the difference in means is larger than 10% within every display condition), while
the difference between the means of P(T1) at lag 3 and lag 7 is quite small (less
than 2%): this latter finding concords with the tendency of T1 report accuracy as a
function of T1–T2 lag commonly reported in scientific literature about the AB (Dux
and Marois, 2009; Martin and Shapiro, 2008; Dell’Acqua et al., 2007).
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(a) Lag×Display Condition interaction plot of
P(T2|T1), with P(T1) means across display
conditions as a reference. Error bars indic-
ate standard errors of the mean.
(b) Percentage of reversed reports of T1
and T2 in the different display conditions.
The reversals frequencies for “Desktop” and
“mini-CAVE” are substantially overlapped.
Anyway, reversals at lag 1 are much more
than at lag 3 and lag 7. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
Figure 5.6.: Study 2 – Lag×Display Condition interaction plot, and percentage of reversed reports
of T1 and T2 in the different display conditions.
The superiority of T2 at lag 1 may be related to a further effect emerged from
this study: the higher order of reversals — i.e., reversed reports of T1 and T2 —
associated to lag-1 trials (Figure 5.6b).
Does the display condition makes a difference on the AB performance?
The size of the main effect of Display Condition on P(T2|T1) (Figure 5.7) is more
relevant when a concurrent auditory distraction is present, and when the RSVP
paradigm is delivered stereoscopically in a virtual motorway context — the 3-D VE
delivered in the mini-CAVE system. However, the sign of this effect is different
in the two conditions, improving P(T2|T1) accuracy in the “Distraction” condi-
tion (as expected based on the beneficial effects documented in past experiments),
while deteriorating it in the “mini-CAVE” condition. Specifically, the mean accur-
acy P(T2|T1) is maximum when there is an auditory distraction concurrent to the
RSVP (95,334%), and minimum when the dual-target task is to be accomplished
in the mini-CAVE visualisation system (90,996%). The size of the main effect for
the “Desktop” display condition is smaller. Applying post hoc tests to the data
for P(T2|T1), Bonferroni and Tukey’s pairwise comparisons agree as they find a
significant difference of the “mini-CAVE” condition from the others (adjusted p-
value<0,004). However, the difference between “Distraction” and “Desktop” mean
conditional accuracies as measured by P(T2|T1) is not significant. As for the post
hoc analysis on the Lag factor, the results show a significant difference of P(T2|T1)
at lag 7 (adjusted p-value<0,007), but without statistical evidence inferring a sig-
nificant difference between the means of P(T2|T1) at lag 1 and lag 3. This confirms
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that no lag-1 sparing is present, except if we consider an interaction of the experi-
mental factors.
Figure 5.7.: Study 2 – Main effect of Display Condition on mean T2|T1 report accuracy. Error
bars indicate standard errors of the means.
For the distraction session further aspects had to be investigated. On one side
whether there was actually a beneficial effect of the auditory distraction on AB
performance with respect to the other display conditions. On the other side, whether
there is a different performance in terms of report accuracy under the “Distraction”
condition when, beside the instruction to participants of listening to the concurrent
sound for detecting its regularity, also the explicit question about sound regularity is
made after the usual questions to report T1 and T2. Concerning the latter issue, an
analysis conducted by adding a “block type” factor to a repeated measures ANOVA
on Lag effect within the “Distraction” sessions revealed no significant difference
(p-value=0,339) between the block where participants were only instructed to pay
attention to the concurrent sound distraction, and the block where, at the end of the
trials, they were also explicitly asked about sound regularity. In this case the result
of the repeated measures ANOVA is that there is a main effect of lag on P(T2|T1)
(p-value=0,023), but the significant difference is only between the accuracy value
at lag 1 and those at lag 3 and lag 7. No significant difference was found between
P(T2|T1) at lag 3 and at lag 7. However, as depicted in Figure 5.8 it seems in this
session no AB has been arisen since all T2|T1 accuracy values are over 90%, and
T1 correct report proportion is very close to the conditional accuracy also at lag 3.
It is like no impairment affected T2 conditional upon T1 correct reports at any lag,
while at lag 1 order reversals impaired T1 reports as found in the other display
conditions. This seems a further evidence of the beneficial effect of the concurrent
auditory distraction on the 2-D RSVP dual-target task.
115
Chapter 5 AB with Road Signs: an Exploration in Virtual Environments
Figure 5.8.: Study 2 – Mean proportions of correct reports versus Lag levels within the “Distrac-
tion” display condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
5.4. Study 2 Discussion
The first objective of Study 2 was to investigate the impact on AB of using road
signs in an RSVP, at a rate — one visual item every 90ms — that with both simpler
stimuli (Dux and Marois, 2009), and with pictures (Einhäuser et al., 2007), already
proved to cause an AB.
The AB consists of a decrease in T2 report accuracy relative to T1 report accuracy
when the two targets appear at a short temporal separation from one another. Such
a fall then recovers for longer lags, that is when T2 appears after T1 identification
is consolidated. The extent of the temporal window where T2 accuracy is impaired,
and the depth of the impairment depend upon stimuli characteristics such as letters
and digits versus natural pictures, or same-category versus different-category targets,
on similarities between targets and distractors, and on possible cuing effects priming
the second target. A special characteristic accompanying AB is lag-1 sparing, a
robust effect that is often, although not always found, when T1 and T2 appear
consecutively, or anyway within 100ms–150ms from one another. Visser et al. (1999)
defined the lag-1 sparing based on the difference in T2 report accuracy between
lag 1 and the lag when T2 report accuracy is minimal (typically at lag 3): when
this difference exceeds 5% then a lag-1 sparing is there. More liberal definitions
of AB have been considered too, as reported in Martin and Shapiro (2008), as well
as more conservative ones (Dell’Acqua et al., 2007). Lag-1 sparing usually occurs
if some requirements are met (Visser et al., 1999): T1 and T2 must appear in the
same spatial location, their SOA must fall within a temporal integration window,
and they need not require an attentional set switch between one another. Most of
the manifested AB effects, and especially lag-1 sparing, assume that T2 accuracy is
calculated conditionally upon T1 correct report (T2|T1 accuracy).
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Our experiment considered three possible values for T1–T2 SOA (lag 1, lag 3, and
lag 7, i.e., 90ms, 270ms, and 630ms) applied in three different display conditions
(2-D display on a computer desktop, 2-D display on a computer desktop with a
concurrent auditory distraction, and presentation in a 3-D VE meaningfully contex-
tualising the RSVP of road signs). The research questions guiding the analyses of
the collected data towards the first objective were those about the capability of the
experiment to cause an AB, and in case to show a lag-1 sparing pattern.
In terms of reduced T2|T1 accuracy our experiment found a statistically significant
decrease at lag 1 and lag 3 compared to lag 7 across display conditions. The mag-
nitude of this AB was not as large as found in previous studies using pictures and
line drawings, and showed no lag-1 sparing effect. The small magnitude of the AB
could be related to the reduced number of possible targets to be identified, which
might have facilitated the formation of short-cut strategies by the participants, and
to the reporting modality, because participants had to choose the two targets from
a 10-item list, and not to “freely” report them as it is common in other experiments
addressing the AB.
The fact that no lag-1 sparing was observed is in line with the results of the study
by Hommel and Akyürek (2003), which differentiated the interpretation of lag-1
sparing between the condition when the task is to report T1 and T2 order along
with the targets identities, and when the task is to report targets identities regard-
less their order of appearance. They found that when also targets order had to be
correctly reported for having a trial response counted as correct, the lag-1 sparing
disappeared or was very less evident. This is the case for the results of our experi-
ment, for which both correct identities, and correct order of T1 and T2 should be
reported to accomplish a correct trial. Another related finding is shared with Hom-
mel and Akyürek (2003) (and also with Potter et al., 2002 and Dell’Acqua et al.,
2007): there is a relevant rate of order reversals at lag 1, which determine a T1
accuracy reduction (down to approximately 80%). The effect is compatible with
two-stage accounts (Chun and Potter, 1995; Potter et al., 2002), and with the the
eSTST model (Wyble et al., 2009). The order reversals may in fact depend from
an integration of T1 and T2 in the same attentional episode, yet at the expense
of episodic information. Thus, T2 superiority at lag 1 likely depends on both a
trade-off with T1 due to integration of the two in the same attentional episode, and
on the fact that T2 either wins the competition with T1 for attentional resources,
as predicted by the model of Potter et al. (2002), or it benefits of the transient
attention response triggered by T1, as postulated in the two-stage account by Chun
and Potter (1995). Also the model proposed in Evans and Treisman (2005) for ex-
plaining rapid processing of natural scenes may explain why lag-1 sparing was not
observed: T1 and T2 features are both recognised in a first parallel stage, but the
serial processing needed for identification determines the AB even at lag 1. The lat-
ter explanation is, however, rather independent of the higher rate of order reversals
found at lag 1, and appears less likely also because no direct measure of accuracy
at lag 1 was taken in the series of experiments by Evans and Treisman (2005).
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We speculate that the general high T2|T1 report accuracy emerged from our data
might also be related to the generally high frequency of use of computers made by
the population participating in the present study, and on the experience as video-
gamers of a relevant group of them. In fact, an attenuation in the AB had been
previously shown in expert video-gamers compared to a control group naïve at us-
ing video games (Green et al., 2003). Actually, the participants in our experiment
took a simple questionnaire during the preparation phase of the first experimental
session they underwent. The questionnaire (see section A.4) included questions in
order to self-rate on a 5-point scale the familiarity of the participant with three
media: personal computers, video games, and virtual environments. The results are
illustrated by the chart in Figure 5.9. Performing a GLM implementing a repeated
measures ANOVA with the Participants’ random factor nested within the “Familiar-
ity with video games use” fixed factor based on the collected self-rates, it emerged a
significant effect of the latter factor on the T2|T1 accuracy, but no significant inter-
action with the “Lag” factor was found. Specifically, the familiarity-factor had two
Figure 5.9.: Study 2 – Self-rating of participants’ familiarity with computers, video games, and
virtual environments. The rates were made on a 5-point scale ranging between 1–no experience,
and 5–assiduous use. Questions are reported in section A.4.
levels, either “High” (self-rate≥3) or “Low”, and its main effect on T2|T1 accuracy
was statistically significant (p-value=0,008), with the mean T2|T1 accuracy across
lags and display conditions for participants having an “High” familiarity with video
games larger than that of those having a “Low” familiarity (96,12% vs 90,97%).
As for the second objective of the present study, it chiefly pointed to the effect on AB
of an immersive 3-D VE providing a meaningful context for the stimuli presented
in the RSVP — the “mini-CAVE” display condition. The effect has been compared
to the AB performance in a classical 2-D display condition, and when an auditory
distraction is delivered concurrently to the 2-D display condition. The results to
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discuss in this case are mainly those related to the third guiding research question,
that is whether the display condition makes a difference on the AB performance.
Actually, the AB was present in the “mini-CAVE” condition, and it showed the low-
est T2 conditional accuracy, with a difference that was statistically significant from
both the “Desktop” and the “Distraction” conditions. This might depend on the
context-relatedness of the visual stimuli (road signs presented at a virtual motorway
junction), on perceptual issues connected to the VE display (e.g., stereoscopy), or
on both of these aspects. It is difficult to isolate the different contributions, but
a putative role of the virtual scene could be expected to improve T2|T1 accuracy,
as previously found with visual background manipulations by Arend et al. (2006).
Furthermore, in the “Distraction” condition of the present experiment, a substantial
immunity to the AB — even of little magnitude as found in the other display con-
ditions — has been revealed by analysing the simple effect of lag. And this seems
in line with the findings and hypothetical explanations of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis
(2006) for beneficial effects of distraction at alleviating the AB magnitude. Follow-
ing these considerations, the expectation would have been to observe a less profound
dip of the T2|T1 curve with respect to those in the 2-D, less immersive conditions,
but this is not the case. In addition to perceptual issues of the stereoscopic display
and head tracking, a possible explanation is related to the involvement compon-
ent that might accompany more immersive virtual experiences. Involvement and
absorption are terms used in studies about what cognitive factors and personality
traits contribute to determine the sense of presence in VEs, e.g., in the form of
immersive tendency (Wallach et al., 2010; Sas and O’Hare, 2003; Takatalo et al.,
2008). There is empirical evidence that experience of an immersive VE is affected
by immersive tendency, a personality trait affecting the level of absorption in the
VE. Absorption is said to require a total attention, fully open to experience, but
also fully concentrated (Sas and O’Hare, 2003). In this framework, our participants’
absorption in the immersive “mini-CAVE” VE could correspond to either a more
diffuse, or an heightened-focused attention allocation. In the former case a diffuse
state compatible with the over-investment hypothesis of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis
(2006) would have predicted a reduced AB magnitude, differently for what actually
found in our “mini-CAVE” condition. The same absorption construct interpreted as
an heightened focused attention, would instead correspond to an over-investment of
resources, and predict what is actually found, i.e., a deteriorated AB performance
compared to 2-D, less immersive conditions.
Our preference goes to the considerations that in this experiment the “mini-CAVE”
condition reduces T2|T1 accuracy due to perceptual issues related to stereoscopy,
although this requires to be demonstrated with further experiments. In fact, al-
though immersive, the interaction of the participant with the VE seemed not so
engaging to trigger a major contribution of subjective immersive tendencies on the
AB task accomplishment. Anyway, an AB is present when the RSVP is presented
in the VE, and the effect of the virtual scene is not similar to that of a moving 2-D
background, or of a concurrent auditory distraction. On the contrary, the auditory
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distraction consisting of a sound engine being either idle or accelerated, resulted in
a suppression of the AB, which was actually not very profound in the other display
conditions.
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The present dissertation stemmed from a research work aimed at investigating the
use of virtual environments in cognitive sciences, but at the interface with medi-
cine. The stated objectives were essentially two. Firstly, to outline a framework for
situating applications of VEs to cognitive sciences, by starting from how VEs are
applied for the assessment and therapy of neurological and mental disorders, and
from what are the grounds for this kind of applications. Secondly, to provide an em-
pirical case study illustrative of the potential of VEs for studying specific aspects of
cognitive processes, not necessarily in the medical domain. The two objectives have
been pursued by individuating specific sets of research questions, and undertaking
them with two different approaches, one directed towards the first objective, and
another towards the second. The conclusions drawn are summarised in the following
sections.
6.1. A Framework for Virtual Environments
Applications to Cognitive Sciences
In order to delineate a framework situating the applications of VEs to cognitive
sciences, the approach has been to consider medical applications, and to formulate
three guiding questions:
• What are the grounds underpinning the applications of VEs for the assessment
and therapy of neurological and mental disorders?
• How are VEs applied for the assessment and therapy of neurological and mental
disorders?
• Is it possible to extend the framework hosting the applications for the assess-
ment and therapy of neurological and mental disorders to all the applications
of VEs to cognitive sciences?
These questions are entangled, and their answers emerged in parallel in the course of
the work. VEs have been applied to diverse medical domains, namely for educational
purposes, for surgery and diagnostics, for medical rehabilitation (including neurore-
habilitation, and general rehabilitation), and for treating mental disorders. The
applications of VEs to assess neuropsychological disorders, and help cognitive func-
tion(s) rehabilitation fall under the neurorehabilitation heading (or the more broad
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category of virtual rehabilitation), whereas mental disorders cover applications of
VEs to psychotherapy and psychiatry. The applications to these two sub-categories,
i.e., neurorehabilitation and mental disorders, share the emphasis on the interact-
ive opportunities offered by VEs, in contrast to simulation opportunities which are
more central for the remaining categories of VE applications to medicine. This con-
sideration has led to the definition of interaction-centred VEs as a master category
for applications of VEs to cognitive sciences from the medical point of view (Riva,
2006).
The criterion underlying the distinction between interaction-centred applications
and simulation-centred applications has the advantage to be less dependent on the
application domain, and to highlight the focus of how and why VEs are used in
a certain context. In the case of the interaction-centred applications considered
in this thesis the why has been summarised in a number of prerogatives making
VEs potentially valuable for applications to cognitive assessment and rehabilitation,
and to psychotherapy and psychiatry. Concerning the how, sub-categories for such
interaction-centred applications have been proposed, and supported with examples
drawn from the scientific literature. Finally, the separate categorisations have been
unified in a single framework, including also non-medical applications, although
these have been only briefly mentioned.
Altogether, the main conclusions related to the directive research questions may be
restated as follows.
What are the grounds underpinning the applications of VEs for the as-
sessment and therapy of neurological and mental disorders?
The prerogatives have been much discussed and analysed for applications to neuro-
psychological assessment and cognitive rehabilitation, but they are substantially
founding also applications to motor rehabilitation, and for the study of neuroscience,
and cognitive sciences in general. Such prerogatives are:
• Environmental enrichment
• Improved ecological validity
• Systematic and controlled delivery of 3-D multimodal stimuli
• Immediate multimodal feedback
• Cueing stimuli to guide successful performance
• Complete digital performance capture
• Safety testing and training environments
How are VEs applied for the assessment and therapy of neurological and
mental disorders?
The categorisations adopted to describe and discuss how VEs have been applied are
reported in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4.
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As for neuropsychological assessment (NA) and cognitive rehabilitation (CR), VEs
have been proposed to address impairments of attention, memory, spatial abilities,
executive functions, and language. Generally, all the applications yielded positive
results when evaluated, demonstrating that the potential of VEs for NA and CR is
concrete. A large number of VEs applications are oriented to assessment, because
the generalisation of psychometric assessment outcomes from the laboratory setting
to daily life is a crucial issue of NA. Actually, studies on psychometric tests in VE
usually correlated with standard tests, and, when the point has been addressed, also
with functioning in the real-world. This is a confirmation that environmental en-
richment and improved ecological validity are likely the most important prerogatives
of VEs for applications to NA. Also CR applications yielded positive results, and
relied on environmental enrichment, but also much on the other prerogatives. How-
ever, some limitations are still affecting these applications: first, a lack of large-scale
studies comparing the effect of VEs with those of standard assessment procedures
and rehabilitation protocols, and a lack of standardisation of VR-based protocols;
second, the requirement of special competences for handling the VR equipment,
both during the intervention itself, and for preparing the VR-based tasks. The
first limitation may be probably overcome with the time, and by counteracting the
second limitation. This can be achieved by means of two concurrent actions: to
promote the establishment of multidisciplinary teams involving clinicians, engin-
eers, and computer scientists, that cooperate since the design of the VE, through its
development and validation, and during its operating life; and to take into consid-
eration since the design phase the target population of the VE, in terms of patients,
and also the needs of the therapists, enabling them to dynamically operate on the
objects and behaviours of a VE at a high abstraction level, and easily adapt the
task to the patient’s specific needs and real-time performance.
Considering the specific areas of application in NA and CR, language disorders seem
to have been the less attractive for VEs applications, likely because contexts as
executive dysfunctions, and memory impairments more evidently and directly took
advantage from the impact of ecologically valid environments. An area apparently
less undertaken is that of attention, probably because it is well covered by non-VR-
based assessment tests, and can be addressed as part of VEs applications addressing
more complex impairments, as those descending from executive dysfunctions.
The applications in psychotherapy seem to be somewhat more advanced, at least for
the application of Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy for the treatment of anxiety
disorders. This is due to the longer history of this kind of applications, with a
greater number of controlled studies carried out to compare them with standard
psychotherapies. Moreover, the psychological connotation of the applications for
mental disorders is relevant also for a more general and basic research about how
VR can affect body perception and representation, the sense of self, and the sense of
agency. Another aspect standing out in applications for mental disorders is the resort
to virtual characters. This helps to ground and spread applications promoting social
interaction, and social inclusion, which are now primary goals for assisting significant
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portions of the ageing population, and the increasing number of youngsters on the
autism spectrum disorder.
Lastly, a general remark emerging from the discussions of the different VEs applic-
ations, independently of whether they address NA and CR, or mental disorders, is
that they are not intended and suitable to replace the current tools. Rather, they
deploy themselves as valuable adjuncts which solve limitations of current stand-
ard interventions, and offer additional capabilities not conceivable with mainstream
paradigms.
Is it possible to extend the framework hosting the applications for the
assessment and therapy of neurological and mental disorders to all the
applications of VEs to cognitive sciences?
The applications of VEs to cognitive neuroscience, and not directed to medical con-
ditions focus on spatial cognition and navigation, and, more recently, on the ability
of VR to induce body-transfer illusions. This scope of application will probably ex-
pand because VR systems are becoming compatible with neuroimaging techniques,
and because of the advances in brain-computer interfaces. Indeed, the latter may
be used to establish a direct connection between the nervous system and a VE.
This may have several applications, and a major one is again in rehabilitation and
training, for instance for patients who have to learn the control of prostheses, or
for patients as quadriplegics, who may control the real environment through actions
effected on virtual objects by using their nervous signals.
At any event, the applications of VEs to medical conditions associated to cognitive
impairments are more numerous than the applications to non-medical conditions,
and, more important, the applications to NA, CR, and mental disorder essentially
encompass all the prerogatives of VEs useful for cognitive science and beyond. Con-
sequently, a single framework has been proposed, as in Figure 2.5.
An observation regarding how a typology of VEs applications may be transversal
to the proposed frameworks is prompted by serious games, i.e., 3-D video games,
often including typical VR technologies as those for motion capture and stereoscopic
vision. This sort of video games is spreading as a means to implement rehabilitation
exercises as game-like tasks. The aim is to increase patient’s motivation, engage-
ment, and attention in the rehabilitation process. Both sensorimotor training and
cognitive rehabilitation may be addressed with serious games applications, even in
the same environment. And also psychotherapy, as for impulse-related disorders,
has been a target for the application of serious games. Therefore, serious games
are a good example of how VEs applications for cognitive science, in this case in
the medical field, may generalise to several domains as identified in the proposed
frameworks.
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6.2. The Empirical Studies of Temporal Attention
Attention, among the different cognitive domains included in the proposed frame-
work, plays a crucial role. Indeed, it affects multiple perceptual and cognitive opera-
tions, and is a fundamental requirement for effectively dealing with the information
coming from the environment, and use them to consistently behave in view of spe-
cific goals. Furthermore, the time course of attention, in terms of how it is allocated
at the level of the human information processing flow, is an issue which has attracted
a comparatively little interest in association to VEs. These were the prime motives
for the two empirical studies undertaken and presented in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
The research questions taken on about attention were indeed split in two experi-
mental studies. Study 1 did not involve VEs, and investigated whether the distri-
bution of attentional resources as indexed by the AB performance could be changed
following a 7-week Tibetan Yoga training undertook by habitual meditators. The
conclusions of the study were a confirmation of the fact that a relatively short train-
ing involving meditation, and specifically a mindfulness meditation style as in Tsa
Lung Tibetan Yoga is capable of improving the AB performance, reflecting a more
efficient allocation of attentional resources over time. The different amounts of med-
itation practised by participants in the 4 weeks prior to the training start did not
statistically affect their baseline performance in the AB task. Possible confounding
factors in this experiment were the lack of a control group, and the fact that not
all the participants practised the same exact amount of meditation and physical
exercise during training. In fact, Tibetan Yoga is different with respect to pure
mental training in that a mild physical exercise associated with visual imagery is a
fundamental part of it, along with mindfulness meditation. The different amounts
of practice by the participants enabled to test whether the contributions to AB
alleviation of the mindfulness meditation component, and of the physical exercise
component were significantly different. However, it was not possible with a general
regression to find a statistically significant contribution of either of the two terms,
average amount of hours of physical exercise per week, and average amount of hours
of mindfulness meditation per week during the 7-week training, on the mean T2|T1
report accuracy.
A future elaboration of Study 1 could be to reconsider the experimental design for
distinguishing the contribution of the body and mind components of the training,
using a larger number of participants, and a control group.
Study 2 introduced a VE in the experiment, and attempted to answer two questions:
whether rapid visual stimuli which are not as simple as letters or numbers, and which
may be meaningfully contextualised in a VE, elicit an AB with similar characteristics
as that arisen with abstract and simple visual stimuli; and whether there is an effect
of the VE on the AB magnitude, similar to that of an auditory distraction. Road
signs were used as visual stimuli for assessing the AB magnitude, and they were
presented on a 3-D virtual motorway junction to have them in a meaningful context.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
The AB magnitude measured as the difference between T2|T1 mean report accuracy
at lag 3 and lag 7 was very little, and no lag-1 sparing was found. The magnitude of
the AB may be relevantly affected by the composition of the group of participants,
who were all assiduous computer users, with a number of them being frequent video
game players. The latter aspect has been already demonstrated as a factor im-
proving the AB performance (Green et al., 2003). The absence of a lag-1 sparing
effect might depend on the fact that also the order of reporting T1 and T2 had
to be right for counting the trial in the correct reports. Besides, the number of
possible targets, although belonging to two different categories, was small (5 anim-
als and 5 vehicles), and reporting was provided by selecting the responses from a
comprehensive multiple-options list.
The effect of the VE was not beneficial, i.e., it did not alleviate the AB, as is
the case for an auditory distraction (a finding at least partially replicated in the
present experiment, albeit the AB “baseline level” to be benefited was already a
high performance). Specifically, the AB magnitude in the immersive 3-D VE, the
“mini-CAVE” condition, was lower than both the 2-D “Desktop” condition, and
the 2-D “Distraction” condition. No specific measures of immersive tendency of
the participants were made, and this difference in personality traits might actually
affect the performance in the VE. Nonetheless, given the limited interaction with the
immersive VE required in the present experiment, it is more likely that perceptual
issues were the reasons for a stronger AB in the “mini-CAVE” system. This aspect
should be further studied in an experiment that uses a participant group without
biases related to previous experience with video games and VEs, including a measure
of immersive tendency of the participants, taking into account more in details the
perceptual properties of the VE display system, and trying to devise a task for
the AB that implies more interaction with the VE. This latter point is important,
because it would be of significant help to elicit a sense of presence in the VE, and the
consequent effects at the psychological and sensorimotor levels in the participants.
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A. Appendixes
A.1. Tibetan Yoga (Tsa Lung) Exercises Instructions
The instructions for Tsa Lung exercises included in the 7-week training programme
whose effects were tested in Study 1 mentioned the following main points (adapted
from a guide prepared by Dr. Rafael Ferrer Estrems, who trained the participants
at the Institute Lama Tzong Khapa in Pomaia, Italy).
Brief Guide on Tsa Lung Exercises
• 5 Tsa Lung exercises. Each performed 5 times.
• They can be used both as a preliminary to other meditation practice, and
as a primary practice for enhancing the experience of open awareness in
day-to-day life.
• Take a comfortable posture. The most important is to have the spine
straight.
• Gently hold the breathing for the whole duration of each exercise.
• 2-phase inhalation: (1) inhale, then hold the breath; (2) re-inhale to expand
further the chest; then, while holding, perform the exercise.
• Exercise 1: attention on the throat. Imagine your breath held at the throat
level, and concentrate on that point. Head turns with no neck movements
are requested.
• Exercise 2: attention on the chest. Lift and rotation of the arms. Hand
closure/opening. Chest rotation with no shoulders movement.
• Exercise 3: attention to a point between the perineum and abdomen. Peri-
neum tension. Abdomen rotation and expansion. Imagine the air encap-
sulated between perineum and diaphragm.
• Exercise 4: attention to no specific point. Arms and hands movements to
vigorously rubbing down the head, face, shoulders, arms, chest, back, and
legs. Stretch an arm as if holding a bow, and imagine you are shooting an
arrow in the direction of your gaze.
• Exercise 5: attention to the perineum. Movements of the legs crossed at
the ankles levels, and rotation of the pelvis.
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A.2 Instructions for Participants in Study 1 Appendixes
A.2. Instructions for Participants in Study 1
Below is reported the text that was used by the experimenter in Study 1 to provide
instructions to the participants before they took part in the experiment session (both
prior to and after the 7-week Tibetan Yoga training). Details might be rephrased
by the experimenter upon request from the participant.
Instructions for the Attentional Blink Experiment
These are the instructions for the subjects participating in the “attentional blink”
experiment.
The objective of the experiment is to assess how an individual manage her/his
own attentional resources over time, when confronted with visual targets em-
bedded in a stream of visual distractors.
The Participant is asked to comfortably sit in front of a computer screen, at
a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm, and to look at the centre of the
screen, where different messages and symbols will appear throughout the whole
experiment.
The whole experiment takes less than 30 minutes and is composed of multiple
trials, organized in 3 blocks.
• Each trial starts with a fixation cross-hair located at the centre of the
screen, followed by a stream of symbols rapidly appearing at the centre of
the screen one after another.
• The fixation cross-hair aim is to indicate the point of the screen where the
Subject has to look, and it disappears as soon as a stream starts.
• The stream is composed of alphabetic letters and two different single-digit
numbers.
• These two numbers are the targets the Subject has to look for and remem-
ber through each trial.
• The two numbers are separated by two or more letters.
• The letters are not important, the Subject does not have to remember
them.
• In each trial, the first digit is called “the FIRST number”, while the second
digit is called “the SECOND number”.
Thus, at the end of each trial, two questions are posed to the Participant:
1. “What was the FIRST number?”
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2. “What was the SECOND number?”
• When question 1) appears on the screen, the Participant should type on
the keypad of the computer keyboard in front of her/him the first number
she/he saw during the trial.
– If he did not see any number, the Participant should type 0.
– Instead, if the Participant saw a number, but is not sure about which
number it was the recommendation is to guess that number and type
it.
• When question 2) appears on the screen, the Participant should type on the
keypad of the computer keyboard in front of her/him the second number
she/he saw during the trial.
– If he did not see it, the Participant should type 0.
– Instead, if the Participant saw a number, but is not sure about which
number it was the recommendation is to guess that number and type
it.
There is no time constraint when responding to the two questions at the end of
each trial.
As soon as the Participant has typed the second number (i.e., as she/he has
answered to question 2), a new trial begins with a fixation cross-hair at the
screen centre.
Overall, the Participant will complete 152 trials, subdivided into 3 blocks:
• Block No.1 is a “Practice Block”, and is intended for the Participant
to become familiar with the experimental set-up and its requirements. The
Practice Block comprises 8 consecutive trials: Participant’s responses
to such trials will not be included in the successive analysis process. Only
during the Practice Block after the Participant’s response to each question
the number actually appeared during the trial (i.e., the correct answer)
will be presented to the Participant as a feedback. Such a feedback will
not be present during the successive experimental blocks.
• The remaining 2 blocks are called “Experimental Blocks” and form
the actual experiment. Each of the Experimental Blocks consists of 72
trials, and the Participant’s responses to such trials will be collected and
analysed for getting information on the attention processing skills of the
Participant.
• Between two consecutive experimental blocks, the Participant should take
a two-minute rest. The experimenter will press a key to let the successive
block to start.
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At the beginning, before starting the Practice Block, the Participant will have to
provide the experimenter with some information (ID, age and problems with vis-
ion if any). The experimenter will collect such data that will remain anonymous
in possible future publications.
You may refer to the sketch below for a graphic summary of the experiment
procedure (Figure A.1).
Figure A.1.: Sketch of Study 1 experimental procedure included in instructions for participants.
The original caption wrote: “Sketch of the overall experimental procedure and of a single trial
(the depicted sequence is for illustrative purpose only)”.
A.3. Instructions for Participants in Study 2
Below is reported the text that participants in Study 2 were asked to read before
taking part in the experiment. Details about the specific session were provided in
addition by the experimenter upon request from the participant. An equivalent
version of these instructions written in Italian was used for the Italian-speaking
participants.
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Instructions for the Attentional Blink Experimental Sessions
3 experimental sessions are foreseen for each participant. Each session should
be undertaken in a different day. The 3 sessions are referred to as: “Desktop”,
Distraction”, and “mini-CAVE”. The first 2 sessions are run by watching to
a computer screen and using a keyboard to provide responses, while in the
“mini-cave” session the visualization is provided by an immersive 3D virtual
environment, and the responses are still delivered through a keyboard. In every
session, the participant is asked to watch a sequence of visual stimuli appearing
all at the same spatial location on the visual display. The participant has to
look for some special stimuli, that we refer to as targets, and that s-/he is asked
to remember and later report in the correct order as they appeared in the just
finished sequence. All the visual elements, included targets, are road signs. The
targets are road signs depicting animals and vehicles, while the other road signs
only show arrows. The sequences differ in the type of targets they include, and
in the temporal separation between their onsets on the visual display during
each sequence; in addition, in the “Distraction” session, the sequences also dif-
fer about whether a concurrent sound is either regular, or deviant during the
sequences visualization. The sound will be that of an idle car engine, as wait-
ing in front of a traffic light. All the required responses are delivered by the
participant by means of a computer keyboard. The participant is instructed to
provide unspeeded responses, and to guess the response anyway when not sure
of it. No collection of the participant’s response time is performed. The “mini-
CAVE” session is substantially identical to the “Desktop” session, except for the
use in the former of an immersive virtual environment representing a motorway
for the presentation of the visual stimuli. During one of the blocks of trials in
the “Distraction” session the participant is additionally asked to recognize if a
sound playing concurrently with the visual sequence is regular or not, based on
the definition of regular and deviant sounds learned in a training phase. Each
session consists of 3 phases:
• A training phase, during which the participant first observes and learns
the names of the target stimuli s-/he will have to look for in the sequences
of the subsequent phases, and then takes a test to check if s-/he learned
those target names.
• A practice phase, during which the participant practices a few sample
trials, similar to those that will constitute the actual experiment in the
next experimental phase.
• An experimental phase, where participants responses to 2 blocks of trials
are collected. These 2 blocks are separated by a rest interval lasting 2
minutes.
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Messages to warn participants about the phase starting, and to ask participants’
input will always appear on the screen at appropriate moments.
A.4. Questionnaire for Participants in Study 2
Below is reported the questionnaire administered to the participants in the Study 2
experiment prior to starting their first session.
Attentional Blink in Virtual Environments
• Session info:
• Date/Data:
• Participant ID / ID Partecipante:
• Sex/Sesso:  F  M
• Age/Età:
• Vision/Vista:  Lenses or spectacles/Lenti o occhiali da vista?
1. Rate the intensity of your previous experience at using the computer (from
1 – No experience, to 5 – Assiduous use ) / Quantifica la tua esperienza
pregressa nell’uso del computer (da 1 – Nessuna esperienza a 5 – Assiduo
utilizzo)
1  2  3  4  5 
2. Rate the intensity of your previous experience with video games (from 1
– No experience, to 5 – Assiduous use ) / Quantifica la tua esperienza
pregressa nell’uso di video games (da 1 – Nessuna esperienza a 5 – Assiduo
utilizzo)
1  2  3  4  5 
3. Rate the intensity of your previous experience with virtual environments
(from 1 – No experience, to 5 – Assiduous use ) / Quantifica la tua esperi-
enza pregressa come utente di ambienti virtuali (da 1 – Nessuna esperienza
a 5 – Assiduo utilizzo)
1  2  3  4  5 
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3-D Three-Dimensional
AB Attentional Blink
ADHD Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
ANT Attention Network Test
AR Augmented Reality
CAD Computer-Aided Design
CAVE CAVE Automatic Virtual Environment
CBT Cognitive Behavioural Therapy
CR Cognitive Rehabilitation
CT Computed Tomography
EEG Electroencephalogram
ERP Event-Related Potentials
eSTST Episodic Simultaneous Type/Serial Token
FA Focused Attention meditation
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
GLM General Linear Model
HMD Head-Mounted Display
hrs hours
ISI Inter-Stimulus Interval
LC Locus coeruleus
MBSR Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction
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Nomenclature
MIS Minimally Invasive Surgery
MR Magnetic Resonance
ms milliseconds
NA Neuropsychological Assessment
OCD Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
OM Open Monitoring meditation
PET Positron Emission Tomography
PI Place Illusion
PRCS Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
PRP Psychological Refractory Period
Psi Plausibility Illusion
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RSVP Rapid Serial Visual Presentation
SAD Social Anxiety Disorder
SC Sensorimotor Contingency
SOA Stimulus Onset Asynchrony
STM Short-Term Memory
T1 First target stimulus appearing in a stream of non-target stimuli
T2 Second target stimulus appearing in a stream of non-target stimuli
TBI Traumatic Brain Injury
TLC Temporary Loss of Control
TOA Target Onset Asynchrony
VE Virtual Environment
VR Virtual Reality
VRET Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy
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Nomenclature
VSTM Visual Short-Term Memory
WCST Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
WM Working Memory
µG Grand mean of a sample population
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